William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 21: Craig's Either/Or Fallacy

 WHERE WE ARE

In Part 20 of this series, I argued that Craig failed to give us a good reason to believe premise (D1) of the reformulated sub-argument for his key premise (5c).  This means that we may reasonably reject this sub-argument, which gives us a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

However, this problem with Craig's case reveals a deeper problem that impacts not only Craig's case but also other cases for the resurrection of Jesus by other Christian apologists.  Specifically, Peter Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus and Josh McDowell's case for the resurrection of Jesus are both Dead on Arrival because their cases involve the Either/Or Fallacy, also referred to as a False Dilemma. Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is also Dead on Arrival because his case commits the Either/Or Fallacy.

THE EITHER/OR FALLACY IN PETER KREEFT'S CASE

Let's begin with Peter Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  Peter Kreeft uses a diagram to lay out the various logical possibilities in relation to alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate[1]:

According to Peter Kreeft, there are only five possible hypotheses about the final fate of Jesus. The five hypotheses are listed on the right side of the above diagram. 

Notice that only the "Christian" hypothesis is a supernatural hypothesis. The Christian Hypothesis here is the same as Craig's Resurrection Hypothesis.  And just as Craig discusses and evaluates only ONE supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate, so does Kreeft discuss and evaluate only ONE supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate.

Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead on Arrival, because his reasoning can be summarized as follows: 

EO1. EITHER there is a plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the relevant facts about Jesus' final fate, OR the supernatural explanation of the Christian Hypothesis is correct.

EO2. There is no plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the relevant facts about Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE:

EO3. The supernatural explanation of the Christian Hypothesis is correct.

Premise (EO1) is false, because there are alternative supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate besides just the Christian Hypothesis (i.e. the Resurrection Hypothesis).

Peter Kreeft's diagram of the logical possibilities is clearly mistaken because it fails to take into account the fact that there are other supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate besides the Christian Hypothesis (or the Resurrection Hypothesis).  In Part 20 of this series, I pointed out that there are at least three such alternative supernatural hypotheses.  Kreeft's case for the resurrection is based on an Either/Or Fallacy.  Premise (EO1), in the above summary of Kreeft's reasoning, asserts a False Dilemma.

THE EITHER/OR FALLACY IN JOSH MCDOWELL'S CASE

Now let's take a look at Josh McDowell's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  McDowell also uses a diagram to lay out the various logical possibilities in relation to alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate[2]:

McDowell divides all hypotheses about Jesus' final fate into two broad categories: Occupied Tomb hypotheses and Empty Tomb hypotheses.  Unlike Kreeft and Craig, McDowell does consider one supernatural hypothesis in addition to the Resurrection Hypothesis.  Among the Occupied Tomb hypotheses, McDowell considers and evaluates the Spiritual Resurrection Hypothesis:

A fourth 'occupied tomb' theory is that Christ's body decayed in the grave and that His real resurrection was spiritual.[3]

This hypothesis accepts that there was a resurrection miracle, but that the miracle did not involve Jesus' physical body.  God returned Jesus to life after death, but did not do so by giving Jesus an immortal physical body.  After his death, Jesus became a spirit or an angel, and his physical body remained in the tomb where it had been buried, according to the Spiritual Resurrection Hypothesis.

Because McDowell does consider at least this one supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate, the reasoning that I used to summarize Kreeft's case does not accurately represent McDowell's reasoning. 

However, if we focus on the general category of "Empty Tomb" hypotheses, McDowell does commit a similar Either/Or Fallacy and thus his case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead on Arrival:

JM1. EITHER there is a plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the Empty Tomb and other relevant facts about Jesus' final fate, OR the supernatural Resurrection Hypothesis is correct.

JM2. There is no plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the Empty Tomb and other relevant facts about Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE:

JM3. The supernatural Resurrection Hypothesis is correct.

Premise (JM1) is false because there are alternative supernatural hypotheses besides the Resurrection Hypothesis that explain the empty tomb.  For example, McDowell does not mention or evaluate the Demonic Hypothesis.  In a later post, I will discuss another supernatural hypothesis that would also explain the empty tomb.

Josh McDowell's diagram of the logical possibilities is clearly mistaken because it fails to take into account the fact that there are other supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate that explain the empty tomb besides the Resurrection Hypothesis.  

