WHERE WE ARE
In Part 21 of this series, I argued that the cases for the resurrection of Jesus made by Peter Kreeft, Josh McDowell, and William Craig are all Dead On Arrival because all three of these Christian apologists present cases that are based on a false dilemma, and thus their cases commit the Either/Or Fallacy.
Why is this the so? For one thing, this is a very common fallacy, which indicates that it is a natural temptation to simplify our options to just two or three. Many of us feel a bit uneasy when we walk through the cereal section of a supermarket and are confronted with two dozen different kinds of cereal to buy. We feel more comfortable when there are just a handful of options to choose from.
A LACK OF IMAGINATION?
I think another problem contributing to the illogical thinking of these three Christian apologists is that they fail to exercise any imagination when thinking about this issue. People often accept a false dilemma because they fail to make any effort to think about the question, "What are ALL of the relevant options in this case?" Just a little bit of effort, just a little bit of imagination, and one can come up with many alternatives to the following false dilemma:
EITHER there is a natural hypothesis that provides a plausible explanation of the empty tomb, OR the Resurrection Hypothesis is correct.
One might well accuse Kreeft, McDowell, and Craig of lacking an imagination. However, I suspect that the problem is a bit more complicated than just a lack of imagination.
Philosophy and law both require one to think critically and to reason logically, and in order to do so, one MUST exercise some imagination. Philosophers and law students (Kreeft and Craig are philosophers, and McDowell studied law) need to be able to think of counterexamples to broad generalizations (e.g., All Xs are Ys), and to think of counterexamples to false dilemmas (e.g., EITHER P is the case OR Q is the case). Without imagination, Kreeft and Craig would not have been able to be successful in philosophy and logic, and McDowell would not have been able to have been successful in studying law.
However, the cognitive bias that was a serious problem with Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus, namely confirmation bias, could explain why Kreeft, McDowell, and Craig failed to exercise their imaginations when considering the above false dilemma.
Confirmation bias impacts various intellectual abilities and processes. It impacts our focus or attention. When one has a firm belief that P is the case, one will tend to search for facts or evidence that supports this belief, and when evidence supporting P presents itself, one will tend to notice that evidence. And when evidence against P presents itself, one will tend to ignore that evidence. Also, even if one does notice disconfirming evidence, confirmation bias also impacts one's thinking in terms of memory. We tend to remember evidence that confirms our beliefs and we tend to forget evidence that disconfirms our beliefs.
Confirmation bias impacts what we are searching for, what we notice, and also what we remember. So, I suspect that it also impacts when we exercise our imaginations. If using your imagination might put a cherished belief at risk of being disconfirmed, then you are less likely to use your imagination, but if using your imagination seems like it could help confirm a cherished belief, then you are likely to use your imagination.
I don't think the problem is that Kreeft, McDowell, or Craig lack imagination. I suspect that all three of these Christian apologists do have good imaginations and do use their imaginations, but that they tend to avoid using their imaginations when this carries the risk of disconfirming one of their Christian beliefs, or of disconfirming a belief that provides support for one of their Christian beliefs.
USING ONE'S IMAGINATION TO THINK UP MORE NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL HYPOTHESES
It is not in the interest of Christian apologists to think up more natural hypotheses or more supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate. That is to say, they have no desire to come up with a new hypothesis that might provide a better explanation of the relevant facts than the Resurrection Hypothesis, which they firmly believe and want to promote. Confirmation bias influences them to avoid using their imaginations for the purpose of constructing more hypotheses that would compete with the hypothesis that they believe and cherish.
GENERATING SUPERNATURAL HYPOTHESES THAT PARALLEL NATURAL HYPOTHESES
Anything you can do, God can do better. Anything that nature can do, God can do better. So, most natural hypotheses can be altered in order to generate a similar supernatural theory.
The most obvious example of this way of generating more hypotheses occurs with the Hallucination Hypothesis. This is a naturalistic hypothesis that explains the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples as being hallucinations, malfunctions of their brains that produced experiences that made it seem like a living Jesus was present, when in reality, Jesus was not present.
