Friday, December 31, 2021

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 27: Further Evaluation of Objection #7

 WHERE WE ARE

The core argument in Objection #7 is this:

1A. The disciples did not expect that Jesus would physically rise from the dead. 

B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN the disciples must have expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead. 

Therefore:

 A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

However, in Part 26 of this series, I clarified and revised premise (1A), so both key premises in the core argument need to be similarly revised:

1B. None of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross. 

B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross. 

Therefore:

 A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

The argument in support of premise (1B) is this:

 3B. All of the eleven disciples thought Jesus was a ghost when they had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. (see Luke 24:36-43)

4B. All of the eleven disciples became convinced that Jesus was not a ghost when they had experiences of an alleged appearance of Jesus in which Jesus ate something to prove to the disciples that he was not a ghost. (see Luke 24:36-43)

Thus:

2B. All of the eleven disciples doubted at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

Therefore:

1B. None of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.

In Part 26 of this series, I argued that premises (3B) and (4B) are both probably FALSE because the Jerusalem appearance stories in Luke 24 are probably FICTIONAL.  

I also argued that even if we assume that the story in Chapter 24 of Luke about a gathering of Jesus' disciples experiencing an alleged appearance of Jesus is an accurate description of an actual historical event, it does NOT follow that (3B) and (4B) are true.  So, Kreeft has FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that premises (3B) and (4B) are true, and we have good reason to believe that those premises are FALSE.  So, we may reasonably conclude that (3B) and (4B) are FALSE and that Kreeft's argument for (2B) is UNSOUND.  So, premise (2B) remains DUBIOUS.

Furthermore, (2B) creates a dilemma for Kreeft.  Either we accept (2B) as TRUE, and are forced to conclude that the Gospels are historically unreliable, or else we reject (2B) as FALSE, and are forced to conclude that Kreeft's Objection #7 FAILS, just like all of his previous six objections FAILED.

Kreeft has FAILED to show that his key premise (1B) is TRUE, so Objection #7 FAILS.


EVALUATION OF PREMISE (B1)

It is now time to examine the other key premise in the argument constituting Objection #7:

B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.

Kreeft provides us with no reason to believe that (B1) is true.  However, since Objection #7 appears to have been borrowed from Josh McDowell's  fifth objection against the Hallucination Theory in The Resurrection Factor (1981, p.85-86), it is reasonable to assume that Kreeft accepted the principle that McDowell based this objection upon:

C. A person P will hallucinate that X occurs (or has occurred) ONLY IF:   person P anticipates or hopefully expects that X will occur.

Thus:

 B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.

We have two main questions to answer about premise (B1):

  • Is premise (C) true?
  • Does premise (B1) follow from premise (C)?

IS PREMISE (C) TRUE?

Neither McDowell nor Kreeft are experts in the field of psychology, so the fact that they believe premise (C) to be true is of no significance.  Neither Kreeft nor McDowell offer any scientific or empirical evidence in support of this generalization about the nature of hallucinations.  Premise (C) is simply asserted (or assumed) to be true without any evidence whatsoever.  So, premise (C) is DUBIOUS.

Furthermore, it is fairly obvious that premise (C) is in fact FALSE.  Sometimes hallucinations can be horrible or terrifying.  Sometimes when people use a hallucinogenic drug they experience a "bad trip" which can include hallucinations that are horrible and/or terrifying.  

A person could, for example, be afraid of snakes and hallucinate that hundreds of deadly snakes are slithering all over and around them.  Did the person who has such a terrifying hallucination "anticipate" or "hopefully expect" to be buried in a huge pile of deadly snakes?  Probably not. 

Even more positive hallucinations can bring unexpected and unanticipated experiences.  Suppose that someone take an hallucinogenic drug and then has a hallucination of floating on a cloud high above a beautiful green valley.  Prior to taking that drug, did that person "anticipate" or "hopefully expect" to be floating on a cloud over a beautiful green valley that day?  Probably not.  This pleasant experience probably just happened and was unexpected and unanticipated.  

Dreams also don't follow this principle.  I might have a nightmare about being chased by a ferocious tiger.  Does that mean that earlier that day I "anticipated" being chased by a ferocious tiger? or that I "hopefully expected" to be chased by a ferocious tiger?  Probably not, since there aren't any ferocious tigers running around in my town.  I just happened to have a bad dream about this highly unlikely terrifying event.

I might also have a wonderful dream about flying like a bird through the treetops in my neighborhood.  Earlier that day, did I "anticipate" that I would be flying like a bird through my neighborhood?  Did I have a "hopeful expectation" that I would soon be flying like a bird through my neighborhood? Probably not, since human beings cannot fly like birds.  I just happened to have a pleasant dream about this physically impossible event. 

So, neither hallucinations nor dreams follow this principle asserted by McDowell, and presumably accepted by Kreeft as the basis for believing premise (B1).  Because premise (C) is FALSE, this argument for (B1) is UNSOUND, and so (B1) remains unsupported and DUBIOUS.


DOES (B1) FOLLOW FROM PREMISE (C)? 

A second problem with the argument for (B1) is that (B1) DOES NOT FOLLOW from premise (C), at least not from (C) by itself.  There is at least one UNSTATED assumption that Kreeft is making here in order for this argument to work:

D. The Hallucination Theory requires that at least some of the eleven disciples had hallucinations of the risen Jesus.

 C. A person P will hallucinate that X occurs (or has occurred) ONLY IF:   person P anticipates or hopefully expects that X will occur.

Therefore:

B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.

With the addition of premise (D), the inference in this argument appears to be VALID.  However, as I have argued previously, Kreeft's understanding of the Hallucination Theory is too narrow and is thus mistaken.  The Hallucination Theory does NOT require that ANY follower of Jesus experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus.  

If, for example, some followers of Jesus had dreams about a risen Jesus, and if the belief that Jesus rose physically from the dead spread among his followers as a result of those dream experiences, then the Hallucination Theory would be true, even though NOBODY experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus.  

If Kreeft refuses to broaden his concept of the Hallucination Theory, then his case for the resurrection of Jesus immediately collapses, because by ignoring various alternative versions of the Hallucination Theory (such as dream experiences of a risen Jesus), Kreeft FAILS to refute all relevant skeptical theories, and thus FAILS to show that his theory is the only theory that might possibly be true.  So, Kreeft has no choice but to accept a broader conception of the Hallucination Theory, one that encompasses other kinds of non-veridical experiences, such as dreams.

It is also possible that some followers of Jesus other than "the eleven" disciples experienced hallucinations of a risen Jesus, and that none of "the eleven" experienced such hallucinations, but the early Christian belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus came into existence because of those hallucinations experienced by followers of Jesus who were not among "the eleven" disciples.  In that case one version of the Hallucination Theory woud be TRUE, even though NONE of "the eleven" disciples experienced a hallucinaiton of a risen Jesus.