McDowell's case for the resurrection is based on an Either/Or fallacy.  Premise (JM1), in the above summary of McDowell's reasoning, asserts a False Dilemma.

THE EITHER/OR FALLACY IN WILLIAM CRAIG'S CASE

William Craig summarizes his case for the resurrection of Jesus in two paragraphs on page 360 of his book Reasonable Faith (3rd edition). Although Craig mentions "alternative naturalistic explanations" in those paragraphs, the ONLY reference to a supernatural explanation or hypothesis in those paragraphs is to the "resurrection hypothesis", the view that God raised Jesus from the dead.

Craig also provides a shorter one-paragraph summary of his case at the bottom of page 360 and the top of page 361:

As alluded to above, the case for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus seems to me to rest upon the evidence for three great, independently established facts: the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith. If these three facts can be established, and no plausible natural explanation can account for them as well as the resurrection hypothesis, then one is justified in inferring Jesus' resurrection as the most plausible explanation of the data.[4] 

Given this summary of his case, Craig's argument is based on showing that the Resurrection Hypothesis provides a more plausible explanation of certain alleged historical facts about Jesus' final fate than various natural explanations or hypotheses.  This completely ignores the fact that there are alternative supernatural hypotheses that should be considered and evaluated in comparison to the Resurrection Hypothesis. 

Therefore, Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus, like Kreeft's case, is Dead on Arrival because it can be accurately summarized as an argument that commits the Either/Or Fallacy:  

EO1. EITHER there is a plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the relevant facts about Jesus' final fate, OR the supernatural explanation of the Christian Hypothesis is correct.

EO2. There is no plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the relevant facts about Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE:

EO3. The supernatural explanation of the Christian Hypothesis is correct.

This is a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead on Arrival.  His case fails because it is based on a False Dilemma. 

END NOTES

1. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p.182.

2. Josh McDowell, The Resurrection Factor (Milton Keynes, England: Authentic Media, 2005), p.114.

3. Josh McDowell, The Resurrection Factor (Milton Keynes, England: Authentic Media, 2005), pp. 90-91.

4. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), pp.360-361.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 20: A Third Reason Why Craig's Case Fails

 WHERE WE ARE

Although I have given up, for now, on trying to clarify premise (C1) of Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c), I have proposed an alternative principle that is focused exclusively on the question "What was Jesus' final fate?" and that seems to be a plausible and acceptable principle, namely premise (C3) in the argument below. This more narrowly focused principle allows me to reformulate Craig's sub-argument for premise (5c):

D1. The Resurrection Hypothesis about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.

B1. The Resurrection Hypothesis about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.

C3. A hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses that either (a) have been mentioned or discussed in books or articles published by Christian thinkers or scholars or by non-Christian or skeptical thinkers or scholars in this century or in the previous century or that (b) are versions of those hypotheses in which unnecessary details or complexities have been removed.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

I will now begin to evaluate this reformulated argument for premise (5c). 

EVALUATION OF PREMISE (D1)

Although premise (D1) does not explicitly state the scope of the phrase "the alternative supernatural hypotheses about the final fate of Jesus", in order for (D1) to logically connect with premise (C3), the scope of this phrase in (D1) must be at least as wide as the scope specified in (C3).  That is to say, (D1) will logically connect with (C3) only if the collection of "the alternative supernatural hypotheses about the final fate of Jesus" that are referenced in premise (D1) includes all of the alternative supernatural hypotheses about the final fate of Jesus that are within the scope specified in premise (C3). 

So, we may reasonably assume that the scope of "the alternative supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate" referenced in premise (D1) are hypotheses that either (a) have been mentioned or discussed in books or articles published by Christian thinkers or scholars or by non-Christian or skeptical thinkers or scholars in this century or in the previous century or that (b) are versions of those hypotheses in which unnecessary details or complexities have been removed.

Premise (D1) is dubious, because Craig has given us no good reason to believe that premise (D1) is true.  But (D1) is not obviously true nor does (D1) assert a self-evident truth. So, Craig's failure to give us a good reason to believe that (D1) is true means it is reasonable to conclude that this premise is dubious; (D1) might well be false.

OTHER SUPERNATURAL HYPOTHESES

How many supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate were discussed by Craig and evaluated in comparison to his favored supernatural hypothesis, the Resurrection Hypothesis? Craig compares ZERO alternative supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate to the Resurrection Hypothesis.  The ONLY supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate that is evaluated by Craig in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith is the Resurrection Hypothesis.  