There is a supernatural hypothesis that is similar to this naturalistic one: the Vision Hypothesis. This is the supernatural hypothesis that God intentionally caused Jesus' disciples to experience visions of a living Jesus, in order to communicate the message that Jesus was alive again, after he had died on the cross. God intervening in the lives and experiences of Jesus' disciples clearly makes this a supernatural hypothesis, but it is similar to the Hallucination Hypothesis, in that Jesus is not physically present during these experiences of the disciples, according to both the naturalistic explanation called the Hallucination Hypothesis and the supernatural explanation called the Vision Hypothesis.
Let's consider some other naturalistic hypotheses. Craig considered and evaluated the Displaced Body Hypothesis in Reasonable Faith.[1] This is a naturalistic hypothesis that claims Joseph of Arimathea moved Jesus' body to a different location after the initial burial of Jesus in a stone tomb, and before the women came to visit the stone tomb on Sunday morning.
Anything Joseph can do, God can do too. So, one supernatural hypothesis is that God moved the body of Jesus to another tomb, perhaps instantly teleporting Jesus' body to a different tomb. This is similar to the naturalistic hypothesis that Craig evaluated, but it involves God intervening in human affairs, so that the moving of Jesus' body was done by a supernatural being using supernatural powers.
Craig also considers and evaluates the Apparent Death Hypothesis. This is a naturalistic hypothesis that claims that Jesus only appeared to die on the cross, but had merely fainted, so that Jesus was actually still alive when he was removed from the cross. This could have been merely a lucky break for Jesus. However, if God was involved, God could have made sure that this fortunate outcome took place.
God could have performed healing miracles on Jesus' body, to keep Jesus alive despite the various injuries and wounds inflicted upon Jesus. God could have instantly healed the wounds from a severe scourging. God could have instantly healed wounds in Jesus' scalp from the crown of thorns. God could have made the nails in Jesus' hands and feet vanish into nothingness and instantly healed the wounds created by the nails. Jesus could have survived his crucifixion because of divine intervention.
Another possibility is that God could have let Jesus suffer from his wounds and injuries, but miraculously prevented Jesus from dying on the cross. For example, if Jesus underwent clinical death (cessation of breathing and heartbeat) on the cross, God could have caused Jesus to be resuscitated before Jesus reached the point of brain death. God could have instantly created new blood in Jesus' veins (like a blood infusion), and God could have caused Jesus' chest to repeatedly compress every few seconds (as if someone were performing CPR on Jesus), causing Jesus' breathing and heartbeat to resume.
Furthermore, the Apparent Death Hypothesis focuses on the idea that Jesus appeared to die on the cross, but did not actually die on the cross. There are different natural ways that this could have occurred. But God also could have intervened to ensure that Jesus appeared to die while actually remaining alive.
Recall that, according to the Gospel of Luke, when the risen Jesus appeared to some of his followers on the Emmaus road (Luke 24: 13-32), they didn't recognize Jesus. Somehow, God made Jesus appear to be somebody else, so that these followers would not recognize who they were talking to. But since God can alter the way Jesus appears to others, God could have performed a miracle that made Jesus appear to be dead, even though Jesus was actually still alive. Thus, this is a third way that there could be a supernatural hypothesis that is similar to the naturalistic hypothesis called the Apparent Death Hypothesis.
MULTIPLYING SUPERNATURAL HYPOTHESES
The philosopher Spinoza was skeptical about miracles and divine revelation. He proposed a powerful objection to miracle claims. He pointed out that Christians believe that there are various supernatural beings besides God: spirits, angels, and demons. But if there are other supernatural beings besides God, then any alleged "miracle" might actually have been caused by a supernatural being other than God.
Given that we (a) don't know God's plans, purposes, and motivations, (b) don't know the plans, purposes, and motivations of other supernatural beings, (c) don't know the number and kinds of supernatural beings that exist, and (d) cannot see or directly observe the actions and activities of God or of any other supernatural beings, we have no way of determining whether an alleged "miracle" was brought about by God or by some other supernatural being.