Thus, there are at least two ways that the Hallucination Theory could be TRUE, without any of "the eleven" disciples having experienced a hallucination of a risen Jesus.  Thus, premise (D) is FALSE.  Therefore, the argument for (B1) is UNSOUND.


CONCLUSION ABOUT THE ARGUMENT FOR (B1)

There are two premises in the argument for (B1):  premise (C) and premise (D). Premise (C) is FALSE, and premise (D) is also FALSE.  So, the argument supporting (B1) is clearly an UNSOUND argument.  Kreeft has FAILED to provide us with a good reason to believe that (B1) is true, so (B1) remains DUBIOUS.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Hallucination Theory does NOT require that ANY follower of Jesus had a hallucination of a risen Jesus, it is clear that (B1) is simply FALSE.


CONCLUSION ABOUT OBJECTION #7

Here is the core argument in the argument constituting Kreeft's Objection #7 against the Hallucination Theory:

1B. None of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross. 

B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross. 

Therefore:

 A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

In Part 26 of this series, I showed that Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that premise (1B) is true.  So, premise (1B) remains dubious.

In this current post, I showed that Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that premise (B1) is true, and that we have good reason to believe that (B1) is FALSE.

Since premise (1B) is DUBIOUS, and premise (B1) is FALSE, this core argument is UNSOUND, and Kreeft's Objection #7 against the Hallucination Theory FAILS, just like all of his previous six objections FAILED. 

Thursday, December 30, 2021

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 26: Evaluation of Objection #7 (The Unbelief of the Disciples)

WHERE WE ARE 

In Part 25 of this series, I clarified and analyzed Kreeft's argument constituting his Objection #7 against the Hallucination Theory.  Here is the core of that argument:

1A. The disciples did not expect that Jesus would physically rise from the dead. 

B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN the disciples must have expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead. 

Therefore:

 A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

This argument is logically VALID (assuming that the phrase "the disciples" means the same thing in both of the premises).  So, the main questions concerning this argument are about the truth of the premises:

  • Is premise (1A) TRUE?
  • Is premise (B) TRUE? 
If one of these premises is DUBIOUS or FALSE, then Objection #7 FAILS, just like the previous six objections have all FAILED.


EVALUATION OF PREMISE (1A)

According to my analysis of Kreeft's reasoning here, Kreeft gives us an argument in support of premise (1A):

 2A. The disciples did not believe at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

Thus:

1A. The disciples did not expect that Jesus would physically rise from the dead. 

This seems like a reasonable inference.  If a disciple did not believe at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead, then that implies that the disciple did NOT expect that Jesus would physically rise from the dead.  

However, some disciples may have believed that Jesus would one day in the distant future physically rise from the dead (say, at the end of the world, when all humans would face divine judgment), but these disciples might have had no expectation that Jesus would rise from the dead just a couple of days after he died on the cross. So, we need to clarify the time frame related to the expectation mentioned in premise (1A).   

Also, the phrase "the disciples" is VAGUE and needs to be clarified. One might think that the phrase "the disciples" refers to the remaining eleven disciples who were part of the inner circle of "twelve disciples" of Jesus, minus Judas Iscariot who had betrayed Jesus.  However, after mentioning "the disciples", Kreeft goes on to list some of them, and in that list, he refers to "the women".  There were NO WOMEN in the group of "twelve disciples".  Jesus had followers or disciples who were women, but according to the Gospels, the inner circle of "the twelve" consisted of twelve MEN.  Because Kreeft specifically mentions "the women", that implies that "the disciples" is a larger more inclusive category than "the eleven" remaining male disciples who were part of "the twelve".

However, if we expand the boundaries of "the disciples" beyond "the eleven", then it becomes UNCLEAR where those boundaries are.  Jesus had hundreds or possibly thousands of followers, and we could consider every follower of Jesus to be a "disciple".  Furthermore, even if we try to divide up the hundreds or thousands of followers of Jesus into more serious "disciples" and less serious followers, it is far from clear how Kreeft would make this distinction.

As we have seen REPEATEDLY in my analysis and evaluation of the previous objections raised by Kreeft, he is a SLOPPY and UNCLEAR thinker.  So, I have no reason to believe that Kreeft has a clear distinction in mind here that he has just neglected to inform us about.  Rather, it is much more likely that he simply does not himself know what the phrase "the disciples" means in this argument.  He is just being his usual VAGUE, SLOPPY, and UNCLEAR self, and does not have any clear idea of what this phrase actually means.

Thus, although we need to CLARIFY the phrase "the disciples" in order to rationally evaluate Kreeft's argument, I don't think we can successfully figure out what Kreeft INTENDED the phrase "the disciples" to mean, because he probably did not have a clear idea of what this phrase means in the first place. Therefore, I suggest that we ignore Kreeft's mention of "the women" and draw the boundaries of this concept more narrowly, limiting it to "the eleven", the remaining male disciples who had been part of the inner circle of "the twelve disciples".  It is mostly "the eleven" that Kreeft is concerned with, and this way we avoid getting into dubious speculations about Kreeft's intentions here, and about how to distinguish between a general follower of Jesus and more serious followers who deserve the title of "disciples".

Here is my clarification of premise (2A) and premise (1A):

 2B. All of the eleven disciples doubted at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

Thus:

1B. None of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross. 

Given this clarification of these premises, the inference here is correct; premise (1B) follows from premise (2B).

Now we need to determine whether (2B) is true.  Kreeft's reasoning provides an argument in support of premise (2A):

3A. The disciples thought Jesus was a ghost when they had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. (see Luke 24:36-43)

4A. The disciples became convinced that Jesus was not a ghost when they had experiences of an alleged appearance of Jesus in which Jesus ate something to prove to the disciples that he was not a ghost. (see Luke 24:36-43)

Thus:

 2A. The disciples did not believe at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

But we have revised premise (2A) in order to clarify it, so now we must also revise (3A) and (4A) in a similar manner so that they will logically connect up with premise (2B):

3B. All of the eleven disciples thought Jesus was a ghost when they had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. (see Luke 24:36-43)

4B. All of the eleven disciples became convinced that Jesus was not a ghost when they had experiences of an alleged appearance of Jesus in which Jesus ate something to prove to the disciples that he was not a ghost. (see Luke 24:36-43)

Thus:

2B. All of the eleven disciples doubted at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

This appears to be a VALID inference or at least a reasonable inference, so if premises (3B) and (4B) are true, then we ought to accept premise (2B) as true.