Is it actually the case that the Resurrection Hypothesis is the ONLY supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate? This is obviously not the case, because the Gospel of Luke, for example, clearly suggests a supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate that is an alternative to the Resurrection Hypothesis.

THE GHOST HYPOTHESIS 

According to the Gospel of Luke, Jesus rose from the dead on Sunday morning, less than 48 hours after he was taken down from the cross, and he appeared to his gathered disciples on Sunday evening:  

36 While they were talking about this, Jesus himself stood among them and said to them, “Peace be with you.” 37 They were startled and terrified and thought that they were seeing a ghost. 38 He said to them, “Why are you frightened, and why do doubts arise in your hearts? 39 Look at my hands and my feet; see that it is I myself. Touch me and see, for a ghost does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have." 40 And when he had said this, he showed them his hands and his feet.  (Luke 24:36-40, NRSV Updated Edition, emphasis added)

 

According to this story, Jesus' disciples initially believed that they were seeing a ghost, the ghost of the dead Jesus. The whole purpose of this specific story appears to be to persuade readers that the skeptical view that appearances of the risen Jesus were simply appearances of the ghost of Jesus is a mistaken view.  

This passage in the Gospel of Luke was written to combat an alternative supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate, namely the hypothesis that: Alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples were simply the appearances of the ghost of Jesus who had died, and who was still dead when these appearances of Jesus to his disciples took place. Let's call this supernatural explanation of the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus the Ghost Hypothesis.

Craig never evaluates this alternative supernatural hypothesis in comparison with the Resurrection Hypothesis, so he never shows that the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of his three key alleged historical facts than the Ghost Hypothesis. 

But the Ghost Hypothesis is not only mentioned in the Gospel of Luke, it is also mentioned by many N.T. scholars who have commented on Chapter 24 of the Gospel of Luke in the 20th century.  

For example, in his commentary on the Gospel of Luke, the Evangelical N.T. scholar Robert Stein makes this comment about the purposes of the author of the Gospel of Luke in telling the above story about an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus:

Another purpose was to demonstrate the physical reality of the risen Christ. What the disciples experienced was not the immortal soul of Jesus or some ghostlike apparition from the nether world.  Rather they experienced the resurrected Christ, and this involved the resurrection of the body.[1]

In other words, the author of the Gospel of Luke told this story and included the specific details in it, in order to combat the skeptical idea that the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples were actually appearances of the ghost of Jesus to his disciples. 

Thus, the N.T. scholar Robert Stein references what I have called the Ghost Hypothesis, in his commentary on Chapter 24 of the Gospel of Luke, a commentary that was published in 1992, near the end of the 20th century. This supernatural hypothesis about the final fate of Jesus was referenced by various Christian scholars in books published in the 20th century, so this hypothesis falls within the scope of hypotheses circumscribed in premise (C3). 

Because Craig is an NT scholar who is familiar with the Gospel of Luke, and especially with the story of the alleged appearance of Jesus to his disciples found in Chapter 24 of the Gospel of Luke, Craig has no excuse for his failure to consider the Ghost Hypothesis as an alternative to the Resurrection Hypothesis.

THE DEMONIC HYPOTHESIS

Another supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate is suggested by something Jesus himself taught in the Gospel of Mark:

21 And if anyone says to you at that time, ‘Look! Here is the Messiah!’ or ‘Look! There he is!’—do not believe it. 22 False messiahs and false prophets will appear and produce signs and wonders, to lead astray, if possible, the elect. 23 But be alert; I have already told you everything. (Mark 13:21-23, NRSV Updated Edition)

According to Jesus, false messiahs and false prophets can produce "signs and wonders" in order to deceive people.  If that is the case, then it is possible that Jesus was himself a false messiah or a false prophet who managed to rise from the dead as a "sign and wonder" in order to deceive his disciples and others. 

Presumably, the supernatural powers of false messiahs and false prophets do not come from God but from demons or from the devil himself.  Thus, this teaching of Jesus suggests the supernatural hypothesis that: Jesus was raised from the dead by a demon or by the devil, as part of a scheme to deceive Jesus' disciples and other people. Let's call this supernatural hypothesis the Demonic Hypothesis.