Therefore, any supernatural explanation involving God or divine intervention into human affairs can be modified into a similar supernatural explanation involving some other sort of supernatural being, such as:
- a spirit or ghost
- an angel
- a demon
- a finite deity
- a human with supernatural power(s)
Thus, for any supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate that involves God intervening in human affairs, we can always easily generate at least five more similar supernatural hypotheses involving some other sort of supernatural being intervening in human affairs.
MULTIPLYING NATURAL HYPOTHESES
In Part 19 of this series, I pointed out that Christian apologists often commit the STRAWMAN fallacy by including unnecessary details or complications in a particular naturalistic explanation. So, one way we can generate more naturalistic hypotheses is by either (a) removing an unnecessary detail from a naturalistic hypothesis or (b) substituting alternative details.
Just as we can substitute an angel or a demon for God in a supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate, so we can substitute a different specific person for a specific person named in a naturalistic hypothesis, or substitute a different category of person for a specific category of person that is specified in a naturalistic hypothesis.
For example, Craig commits the STRAWMAN fallacy in his description of the Displaced Body Hypothesis, because he includes the unnecessary detail that it is Joseph of Arimathea who moves Jesus' body from the stone tomb where it was initially placed. We could simply remove this detail, and characterize the Displaced Body Hypothesis more generally, like this:
SOMEBODY moved Jesus' body from the stone tomb where it was initially placed, but did not tell Jesus' disciples about doing this.
Another way to fix the problem with Craig's overly-specific characterization of this naturalistic hypothesis, is to just generate several similar naturalistic hypotheses that name other people:
Nicodemus moved Jesus' body...
A gardener moved Jesus' body...
Some Roman soldiers moved Jesus' body...
James, the brother of Jesus, moved Jesus' body...
Judas moved Jesus' body...
Peter moved Jesus' body...
John moved Jesus' body...
Mary Magdalene moved Jesus' body...
Thomas moved Jesus' body...
Whenever a naturalistic hypothesis names a specific person or specifies a particular group or category of persons, we can modify that hypothesis by naming a different person or a different category of persons in order to generate more naturalistic hypotheses.
INDIVIDUATING THE DISCIPLES
Another common problem with a failure of imagination by Christian apologists is that they oversimplify hypotheses by treating Jesus' disciples as a uniform group, rather than as individual people who had different experiences and who formed different beliefs about Jesus' final fate.
This is especially obvious in the case of the Conspiracy Hypothesis. Here is how Craig characterises this naturalistic hypothesis:
According to this explanation, the disciples stole the body of Jesus and lied about his postmortem appearances, thus faking his resurrection.[2]
Craig does not specify the meaning of the phrase "the disciples", but it seems fairly clear that he is referring to Jesus' twelve disciples minus Judas Iscariot.
It is certainly possible that all eleven remaining disciples out of "the twelve" conspired together to lie about how Jesus' body disappeared and about seeing the risen Jesus. However, it is not necessarily the case that all eleven disciples were deceivers.
Some of the eleven disciples could have been deceived. Each of the eleven disciples had their own individual experiences after Jesus was crucified, and each of them formulated their own individual beliefs about what happened to Jesus after he was crucified. It is an oversimplification to assume that all eleven disciples had the same experiences and formed the same beliefs about what happened to Jesus after his crucifixion.
If we treat each of the eleven disciples as an individual person, then the Conspiracy Hypothesis can be divided up into many different possibilities, many different combinations of disciples in which some were deceivers and some were deceived:
Given eleven disciples and two possible states (Deceiver OR Deceived), there are this many different permutations of the disciples:
2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2
= 2 x (2 x 2) x (2 x 2) x (2 x 2) x (2 x 2) x (2 x 2)
= 2 x (4) x (4) x (4) x (4) x (4)
= 2 x 4 x [(4) x (4)] x [(4) x (4)]
= 2 x 4 x [16] x [16]
= (2 x 4) x (16 x 16)
= (8) x (256)
= 2,048 Permutations
In only one of these 2,048 permutations is none of the eleven disciples a deceiver. So, there are 2,047 different naturalistic hypotheses where at least one of the disciples was a deceiver. Thus, there are 2,047 different naturalistic hypotheses that are contained just in the idea of the Conspiracy Hypothesis if we treat the eleven disciples as individuals, instead of treating them all as a uniform group.