There are two problems, however, with premises (3B) and (4B).  First of all, as I have previously argued, the Jerusalem appearance stories in Chapter 24 of Luke are probably FICTIONAL stories.  An objective review of the Gospel evidence shows that it is more likely that Mark and Matthew are correct that the first experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples took place in Galilee a week or more after e crucifixion than that Luke and John are correct that these first experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples took place in Jerusalem only two days after the crucifixion.  Thus, it is probable that the Jerusalem appearance stories found in Luke and John are FICTION.  So, Kreeft has FAILED to give us a good reason to believe that premises (3B) and (4B) are true, and since the story that these premises are based upon is probably FICTION, we have good reason to believe that premises (3B) and (4B) are FALSE, because it is unlikely that a FICTIONAL story would just happen to reflect historical reality by chance.

A second problem is that even if we assume that the Jerusalem appearance stories in Luke describe actual historical events in an accurate way, it is NOT clear that ALL of the eleven disciples "thought Jesus was a ghost" when he first appeared to them, nor is it clear that ALL of the eleven disciples became convinced that Jesus had physically risen from the dead after having an experience in which it seemed to them that Jesus ate some fish in their presence.  In other words, the story in Chapter 24 of Luke about a gathering of Jesus' disciples having an experience of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus does NOT imply that premises (3B) and (4B) are TRUE. 

Here is the relevant passage from Luke:

33 That same hour they got up and returned to Jerusalem; and they found the eleven and their companions gathered together. 

34 They were saying, “The Lord has risen indeed, and he has appeared to Simon!” 

35 Then they told what had happened on the road, and how he had been made known to them in the breaking of the bread.

36 While they were talking about this, Jesus himself stood among them and said to them, “Peace be with you.” 

37 They were startled and terrified, and thought that they were seeing a ghost. 

38 He said to them, “Why are you frightened, and why do doubts arise in your hearts? 

39 Look at my hands and my feet; see that it is I myself. Touch me and see; for a ghost does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have.” 

40 And when he had said this, he showed them his hands and his feet.

(Luke 24:33-40, NRSV)

The key verse here is verse 37: "They were startled and terrified, and thought they were seeing a ghost."  The main question at issue is this: who are the people that are being referred to by the pronoun "They" in verse 37?

The reference of the pronoun "they" appears to shift around in this passage. In verse 33, the word "they" appears to refer to the two disciples who "returned to Jerusalem" and told other disciples in Jerusalem about experiencing an appearance of the risen Jesus earlier that day. In verse 34 it is not clear who the word "they" refers to.  In verses 35 and 36, the word "they" appears to refer once again to the two disciples who "returned to Jerusalem".

But when we get to verse 37, it seems fairly clear that the reference of the word "they" shifts to the entire gathering of disciples, which would include the two disciples that had "returned to Jerusalem" as well as "the eleven" and also "their companions", that is the companions of "the eleven" disciples.  Thus, this gathering of followers of Jesus included AT LEAST fifteen people (2 disciples who returned to Jerusalem + 11 disciples + 2 companions).  

Since the number of "companions" is not specified, there could potentially be more companions of "the eleven" than "the eleven" themselves.  If each of "the eleven" disciples had an average of one companion present, then there would have been eleven companions in addition to the two disciples who had returned to Jerusalem and "the eleven" disciples who had remained in Jerusalem.  In that case, the whole group would have consisted of two dozen people (2 who returned to Jerusalem, 11 who were called "the eleven" disciples, and 11 companions of "the eleven" = 24 people).  

It is also possible that each of "the eleven" disciples had an average of two companions present at the gathering, and in that case, the total number of people present would have been 35 (2 disciples returning to Jerusalem, 11 disciples who were called "the eleven", and 22 people who were companions of "the eleven").

There were at least 15 people present, and potentially as many as 35 people present.  So, with a group of such size, it is UNLIKELY that Luke knew the names of each and every person who was present during this event, and even MORE UNLIKELY that Luke personally interviewed each and every person who was present at this event.  Therefore, it is VERY UNLIKELY that Luke KNEW that each and every person present at this event felt "startled and terrified" upon having an experience of an alleged appearance of Jesus.  It is also VERY UNLIKELY that Luke KNEW that each and every person present at this event felt "startled and terrified" because he or she believed that he or she was "seeing a ghost".

Because it is VERY UNLIKELY that Luke had such detailed and directly verified information about this particular event (which took place about five decades before the Gospel of Luke was written), the claim that EVERY person present at this event felt "startled and terrified" upon having an experience of an alleged appearance of Jesus is DUBIOUS at best.  Also, the claim that EVERY person present at this event felt "startled and terrified" because he or she thought he or she was "seeing a ghost" is DUBIOUS at best.

Furthermore, to interpret the word "They" in verse 37 as implying that EVERY person who was present was "startled and terrified" and felt that way because EVERY person present thought he or she was "seeing a ghost" is itself DUBIOUS.  That is an implausible and extreme way of interpreting the pronoun "They" when what is under discussion is a group containing 15 to 35 people.  

When we talk about such a group consisting of many people having a specific emotional reaction to an event or circumstance, it is generally understood that NOT EVERYONE would have the same emotional reaction, and so when the word "They" is used about a group containing several people, this is reasonably understood to mean "Most of the people in the group..."

Thus, even if we assume that this story in Chapter 24 of Luke is an accurate description of an actual historical event, it DOES NOT FOLLOW that EVERY single person present at this event felt "startled and terrified" nor that EVERY single person present at this event felt "startled and terrified" because he or she thought he or she was "seeing a ghost".  Therefore, even if we assume that this story in Chapter 24 of Luke is an accurate description of an actual historical event, premise (3B) DOES NOT FOLLOW:

3B. All of the eleven disciples thought Jesus was a ghost when they had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. 

It is entirely compatible with the description of this event in Chapter 24 of Luke that:

MOST of the people present at this event felt "startled and terrified" when they experienced an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus, and the people who were "startled and terrified" felt that way because they thought they were "seeing a ghost", and yet six of "the eleven" disciples did NOT feel "startled and terrified" when they experienced the alleged appearance of the risen Jesus because they were EXPECTING that Jesus would physically rise from the dead within a few days or weeks after his crucifixion.

Therefore, claims (3B) and (4B) DO NOT FOLLOW from the assumption that the story in Chapter 24 of Luke about a Jerusalem appearance of the risen Jesus to his gathered disciples is an accurate description of an actual historical event.

Premises (3B) and (4B) are probably FALSE because the Jerusalem appearance stories in Chapter 24 of the Gospel of Luke are probably FICTIONAL stories.  Even if we assume that this story from Chapter 24 of Luke about a Jerusalem appearance of the risen Jesus to his gathered disciples is an accurate description of an actual historical event, it DOES NOT FOLLOW that (3B) and (4B) are TRUE.  Thus, premise (3B) and premise (4B) remain DUBIOUS, and Kreeft has FAILED to show that the key premise (2B) is TRUE.  Thus, premise (2B) remains DUBIOUS itself.