According to the Gospels, Jewish opponents of Jesus attributed his miracles to the devil:

22 Then they brought to him a demon-possessed man who was blind and mute, and he cured him, so that the one who had been mute could speak and see. 23 All the crowds were amazed and were saying, “Can this be the Son of David?” 24 But when the Pharisees heard it, they said, “It is only by Beelzebul, the ruler of the demons, that this man casts out the demons.” (Matthew 12:22-24, NRSV Updated Edition)

In 1987, Pope John Paul II taught about how the opponents of Jesus attributed "the miracles performed by Jesus" to "the power of Satan": 

In this regard it is well to observe that these facts are not only attested to and narrated by the apostles and disciples of Jesus, but in many cases they are admitted by his opponents. For example, it is significant that they did not deny the reality of the miracles performed by Jesus, but they attributed them to the power of Satan. For they said, "He is possessed by Beelzebul, and by the prince of demons he drives out demons" (Mk 3:22; cf. also Mt 8:32, 12:24; Lk 11:14-15). [2]

The Pope went on to mention that many other miracles were performed by Jesus:

All the evangelists record the facts to which Peter referred on the day of Pentecost, "mighty deeds, wonders and signs" (cf. Acts 2:22). The Synoptics narrate many individual events, but at times they also use generalized expressions. For example, Mark's Gospel states, "He cured many who were sick with various diseases, and he drove out many demons" (1:34). Likewise Matthew and Luke state, "...curing every disease and illness among the people" (Mt 4:23); "...power came forth from him and healed them all" (Lk 6:19). These expressions give us to understand the great number of miracles performed by Jesus.[2]

At the end of this teaching, the Pope mentioned the resurrection of Jesus, calling it the "miracle of miracles":

...the death [of Jesus] on the cross and the "miracle" of the resurrection (miracle of miracles)...[2] 

Although Pope John Paul II did not explicitly describe the Demonic Hypothesis, his key points imply this hypothesis.  If many of the Jewish opponents of Jesus attributed "the miracles performed by Jesus" to "the power of Satan", and if the resurrection of Jesus was viewed as the "miracle of miracles" by Jesus' followers, how might some of the Jewish opponents of Jesus have cast doubt on this alleged amazing miracle? 

Obviously, some of the Jewish opponents of Jesus might well have admitted that Jesus died and came back to life, but then they would have claimed that this amazing event was brought about by "the power of Satan".  Thus, the message of Pope John Paul II referenced above strongly implies that the Demonic Hypothesis would likely have been one of the skeptical ideas put forward by Jewish opponents of Jesus in the first century. 

Craig, however, does not consider the Demonic Hypothesis in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith, and he does not attempt to evaluate this supernatural hypothesis in comparison with the Resurrection Hypothesis in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith.  So, Craig does not show that the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of his three key alleged historical facts about Jesus' final fate than the Demonic Hypothesis. 

THE VISION HYPOTHESIS

Another alternative supernatural hypothesis is suggested by various stories found in the book of Acts.  For example, in the book of Acts, Stephen, the first Christian martyr, had a vision of Jesus as he made a speech accusing his fellow Jews of having recently murdered the Messiah that God had sent to them: 

51 “You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart and ears, you are forever opposing the Holy Spirit, just as your ancestors used to do. 52 Which of the prophets did your ancestors not persecute? They killed those who foretold the coming of the Righteous One, and now you have become his betrayers and murderers. 53 You are the ones who received the law as ordained by angels, and yet you have not kept it.” 54 When they heard these things, they became enraged and ground their teeth at Stephen. 55 But filled with the Holy Spirit, he gazed into heaven and saw the glory of God and Jesus standing at the right hand of God. 56 “Look,” he said, “I see the heavens opened and the Son of Man standing at the right hand of God!” 57 But they covered their ears, and with a loud shout all rushed together against him. 58 Then they dragged him out of the city and began to stone him...     (Acts 7:51-58, NRSV Updated Edition) 

According to this story, Jesus appeared to Stephen in a VISION; Stephen said to the crowd, "I see the heavens opened..." because nobody else saw Jesus floating in the sky "standing at the right hand of God" at that time. This was an experience that Stephen had that did not correspond to an objective, physically present Jesus.

But if Stephen could have a vision of Jesus, even when Jesus was not physically present, then the same sort of experience could have happened to Jesus' disciples. The story about Stephen in the book of Acts, suggests the idea that the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples were actually visions of Jesus, and those experiences were not the result of Jesus being physically present with the disciples.  