Furthermore, the distinction between being a deciever and being deceived is itself subject to an Either/Or Fallacy and an associated failure of imagination by Christian apologists:
Each of Jesus' eleven remaining disciples was EITHER a deceiver OR was deceived concerning Jesus' final fate.
This Either/Or claim is a false dilemma, because one or more of Jesus' eleven remaining disciples might have been neither a deceiver nor deceived concerning Jesus' final fate. For example, suppose that Jesus had not risen from the dead, and suppose that one of the disciples seriously doubted or rejected the claim that Jesus rose from the dead, and suppose this disciple did not promote or preach the belief that Jesus rose from the dead. Such a doubting disciple would have been neither a deceiver nor would this disciple have been deceived concerning Jesus' final fate.
Because the above Either/Or claim is false, we must recognise at least three different possible states for each of the eleven remaining disciples. That means that the number of historical possibilities suggested by the Conspiracy Hypothesis is much greater than 2,047:
3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3
= 3 x (3 x 3) x (3 x 3) x (3 x 3) x (3 x 3) x (3 x 3)
= 3 x (9) x (9) x (9) x (9) x (9)
= 3 x 9 x [(9) x (9)] x [(9) x (9)]
= 3 x 9 x [81] x [81]
= (3 x 9) x (81 x 81)
= (27) x (6,561)
= 177,147
Some of these 177,147 historical possibilities involve none of the disciples being a deceiver, and thus those possibilities would not be included under the idea of the Conspiracy Hypothesis. There are 2,048 such permutations where none of the eleven disciples would be a deceiver[3], so the total number of historical possibilities that are included in the idea of the Conspiracy Hypothesis, when we view the eleven remaining disciples as individuals instead of as a uniform group would be this:
177,147 total - 2,048 permutations with no deceivers
= 175, 099 possibilities with at least one deceiver
CONCLUSIONS
The fact that three different well-known Christian apologists put forward cases for the resurrection of Jesus that are Dead on Arrival because they commit the Either/Or Fallacy suggests that there is a problem of lack of imagination on the part of many Christian apologists.
I suggest that this lack of imagination is connected to the cognitive bias called Confirmation Bias, so that these Christian apologists do sometimes use their imaginations, but tend to avoid using their imaginations when doing so puts their cherished Christian beliefs at risk.
Kreeft foolishly believed that there were only five possible explanations or hypotheses concerning Jesus' final fate.[4] McDowell believed there twice as many explanations of Jesus' final fate: five occupied-tomb explanations, and five empty-tomb explanations.[5] In Reasonable Faith, Craig discusses and evaluates four naturalistic hypotheses about the empty tomb, one naturalistic hypothesis about the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus, and three naturalistic explanations of the origin of the Christian belief in Jesus' resurrection.[6]
There are many more alternative hypotheses, both supernatural and naturalistic that should be considered and evaluated, but Christian apologists tend avoid using their imaginations to generate more than just a handful of hypotheses about the final fate of Jesus, probably because of Confirmation Bias, and their sense that generating more such hypotheses would put their belief in the Resurrection Hypothesis at risk.
END NOTES
1. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), pp.376-377.
2. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, p.371.
3. Since "Deceived" and "Neither Deceiver nor Deceived" are two alternative states that an individual disciple could be in, we can calculate the total number of permutations that involve eleven disciples each being in one of these two states. That is the same as the total number of permutations in my first calculation, where each of the eleven disciples was assumed to either be a Deceiver or to be Deceived: 2,048 permutations.
4. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p.182.
5. Josh McDowell, The Resurrection Factor (Milton Keynes, England: Authentic Media, 2005), p.114.
6. William Craig, Reasonable Faith. Craig discusses four naturalistic explanations of the empty tomb on pages 371 to 377; Craig discusses one naturalistic explanation of the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus on pages 384 to 387; Craig discusses three naturalistic explanations of the origin of the Christian belief in Jesus' resurrection on pages 390 to 395. Craig compares these eight naturalistic theories to just one supernatural hypothesis: the Resurrection Hypothesis.