Finally, there is a very serious problem with premise (2B).  If this premise is in fact true, then it provides a POWERFUL reason to doubt that Jesus physically rose from the dead.  So, if we reject premise (2B), then the argument constituting Objection #7 FAILS, just like the previous six objections that Kreeft put forward against the Hallucination Theory.  On the other hand, if we accept premise (2B) as TRUE, then we have a very good reason to doubt and reject Kreeft's ultimate conclusion that Jesus physically rose from the dead.

Here is the problem.  If ALL of "the eleven" disciples who were part of the inner circle of "the twelve" disciples of Jesus "did not believe at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead", then this implies that the Gospels are historically unreliable accounts of the life, ministry, and death of Jesus.  But if the Gospels are historically unreliable, then there is no hope of Kreeft, or anyone else, building a strong case for the physical resurrection of Jesus.  One cannot prove such a miracle on the basis of historically unreliable texts.

According to the Gospels, Jesus performed extraordinary supernatural feats on several occasions:

  • Jesus walked on water.  (Mark 6:45-51)
  • Jesus instantly calmed a raging storm. (Mark 5:35-41)
  • Jesus fed thousands of people with two fishes and five loaves of bread. (Mark 6:34-44)
  • Jesus turned water into wine. (John 2:1-11)
  • Jesus raised people from the dead. (Mark 5:21-43 & John 11:38-43)

If Jesus had actually performed these amazing supernatural feats, as the Gospels claim, then it is UNLIKELY that ANY of his inner circle of disciples would have had significant doubts about Jesus physically rising from the dead.  

Furthermore, if Jesus had actually performed these extraordinary supernatural feats, as the Gospels claim, then it is VERY UNLIKELY that ALL of his inner circle of disciples (ALL of "the eleven") would have had significant doubts about Jesus physically rising from the dead.  Therefore, if we assume that premise (2B) is TRUE, then we have a very good reason to conclude that the Gospels are NOT historically reliable.  If we assume that (2B) is TRUE, then we have a very good reason to believe that Kreeft cannot build a strong case for the physical resurrection of Jesus.

So we are faced with a dilemma.  Either we reject premise (2B) as FALSE and thus conclude that Kreeft's Objection #7 FAILS (like all of his previous six objections), or else we accept the key premise (2B) as TRUE and thus conclude that Kreeft's attempt to prove that Jesus physically rose from the dead is a hopeless effort that is doomed to FAIL.

Tuesday, December 28, 2021

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 25: The Unbelief of the Disciples

 WHERE WE ARE

The core of the argument constituting Peter Kreeft's Objection #6 in his Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA) is as follows:

 C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

In Part 23 of this series, I showed that Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that premise (2B) is true and that there is a good reason to believe (2B) is FALSE, so we may reasonably conclude that premise (2B) is FALSE. 

In Part 24 of this series, I showed that Kreeft also FAILED to provide us with a good reason to believe that premise (C) is true and that we have good reason to believe that (C) is FALSE, so we may reasonably conclude that premise (C) is FALSE.

Because BOTH key premises in the core argument of Objection #6 are FALSE, it is clear that this core argument is UNSOUND, and that means that Kreeft's Objection #6 FAILS to refute the Hallucination Theory:


OBJECTION #7: THE UNBELIEF OF THE DISCIPLES

Here is how Peter Kreeft presents his Objection #7 against the Hallucination Theory:

7. Not only did the disciples not expect this, they didn't even believe it at first—neither Peter, nor the women, nor Thomas, nor the eleven. They thought he was a ghost; he had to eat something to prove he was not  (Lk 24:36-43).    (HCA, p.187)

Yet again,  Kreeft leaves the conclusion of his argument UNSTATED, so I will state it for him:

1. The disciples did not expect this.

2. The disciples didn't even believe it at first.

3. They thought he was a ghost. (see Luke 24:36-43)

4. He had to eat something to prove he was not. (see Luke 24:36-43)

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

It is immediately OBVIOUS that the conclusion DOES NOT FOLLOW from the premises.  There is, for example, no mention of the "Hallucination Theory" in any of the stated premises, so no conclusion about the Hallucination Theory is implied by these premises.  That means that once again Kreeft has left at least one key premise UNSTATED.

There are also referring expressions in every stated premise, so each premise requires some clarification:

1A. The disciples did not expect that Jesus would physically rise from the dead. 

2A. The disciples did not believe at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

3A. The disciples thought Jesus was a ghost when they had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. (see Luke 24:36-43)

4A. The disciples became convinced that Jesus was not a ghost when they had experiences of an alleged appearance of Jesus in which Jesus ate something to prove to the disciples that he was not a ghost. (see Luke 24:36-43)

Therefore:

 A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

Not only did Kreeft FAIL to state the conclusion of this argument and also FAIL to state at least one key premise of the argument (that connects his stated premises to the Hallucination Theory), but it is UNCLEAR how Kreeft thinks his premises are RELEVANT to the conclusion.  In some of Kreeft's UNCLEAR arguments, one can easily guess at the content of his UNSTATED premises, but in this case, there is no obvious logical connection between his stated premises and the conclusion that he is trying to prove. This is an extremely sloppy and UNCLEAR argument.

Because this argument is so UNCLEAR, and because this argument is obviously missing a key premise or premises, and because Kreeft draws most of his arguments from Josh McDowell's apologetics books, I'm going to turn to McDowell's objections against the Hallucination Theory for clues about what Kreeft had in mind in his Objection #7.

After reviewing McDowell's objections against the Hallucination Theory in his book The Resurrection Factor (hereafter: TRF), it is clear that Objection #7 was borrowed from one of McDowell's objections against the Hallucination Theory.  Here is McDowell's version of this objection:

A fifth principle is that hallucinations require of people an anticipating spirit or hopeful expectancy which causes their wishes to become father of their thoughts and hallucinations.  As we look at the disciples, the last thing they expected was a resurrection. They thought Christ had been crucified, buried. ...That was the end of it.

The late theologian, Paul Little, made an accute observation about the anticipatory attitued of the alleged "hallucinators":   "...In fact, when the Lord finally appeared to the disciples, they were frightened and thought they were seeing a ghost." (TRF, 1981, p.85-86)

We see from McDowell that the stuff about the disciples thinking Jesus was a ghost is being given as a REASON in support of the claim that "the last thing they [the disciples] expected was a resurrection".   More importantly, we see that the connection between the doubt of the disciples and the Hallucination Theory is the alleged "principle" that "hallucinations require of people an anticipating spirit or hopeful expectancy".  Kreeft neglected to include this crucial assumption when he sloppily re-stated McDowell's objection, making Kreeft's Objection #7 extremely UNCLEAR.