Note that a vision is an experience that is caused by God in order for God to communicate an important truth to the person who has this experience. Thus, a vision is NOT the same as a hallucination.  Skeptics who doubt the existence of supernatural beings and supernatural forces prefer the Hallucination Hypothesis, the view that the alleged experiences of a risen Jesus by the disciples were the result of some sort of brain malfunction that produced experiences that had no direct connection with reality.  

The Vision Hypothesis asserts that the alleged experiences by Jesus' disciples of a living Jesus after his crucifixion were not caused by a brain malfunction, but were intentionally caused by God in order to communicate an important truth to Jesus' disciples.  So, the Vision Hypothesis, unlike the Hallucination Hypothesis, implies the existence of God and of supernatural causes of events, including experiences. 

Note that this Vision Hypothesis is mentioned by the Christian apologists Gary Habermas and Michael Licona in their book The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, which was published in 2004.[3] Christian apologists Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli seem to briefly consider the Vision Hypothesis, which they descibe this way: "...God sent a holy hallucination to teach truths..."[4] The Vision Hypothesis was proposed by Hans Grass in 1964.[5]

Craig, however, does not discuss the Vision Hypothesis in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith, nor does Craig attempt in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith to evaluate the Vision Hypothesis in comparison with the Resurrection Hypothesis.  So, Craig does not show that the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of his three alleged key historical facts than the Vision Hypothesis.

CONCLUSION

In short, there are at least three alternative supernatural hypotheses concerning Jesus' final fate in addition to the Resurrection Hypothesis, but Craig fails to provide a good reason to believe that the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of the relevant historical facts than any of these alternative supernatural hypotheses. 

Because it is not obvious that the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation than these alternative supernatural hypotheses, and because it is not self-evident that the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation than these alternative supernatural hypotheses, the fact that Craig has failed to give us a good reason to believe premise (D1) of the reformulated sub-argument for the key premise (5c), we may reasonably conclude that premise (D1) is dubious.  This gives us a good reason to reject Craig's sub-argument for (5c), and a third good reason to conclude that his case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

END NOTES

1. Robert Stein, The New American Commentary, Volume 24: Luke (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1992), p.618.

2. John Paul II, "The Fact and Significance of Christ's Miracles", dated November 11, 1987, viewed on 5/6/26 on this web page: https://inters.org/John-Paul-II-Catechesis-Miracle-Significance

This is part of  Catechesis on the Meaning of Miracles, November 11, 1987 - January 13, 1988, by Pope John Paul II. 

3. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2004), page 155. 

4. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p.188.

5. Google AI response to "Objective Vision Theory":

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 19: Further Refinement of Premise (C)

 WHERE WE ARE

Here again, is Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c):

D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

I have given up hope, at least for now, of trying to clarify the principle stated in premise (C1).  Thus, I have given up hope, at least for now, of attempting to rationally evaluate whether (C1) is true or false, probable or improbable. Therefore, I am unable to conclude that this sub-argument for (5c) is sound.(Note: I could still determine it to be an unsound argument, if I can clarify one of the other premises and determine that one of the other premises is false or improbable or dubious).

In Part 18 of this series, I proposed that we narrow the scope of premise (C1) so that it only addresses the question of Jesus' final fate.  In that case, I had an idea for how to reformulate (C1) to turn it into a plausible principle:

C2. A hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses that have been mentioned or discussed in books or articles published by Christian thinkers or scholars or by non-Christian or skeptical thinkers or scholars in this century or in the previous century. 

However, on reflection, it now seems to me that the principle stated in (C2) is not correct and is not acceptable as it stands.  This principle is too constrictive; the scope is too narrow for the principle to be plausible and acceptable.

WHY PREMISE (C2) IS TOO NARROW

I have studied the question of the resurrection of Jesus for a number of decades, and one problem that I have found repeatedly with the arguments of Christian apologists is that they frequently commit the STRAWMAN fallacy when they criticize alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

The way that they do this is by including a number of unnecessary details and complexities in their characterizations of naturalistic hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.  

For example, when I recently outlined some of the naturalistic hypotheses considered by William Craig in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith, I revised his characterization of two of the naturalistic hypotheses because he included unnecessary details in his characterizations (see End Notes #4 and #5 in Part 17 of this series).  The more details and the more complexities one includes in characterizations of a naturalistic hypothesis, the less likely it is that the naturalistic hypothesis (so described) will be true. 