But since we have located the probable source of Objection #7 in the objections presented by McDowell against the Hallucination Theory, we can now clarify Kreeft's Objection #7 so that it actually makes some sense:

3A. The disciples thought Jesus was a ghost when they had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. (see Luke 24:36-43)

4A. The disciples became convinced that Jesus was not a ghost when they had experiences of an alleged appearance of Jesus in which Jesus ate something to prove to the disciples that he was not a ghost. (see Luke 24:36-43)

Thus:

 2A. The disciples did not believe at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

Thus:

1A. The disciples did not expect that Jesus would physically rise from the dead. 

B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN the disciples must have expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead. 

Therefore:

 A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

The missing key premise (B) is presumably based upon the principle about hallucinations that McDowell put forward but that Kreeft neglected to mention:

C. A person P will hallucinate that X occurs (or has occurred) ONLY IF:   person P anticipates or hopefully expects that X will occur.

Thanks to McDowell's clearer presentation of this objection, we can now analyze the logical structure of Kreeft's argument that constitutes his Objection #7: 



Now that we have CLARIFIED Kreeft's argument constituting his Objection #7 against the Hallucination Theory, we are in a position to rationally evaluate this argument.  In the next part of this series, I will begin to critically evaluate this argument.

 

Sunday, December 26, 2021

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 24: Evaluation of Premise (C) of Objection #6

 WHERE WE ARE 

The core of the argument constituting Peter Kreeft's Objection #6 is as follows:

 C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

In Part 23 of this series, I showed that Kreeft's argument in support of the key premise (2B) was based on a DUBIOUS premise and also on a FALSE premise, so he FAILED to provide a good reason for us to believe that premise (2B) is true.   

I also briefly argued that premise (2B) is FALSE, because some versions of the Hallucination Theory do NOT require that ANY followers of Jesus had hallucinations of the risen Jesus (e.g. belief in Jesus' resurrection could have begun based on DREAMS about the risen Jesus).

Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that (2B) is true, and there is a good reason to believe (2B) is FALSE, so we may conclude that premise (2B) is FALSE, and that the core argument in Objection #6 is UNSOUND, and thus that Objection #6 FAILS.  

However, I will continue my evaluation of the core argument by taking a closer look at the other key premise in the core argument:

 C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.


EVALUATION OF PREMISE (C) 

Here is my analysis of Kreeft's reasoning in support of premise (C):

1. Hallucinations come from what we already know.

B. IF hallucinations come from what we already know, THEN in hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do. 

Thus:

C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.

The logic of this argument for (C) is VALID.  Thus, the questions at issue here concern the truth of premise (1) and premise (B).  

I accept premise (1) as true, so long as we take the word "know" loosely to refer to a person's memories and experiences.  Hallucinations and dreams are based on the memories and experiences of the person who has the hallucination or dream.  Given that premise (1) is true, the only question remaining about this argument for (C) is whether premise (B) is true or false. 

Kreeft is making a fundamental error in premise (B).  He FAILS to take into account the power of human minds to create new combinations of ideas and characteristics.  In short, he ignores the power of human imagination.  I have seen gold coins, gold fillings, and gold nuggets, and I have seen many different mountains, in the state of Washington, in other states, and in other countries in Europe.  But I have never ever experienced a GOLD MOUNTAIN, a mountain made of gold. 

However, because I have experienced gold, and because I have experienced mountains,  my mind is able to combine these two ideas into a new idea, the idea of a GOLD MOUNTAIN.  It would be very "surprising and unexpected" for me to be driving along a road one day and to come upon a GOLD MOUNTAIN because I have never seen such a thing. I can, nevertheless, imagine a GOLD MOUNTAIN right now, without ever having seen one.  Similarly, I could have a DREAM or a HALLUCINATION about a GOLD MOUNTAIN, even though I have never ever experienced a GOLD MOUNTAIN.  Such a dream or hallucination would include something that is "surprising and unexpected", namely the experience of a GOLD MOUNTAIN.

Similarly,  I have experienced people lying to me, and lying to others.  So, if I met a person who was always completely honest with me, that would NOT prevent me from having a DREAM or a HALLUCINATION about that person lying to me.  

Because I have had experiences of people lying to me, and because I have had experiences of the person who was always honest with me (let's say his name was James), I can put those two different ideas together in my imagination, and I can imagine James telling me a lie.  So, even though I have never experienced James lying to me,  I could DREAM about James lying to me, and I could have a HALLUCINATION about James lying to me.  If I were to hallucinate about James lying to me, that hallucination would include James doing something that was "surprising and unexpected" for James to do.

Our minds are able to combine ideas and characteristics and things in ways that we have never actually experienced.  Because of this power of our minds, premise (B) is clearly FALSE.  Thus, Kreeft's argument in support of premise (C) is UNSOUND, and Kreeft has FAILED to give us a good reason to believe that premise (C) is true.

Furthermore, given that our minds can combine ideas and characteristics to create or imagine new and novel things and circumstances, it is clear that premise (C) is FALSE.  For example, we see birds flying, and we see people walking and running and swimming, but we never see people flying like birds, and we never experience flying like a bird in normal life.  But we can DREAM about people flying, and we can DREAM about flying ourselves.  

Our minds have the power to combine ideas and experiences in new and novel ways.  We can imagine the experience of flying like a bird, so we can have DREAMS about flying, and we can have HALLUCINATIONS about flying.  Flying like a bird is not physically possible for humans, so we don't have such experiences, and if I experience flying in a DREAM, that is something that is "surprising and unexpected" for me to be able to do.  But nothing prevents my mind from imagining what it would be like to fly like a bird, and many people do have such experiences while DREAMING.

We can imagine a person who has always been honest and truthful to us telling us a lie.  We have experienced people lying to us and lying to others, so we are able to imagine anyone, even a totally honest person, lying to us.  Because we can imagine anyone lying to us, we can DREAM about a person who is in fact completely honest lying to us, and we can HALLUCINATE about a person who is in fact completely honest lying to us.  If I know a completely honest person named "James", I can DREAM or HALLUCINATE about James lying to me, even if I have never ever experienced James lying to me.  That means that I can DREAM or HALLUCINATE about James saying something to me that it would be "surprising and unexpected" for James to say to me.  Thus, premise (C) is FALSE.  


EVALUATION OF OBJECTION #6

Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that (2B) is true, and there is a good reason to believe (2B) is FALSE, so we may conclude that premise (2B) is FALSE, and that the core argument of Objection #6 is UNSOUND.

Kreeft has also FAILED to provide us with a good reason to believe that (C) is true, and we have good reason to believe that (C) is FALSE, so we may conclude that premise (C) is FALSE, and that the core argument of Objection #6 is UNSOUND. 

Because both key premises in the core argument of Objection #6 are FALSE, it is clear that this core argument is UNSOUND, and that means that Kreeft's Objection #6 FAILS to refute the Hallucination Theory.

Saturday, December 25, 2021

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 23: Evaluation of Premise (2B)

WHERE WE ARE 

The core of the argument constituting Peter Kreeft's Objection #6 is as follows:

 C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

The logic of the core argument is VALID, so the main questions at issue about this argument concern the premises:

  • Is premise (C) TRUE?
  • Is premise (2B) TRUE? 

EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (2B)

Kreeft assumes a historical claim in support of premise (2B):  

D. Some of Jesus' followers experienced alleged appearances of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do. (see Acts 1:4, 9)

Thus:

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

As I mentioned in Part 22 of this series, the historical claim asserted in premise (D) is too subjective and vague to be the basis for a REFUTATION or DISPROOF of anything, because one cannot possibly prove or disprove such a vague and subjective claim.  But one can offer reasons for and against (D), so it is subject to rational evaluation, to a limited degree.  

Premise (D) is itself supported by a reference to a few verses in the first chapter of Acts:

4 While staying with them, he ordered them not to leave Jerusalem, but to wait there for the promise of the Father. “This,” he said, “is what you have heard from me; 

5 for John baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days from now.”

8 But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth.” 

9 When he had said this, as they were watching, he was lifted up, and a cloud took him out of their sight.  (Acts 1:4-5 & 8-9)

Kreeft focuses on verse 4 and verse 9.   In verse 4 Jesus says something, and in verse 9 Jesus does not say anything.  So, presumably it is in verse 4 that Kreeft thinks Jesus says something that was "surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say", and in verse 9 Kreeft thinks that Jesus does something that was "surprising and unexpected for Jesus to...do".


ACTS CHAPTER 1 VERSE 9

But in verse 9 Jesus doesn't actually do anything.  Jesus "was lifted up" into the sky by some invisible being or force.  One might infer that Jesus was causing himself to rise up into the sky by some supernatural power that he possessed, but the verse does NOT say this.  

Since God raised Jesus from the dead, according to Christian belief, it seems more likely (from a Christian point of view) that God was the cause of Jesus rising up into the sky, providing a second astonishing miracle to show God's approval of Jesus' life and teachings.  But if God caused Jesus to rise up into the sky, then Jesus was NOT doing something that was "surprising and unexpected";  God was doing something to Jesus.  

Furthermore, since God is mysterious, we cannot with any confidence predict what God is going to say or do.  But if we cannot confidently predict what God would do to Jesus after Jesus appeared to his followers for several weeks, then how can we confidently judge that God causing Jesus to be "lifted up" into the sky was a "surprising and unexpected" thing for God to do? Nevertheless, what God was doing to Jesus in this situation does NOT seem particularly "surprising and unexpected".  

In the Old Testament, God raised the great prophet  Elijah up into heaven at the end of Elijah's ministry (2 Kings 2:1-15).  Although we could not confidently predict that God would do the same thing to Jesus, any Jewish follower of Jesus who was familiar with OT stories about the prophet Elijah might well have guessed that God would "lift up" Jesus into heaven, like God had done with the prophet Elijah, according to the OT.  

The followers of Jesus believed Jesus to be a great prophet, and some Jews who were impressed by Jesus believed that Jesus was  in fact Elijah, who had returned from being in heaven with God (Luke 9:18-19).  Given that Jesus was believed to be a great prophet like Elijah, and given that some people believed that Jesus was Elijah, it does not seem "surprising and unexpected" that God would "lift up" Jesus into the sky at the end of his ministry, just as God did with Elijah, according to the OT. 

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Jesus caused himself to rise up into the sky, using some supernatural power that he possessed.  Could we then conclude that Jesus had done something that was "surprising and unexpected" for Jesus to do?  Is this action "surprising and unexpected" because ordinary people cannot fly or float up into the sky?   But according to the Gospels, Jesus had previously performed extraordinary supernatural feats like this on a number of occasions:

  • Jesus walked on water.  (Mark 6:45-51)
  • Jesus fed thousands of people with two fishes and five loaves of bread. (Mark 6:34-44)
  • Jesus turned water into wine. (John 2:1-11)
  • Jesus raised people from the dead. (Mark 5:21-43 & John 11:38-43)

If the Gospels provide accurate and reliable information about the life and ministry of Jesus, then Jesus performed extraordinary supernatural feats on a number of occasions before he was crucified.  If Jesus had performed a number of extraordinary supernatural feats before he was crucified, then it doesn't seem particularly "surprising and unexpected" for Jesus to perform another extraordinary supernatural feat after he was crucified and rose from the dead.  So, either the Gospels contain several fictional stories about Jesus performing extraordinary supernatural feats, or else, there seems to be nothing particularly "surprising and unexpected" about Jesus causing himself to rise up into the sky at the end of his ministry.  

If the Gospels do contain several fictional stories about Jesus performing extraordinary supernatural feats, then the credibility of the Gospels would be destroyed, and thus Kreeft and other Christian apologists would have no hope of ever proving, or making a strong case for, the claim that Jesus rose from the dead.  But if the Gospels stories about Jesus performing several extraordinary supernatural feats are accurate and true, then the view that Jesus causing himself to rise up into the sky was "surprising and unexpected" seems rather dubious. Such a grand supernatural exit by Jesus seems like something that Jesus' disciples would have EXPECTED, if not predicted, Jesus to do.

So, either the Gospels are UNRELIABLE accounts of the life, ministry, and death of Jesus (thus eliminating any hope of proving the resurrection of Jesus), or else premise (D) appears to be FALSE, or at least DUBIOUS, in terms of the idea of Jesus doing something that would be "surprising and unexpected" for Jesus to do.


ACTS CHAPTER 1 VERSES 4 and 5

What about what Jesus SAYS in verses 4 and 5 of Chapter 1 of Acts?  Does Jesus say something that is "surprising and unexpected" for Jesus to say?

4 While staying with them, he ordered them not to leave Jerusalem, but to wait there for the promise of the Father. “This,” he said, “is what you have heard from me; 

5 for John baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days from now.”

First of all, it does NOT seem "surprising and unexpected" for Jesus to be talking about "the Holy Spirit" to his disciples after his crucifixion, because he did so during his ministry before he was crucified:

If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him!” (Luke 11:13, NRSV)

And everyone who speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven; but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven.  (Luke 12:10, NRSV)

11 When they bring you before the synagogues, the rulers, and the authorities, do not worry about how you are to defend yourselves or what you are to say; 

12 for the Holy Spirit will teach you at that very hour what you ought to say.”  (Luke 12:11-12, NRSV)

In the very passage from Acts that Kreeft points us to, Jesus says that "This...is what you have heard from me" indicating that this is NOT something new that he is telling his disciples, but something that Jesus had taught his disciples previously. 