It might well be the case that Craig commits the Strawman fallacy unknowingly, and thus innocently, when he characterized these two naturalistic hypotheses: 

• The Wrong Tomb Hypothesis (WTH)
• The Displaced Body Hypothesis (DBH)

In Craig's defense, he accurately described the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis as it was presented by Kirsopp Lake, and he accurately described the Displaced Body Hypothesis as it was presented by Joseph Klausner.  Nevertheless, it is unfair of Craig to characterize these two theories in a way that includes unnecessary details.

Why would the proponents of these alternative naturalistic hypotheses have included unnecessary details?  This error by Lake and by Klausner (and by Craig), is very natural and quite understandable.  It is based on a common cognitive bias that we all have and that we all must consciously fight against, namely the Conjunction Fallacy:  

Cognitive Biases: The Conjunction Fallacy

The Conjunction Fallacy: Where Intuition and Probability Collide

Another cognitive bias also appears to be at work here, namely the Availability Heuristic:

What is the Availability Heuristic?

The characteristic of "vividness" is relevant to this problem with many characterizations of naturalistic hypotheses.  

By including unnecessary details, a storyteller can make the description of an event more vivid, more easily imagined or pictured in the minds of people who hear or read the story.  The vividness of a story often makes that story seem more plausible to the people who hear or read that story.  However, it is simply a fact of probability that the more details are included in a description of an event, the less likely it is the case that the event actually occurred as described. 

The reason that I cannot accept the principle stated in (C2) is that it is very common for alternative naturalistic hypotheses to be characterized UNFAIRLY, because naturalistic hypotheses are frequently characterized with the use of unnecessary details or unnecessary complexity.  Therefore, in order to give alternative naturalistic hypotheses a fair treatment, we must often reformulate the descriptions or characterizations of these hypotheses in order to remove unnecessary details or unnecessary complexities, as I have already done with Craig's characterizations of two alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

A REFINEMENT OF PREMISE (C2)

In view of the above problems with the principle stated in premise (C2), I propose the following revision of that premise:

C3. A hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses that either (a) have been mentioned or discussed in books or articles published by Christian thinkers or scholars or by non-Christian or skeptical thinkers or scholars in this century or in the previous century or that (b) are versions of those hypotheses in which unnecessary details or complexities have been removed.

CONCLUSION 

I realize that this refined version of premise (C) is more complicated and detailed than the original version (C1) and than the more narrowly scoped premise (C2).  But the additional details and complexity are, in my view, needed in order for this principle to be plausible and acceptable. 

 

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 18: More Attempts to Fix Craig's Sub-Argument for (5c)

WHERE WE ARE

William Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c) fails, because the meanings of the premises of the sub-argument are too unclear to be rationally evaluated. So, as the argument stands, it fails to provide us with a good reason to believe that (5c) is true. Unless we can fix Craig's sub-argument by clarifying the meaning of its premises, the sub-argument should be rejected, and that will give us a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

In Part 17 of this series, I considered a possible clarification of the unclear phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" by means of a proposed definition of this phrase that was based upon listing "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" that Craig examines in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith. Although the proposed definition clarified the meaning of premise (B), it did not work to fix Craig's sub-argument because the proposed definition also made premise (C1) false.  Thus, using the proposed definition would make Craig's sub-argument unsound, and the sub-argument would fail.

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)

Here, once again, is Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c): 

D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

CRAIG'S HINT ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE "ALTERNATIVE NATURALISTIC HYPOTHESES"

Because Craig does not realize the significant unclarity of the phrase "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" in his sub-argument for premise (5c), he makes no serious attempt to clarify or define what that phrase means.  So, I suspect I will have to clarify the meaning of this phrase on my own, without much help from Craig.

However, Craig does provide a hint at what he means by this phrase:

An argument for Jesus' resurrection which conforms to actual historiographical practice will be formulated as an inference to the best explanation. According to this approach, we begin with the evidence available to us and then infer what would, if true, provide the best explanation of that evidence. Out of a pool of live options determined by our background beliefs, we select the best of various competing explanations to give a causal account of why the evidence is as it is and not otherwise. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360)

The last sentence in the above quote contains the hint that explanations or hypotheses should be considered from "a pool of live options determined by our background beliefs". In short, according to Craig, we can ignore any "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" that are NOT "live options" based on our "background beliefs".  