Second, the idea that Jesus would "baptize" his disciples "with the Holy Spirit" is an idea that John the Baptist had previously predicted, and some of Jesus' disciples had been disciples of John the Baptist before they became disciples of Jesus, so they would have been aware of this prediction by John the Baptist:

15 As the people were filled with expectation, and all were questioning in their hearts concerning John, whether he might be the Messiah, 

16 John answered all of them by saying, “I baptize you with water; but one who is more powerful than I is coming; I am not worthy to untie the thong of his sandals. He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and fire.  (Luke 3:15-16) 

Not only had Jesus previously taught his disciples about "the Holy Spirit", but a devout Jew who the disciples admired had specifically predicted that Jesus would one day "baptize" his followers "with the Holy Spirit". So, what Jesus says in verses 4 and 5 of Chapter 1 of Acts does not appear to be anything that it is "surprising and unexpected" for Jesus to say. 


THE UNRELIABILITY OF ACTS CHAPTER 1

Furthermore, I have been treating the passage from Chapter 1 of Acts as if it was accurate and reliable information about Jesus and his disciples.  But people who advocate the Hallucination Theory are, in general, skeptical people.  People who believe or take seriously the Hallucination Theory are unlikely to view the Gospels or the book of Acts as being historically reliable.  Skeptics generally view the Gospels and Acts as being UNRELIABLE sources of historical information.  From a skeptical point of view, the claims about Jesus in Chapter 1 of Acts, are very DUBIOUS claims.  So, the reference to verses in Chapter 1 of Acts FAIL to provide significant support for premise (D).

Finally, there are not only many good reasons to doubt the historical reliability of the Gospels and Acts, but there are also good reasons to doubt the historical reliability of Chapter 1 of Acts in particular.  Luke and Acts were written by the same author.  I have previously argued that the stories about Jerusalem appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples found in Luke and John are probably fictional, because the Gospel of Mark and the Gospel of Matthew agree that the FIRST appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples took place in Galilee a week or more after Jesus was crucified, while the Gospels of Luke and John tell stories about appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples happening in Jerusalem about 48 hours after the crucifixion of Jesus. 

Luke has Jesus tell the disciples to "remain in Jerusalem" (Luke 24:45-49), which directly contradicts the Gospels of Mark and Matthew, where the risen Jesus sends a message to his disciples that he is heading back to Galilee and that they are to leave Jerusalem and head back to Galilee in order to meet Jesus in Galilee (Mark 16:1-7, Matthew 28:1-10).  In the book of Acts, Jesus' apostles remain in Jerusalem until Pentacost, meaning that they remain in Jerusalem after the crucifixion for nearly two months.  Given that Mark and Matthew are more likely to be correct than Luke and John about whether Jesus' apostles stayed in Jerusalem after the crucifixion, we have good reason to believe that Chapter 1 of Acts is just as fictional as the final chapter of the Gospel of Luke.  

It is more likely that the apostles fled Jerusalem and headed back to Galilee as soon as they could after Jesus was arrested, in order to avoid being crucified along with their leader Jesus.  It took them several days to walk back to Galilee, and the first experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus took place in Galilee a week or more after the crucifixion. So, we have good reason to doubt the historicity of Chapter 1 of Acts. Therefore, Kreeft has FAILED to provide us with a good reason to believe the historical claims in Chapter 1 of Acts, and we have good reason to believe that Chapter 1 of Acts is fiction or a FALSE story that the author of Luke and Acts heard being told in some Christian community. So, Kreeft has FAILED to provide us with any significant evidence for premise (D), and premise (D) remains DUBIOUS.


PREMISE (2B) DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM PREMISE (D)

Kreeft has FAILED to prove the key premise (2B), because the only reason he offers in support of (2B) is the DUBIOUS claim (D).  But not only is (D) a DUBIOUS claim, but even if (D) were true, premise (2B) does NOT FOLLOW from (D).  The inference from (D) to (2B) is INVALID.

In order to get from (D) to (2B), Kreeft needs to make at least one other assumption, and the most likely assumption that he was making here is that the Hallucination Theory implies that any alleged experiences of Jesus' followers of the risen Jesus must have been hallucinations:

D. Some of Jesus' followers experienced alleged appearances of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do. (see Acts 1:4, 9)

E. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN any experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus had by Jesus' followers must have been hallucinations of the risen Jesus.

Thus:

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

But as I have argued in previous posts, Kreeft's understanding of the Hallucination Theory is mistaken.  First of all, only SOME versions of the Hallucination Theory require that SOME of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus. Other versions, such as the view that some of Jesus' followers experienced DREAMS of the risen Jesus, do not require that any of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

Second, even versions of the Hallucination Theory that require that some of Jesus' followers had hallucinations of the risen Jesus do NOT require that ALL experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus had by his followers must have been hallucinations.  What matters is the specific experiences, perhaps had by some of the apostles, that were primary causes of the early Christian belief in Jesus' physical resurrection were hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

If, for example, Peter had a hallucination of the risen Jesus, and that convinced Peter that Jesus had physically risen from the dead, and if Peter then was able to convince some other apostles of Jesus to believe that Jesus had physically risen from the dead, then it would be the case that Peter's hallucination of the risen Jesus was the primary cause of the early Christian belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus.  In that case, others might have had dreams of the risen Jesus, and that would not contradict the version of the Hallucination Theory that requires that the primary cause of the early Christian belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus was a hallucination (or hallucinations) of the risen Jesus.

Thus, premise (E) is simply FALSE.  This is a mistaken assumption that Kreeft appears to make about the nature of the Hallucination Theory.  Kreeft's reasoning in support of premise (2B) is based on the DUBIOUS premise (D), and the FALSE premise (E), so the argument for (2B) is clearly UNSOUND, and gives us no good reason to believe that (2B) is true.  Thus, Kreeft has FAILED to show that the key premise (2B) is true, and this premise remains DUBIOUS.

Finally, since the Hallucination Theory can be TRUE even if NONE of the followers of Jesus ever experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus (e.g. if they experienced DREAMS of the risen Jesus and this convinced them that Jesus had in fact risen), premise (2B) is simply FALSE.

Thursday, December 23, 2021

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 22: Objection #6: Surprising Words and Actions

 WHERE WE ARE

Peter Kreeft's fifth objection to the Hallucination Theory was given in two brief sentences. In Part 19 of this series of posts, I clarified the meanings of those two sentences, made explicit the UNSTATED conclusion of this argument, figured out the UNSTATED premises that form the core of the argument constituting Objection #5, and determined the logical structure of the argument. The core argument in Objection #5 is as follows:

C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

In Part 20 of this series, I showed that premise (C), a key premise in the argument constituting Peter Kreeft's Objection #5 against the Hallucination Theory, was not only DUBIOUS (because Kreeft failed to show it was true), but that this premise was in fact FALSE.