In Part 17 of this series, I mentioned that there was some unclarity of the scope of the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses", and that this phrase might refer to ALL such hypotheses, or to SOME such hypotheses, or to a subset of such hypotheses that are characterized in a specific way. We now have a specific characterization that limits the scope of "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" that need to be considered and evaluated: naturalistic hypotheses that are "live options" based on our "background beliefs".

Craig believes that God exists and that God sometimes intervenes in human affairs (i.e. performs miracles).  Thus, the Resurrection Hypothesis is a "live option" for Craig, and he should consider and evaluate that hypothesis to see whether it is a better or worse explanation of the relevant facts than other hypotheses, according to Craig's proposed criterion about the scope of hypotheses that should be considered and evaluated.

However, if Craig is allowed to ignore or set aside some "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" because they are not "live options" for him, based on his background beliefs, then I, and other skeptics, must also be allowed to ignore or set aside some "alternative supernatural hypotheses" if some such hypothesis is not a "live option" for us, because of our background beliefs.

There is an obvious problem here. Different people have different background beliefs.  I, for example, am an atheist.  I believe that God does not exist.  Thus, based on this background belief, I am free to ignore and set aside the Resurrection Hypothesis that Craig is so intent on persuading us all to believe.  

Recall that the Resurrection Hypothesis is the claim that "God raised Jesus from the dead."  Since my backgound belief is that there is no God, the Resurrection Hypothesis is NOT a "live option" for me. So, based on Craig's proposed methodology, I am free to ignore or toss aside the Resurrection Hypothesis before I even begin to consider and evaluate the relative merits of various competing alternative hypotheses.

Furthermore, even if Craig could persuade me to change my mind and to believe that God exists, that would not resolve the issues from the differences in our background beliefs.  As a skeptic, I believe that if God exists, God does not intervene in human affairs.  In other words, if I were to stop being an atheist and to start believing in God, I would be a deist rather than accepting traditional Christian theism.  Deists believe that God exists, but they also believe that God does NOT intervene in human affairs. Given this background belief, I would still be allowed, based on Craig's proposed criterion, to ignore and set aside the Resurrection Hypothesis before considering and evaluating the merits of this hypothesis in comparison with alternative hypotheses.

Suppose that Craig persuades me not only to believe that God exists and that God sometimes intervenes in human affairs, that would still not resolve all of the significant differences in our background beliefs.  I am also an agnostic concerning the plans, purposes, and motivations of God.  In other words, one of my background beliefs is that even if God exists and sometimes intervenes in human affairs, no human being can determine when such interventions have occured, because no human being knows the plans, purposes, or motivations of God. 

This background belief of mine would allow me to ignore and toss aside the Resurrection Hypothesis even before considering and evaluating it in comparison with alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.

Believing in the existence of God is not sufficient to make the Resurrection Hypothesis a "live option" for me.  Also, I do not share Craig's background belief that God sometimes intervenes in human affairs. Furthermore, unlike Craig, I do not believe that humans are able to determine when God has intervened in human affairs, because to do so would require knowing about God's purposes, plans, and motivations, but humans don't have such knowledge, according to my background beliefs.

I'm pretty sure that Craig would not want atheists and skeptics to ignore or toss aside the Resurrection Hypothesis before even considering it and evaluating its plausibility as an explanation for the relevant historical facts about Jesus' final fate. In order to ensure that atheists and skeptics don't simply ignore or toss aside the Resurrection Hypothesis as not being a "live option" based on the background beliefs of atheists and skeptics, Craig might try to lower the requirements for a hypothesis to be a "live option".

For example, Craig might point out that most atheists and skeptics are not 100% certain that there is no God. He might use this idea in order to make the Resurrection Hypothesis into a "live option" even for most atheists and skeptics.  Craig might say that as long as there is a small chance (say a 1% chance) that God exists and that God sometimes intervenes in human affairs, and that humans can know about the plans, purposes, or motivations of God, one should view the Resurrection Hypothesis as a live option.  On this lowered standard, it might well be the case that most atheists and skeptics would be rationally obligated to consider and evaluate the Resurrection Hypothesis in comparison to alternative hypotheses, such as various alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