In Part 21 of this series, I have shown that Kreeft's argument in support of premise (D) is based on a DUBIOUS premise and on an INVALID inference from that DUBIOUS premise, so the argument supporting (D) is UNSOUND, and thus premise (D) is itself DUBIOUS.

The argument constituting Objection #5 against the Hallucination Theory is clearly a BAD argument, and therefore Objection #5 FAILS, just like Objection #1, Objection #2, Objection #3, and Objection #4 all FAILED:


It is time to take a look at Kreeft's Objection #6 (Surprising Words & Actions).


INITIAL ANALYSIS OF OBJECTION #6

Kreeft again presents a very brief and UNCLEAR argument constituting his sixth objection against the Hallucination Theory:

6. Hallucinations come from within, from what we already know, at least unconsciously. This one said and did surprising and unexpected things (Acts 1:4,9)—like a real person and unlike a dream. (HCA, p.187)

Once again Kreeft left the conclusion of the argument UNSTATED:

1. Hallucinations come from what we already know.

2. This one said and did surprising and unexpected things.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

Once again Kreeft leaves important premises UNSTATED, because the conclusion clearly does NOT FOLLOW logically from these two STATED premises.  Once again Kreeft uses the referring expression "This one" in premise (2) which is a reference back to the subject of premise (1): "Hallucinations".  Once again if we take premise (2) literally and straightforwardly it contradicts Kreeft's own view:

1. Hallucinations come from what we already know.

2A. Hallucinations of the risen Jesus experienced by some of his followers included Jesus saying and doing surprising and unexpected things for Jesus to say or do.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

If some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus, then that SUPPORTS the Hallucination Theory, which Kreeft is attempting to DISPROVE.  Once again, because Kreeft's argument is so UNCLEAR, it needs a good deal of clarification before we can properly evaluate the argument.


TOO SUBJECTIVE AND TOO VAGUE TO BE A REFUTATION

However, it is possible to make an important initial evaluation before clarifying the argument further.  Premise (2) is a key premise of this argument but it makes a claim that is both SUBJECTIVE and VAGUE.  The following two kinds of claims are hopelessly SUBJECTIVE and VAGUE:

It would be surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say X. 

It would be surprising and unexpected for Jesus to do X.

In general, claims like this about Jesus will be impossible to PROVE or DISPROVE with any significant degree of certainty.  One can give reasons for or against such claims, but they are too SUBJECTIVE and too VAGUE to be the sort of claim that can be a rational basis for a DISPROOF or REFUTATION of the Hallucination Theory. At best, Objection #6 can only provide a modest reason against the Hallucination Theory, and cannot possibly DISPROVE or REFUTE the Hallucination Theory.


THIS IS DANGEROUS TERRITORY FOR KREEFT

In this argument, Kreeft is stomping around on ground where angels fear to tread.  His argument here threatens a basic doctrine of Christian faith.

God is mysterious.  God is perfectly wise and all-knowing, according to Christian theology.  Are we finite and limited human beings capable of PREDICTING what God is going to say or do?  We are able to predict the words and actions of other ordinary human beings to some degree.  But even predicting the words and actions of ordinary people is a shaky and uncertain thing to do.  How much more uncertain and unreliable would the predictions of finite and imperfect humans be about an infinite and perfect person who is all-knowing

The problem of evil illustrates the difficulty of knowing what God will say or do.  A world in which there is predation, where preditor animals hunt, kill, and eat other animals does not seem like what a perfectly good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God would create.  A world in which there is pain, suffering and death does not seem like what a perfectly good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God would make.  A world in which there are viruses, bacteria, and parasites that cause sentient animals and human beings to suffer and die does not seem like a world that a perfectly good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God would create.  But this world is such a world, so if God exists and this world was created by God, then clearly God's ways are mysterious, and we limited and finite human beings cannot understand or predict what God will say and do.

But if Jesus was God incarnate, then any difficulty that we have in trying to PREDICT the words and actions of God apply equally to PREDICTING the words and actions of Jesus.  If God is a mystery, and if Jesus was God incarnate, then Jesus must be just as much a mystery to us as God.  If the words and actions of God are something that we limited and finite humans CANNOT PREDICT, then the words and actions of Jesus must also be something that we finite humans CANNOT PREDICT.   

If we humans can PREDICT what Jesus will say or do, then Jesus is presumably an ordinary human being and Jesus is NOT God incarnate.  But if we CANNOT PREDICT what Jesus will say or do, then nothing Jesus says or does can be "surprising and unexpected".  So, either Christianity is FALSE (for claiming that Jesus is God incarnate) or else it is not possible to determine whether Kreeft's premise (2) is TRUE.  

In confidently asserting premise (2) to be TRUE, Kreeft implies that the words and actions of Jesus can be PREDICTED by ordinary finite humans, and this strongly suggests that Jesus is an ordinary finite human being and that Jesus is NOT God incarnate. So, if this argument by Kreeft is successful, it will also cast doubt on a basic doctrine of the Christian faith: the belief that Jesus is God incarnate.


MAKING KREEFT'S UNSTATED PREMISES EXPLICIT

The first premise of Kreeft's argument FAILS to logically connect with the second premise, because the first premise talks about "from what we already know", but the second premise talks about what is "surprising and unexpected".  Clearly, Kreeft assumes that there is a connection between these two different concepts:

1. Hallucinations come from what we already know.

B. IF hallucinations come from what we already know, THEN in hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do. 

Thus:

C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.

The second premise of Kreeft's argument appears to contradict his own viewpoint:

2A. Hallucinations of the risen Jesus experienced by some of his followers included Jesus saying and doing surprising and unexpected things for Jesus to say or do.

This premise needs to be revised so that it does not contradict Kreeft's own view.  As with the previous argument constituting Objection #5, Kreeft intends to put forward a reduction-to-absurdity argument against the Hallucination Theory:

2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

Kreeft references a couple of verses from the book of Acts in support of this second premise, so there is an UNSTATED historical claim that he has in mind as support for the second premise:  

D. Some of Jesus' followers experienced alleged appearances of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do. (see Acts 1:4, 9)

Thus:

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say and do.

The core of the argument constituting Objection #6 is thus as follows:

 C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

The logical structure of the whole argument constituting Objection #6 can now be diagramed:

Now that we have clarified and analyzed the argument constituting Kreeft's Objection #6 against the Hallucination Theory, we are in a position to rationally evaluate the argument, which I will begin to do in the next post of this series.

Defending the MYTH THEORY - INDEX

In this series of fifteen posts, I have shown that every single one of Peter Kreeft's six objections against the  Myth Theory  FAILS: Kr...