If Craig wishes to lower the bar for what counts as "a live option" such as that a hypothesis need only have a 1% chance of being true in view of the background beliefs of the person who is doing the investigation, then the bar for alternative naturalistic hypotheses must ALSO be lowered, so that any alternative naturalistic hypothesis that has only a 1% chance of being true in view of the background beliefs of religious people and people who believe in God, and in divine intervention into human affairs, must ALSO be counted as a "live option" for such investigators of Jesus' final fate.  I doubt that Craig would be willing to lower the bar this much for alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

In any case, narrowing the scope of hypotheses that should be considered by using the criterion of whether a hypothesis is "a live option" based on the "background beliefs" of the investigator of the question at issue is problematic both because different people have different background beliefs, and also because the idea of being "a live option" is both vague and subjective. I don't see how Craig's sub-argument can be rescued on the basis of definitions of the unclear phrases "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" and "the alternative supernatural hypotheses" that are grounded in the vague and subjective criterion suggested by Craig.

SCOPE IS THE MAIN ISSUE 

There is actually no obvious problem with the meaning of the term "alternative" nor with the meaning of the term "naturalistic" nor with the meaning of the term "hypotheses", so why is the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" unclear and problematic? 

The problem here is one of scope.  Given Craig's comment implying that some hypotheses can reasonably be set aside based on whether the hypothesis is "a live option" in view of the "background beliefs" of the person who is investigating the question at issue (e.g. What was Jesus' final fate?), it is clear that Craig does not believe that one must consider and evaluate ALL "alternative hypotheses" in order to arrive at a justified conclusion as to which hypothesis is the best explanation of the relevant evidence.  

But if we don't have to consider and evaluate ALL of "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" nor ALL of "the alternative supernatural hypotheses", then how do we determine which hypotheses must be considered and evaluated? How do we determine that we have considered enough alternative hypotheses to arrive at a solid and well-justified conclusion about which hypothesis is the best explanation of the relevant facts?

Obviously, there is no magic number of alternative hypotheses that must be considered and evaluated or that will guarantee that we have examined enough alternative hypotheses.  For some issues, there might be only a handful of hypotheses that need to be considered and evaluated. But for other issues, we might well need to consider and evaluate dozens of alternative hypotheses.

ANOTHER PROPOSED CLARIFICATION

I don't think Craig has provided a useful suggestion in terms of clarification of the problematic phrases in his sub-argument for premise (5c). So, I think I will have to come up with my own suggested clarification, in order to try to make it so that we can rationally evaluate the truth or falsity of the premises of this sub-argument.

Although I cannot think of a good general criterion that could be used to determine which alternative hypotheses should be considered and evaluated, I can make what I believe to be a reasonable suggestion concerning this specific issue, concerning the question "What was Jesus' final fate?"  I think that, in general, the more alternative hypotheses we consider and evaluate the better and more justified our conclusions will be about which hypothesis is the best explanation of the relevant facts.  

However, there are practical limits in terms of the time and effort required to gather up alternative hypotheses to consider and evaluate. There are also practical limits on the time and effort required to do a careful comparison of the relative merits of the various alternative hypotheses.  

I suggest that we limit ourselves to alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate that have been mentioned or discussed by Christian thinkers and scholars, as well as by non-Christian and skeptical thinkers and scholars, who have published books or articles that touch on the question of Jesus' final fate in the current century and in the previous two centuries. If an alternative hypothesis has not been mentioned or discussed in such published books or articles in that time period, it seems reasonable to ignore or set aside such a hypothesis.

Some might complain that this is too wide of a net, and that it would take too much time and effort to identify all such alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.  We could further narrow the scope by limiting the time frame to the current century and the previous century, although I doubt that this would eliminate more than just a few alternative hypotheses from being considered and evaluated.

This suggestion leaves the methodological principle stated in premise (C1) unclear and undefined, because my suggestion is only concerned with the specific issue "What was Jesus' final fate?"  I have not provided a general way of determining when a hypothesis is one that should be considered and evaluated in comparison to other hypotheses in order to arrive at a solid and justified conclusion about which hypothesis is the best explanation for the relevant facts.  So, we still cannot rationally evaluate the truth or falsehood of premise (C1), as it stands.

However, we could narrow the scope of (C1) itself, so that it too is only concerned with the specific issue "What was Jesus' final fate?":

C2. A hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses that have been mentioned or discussed in books or articles published by Christian thinkers or scholars or by non-Christian or skeptical thinkers or scholars in this century or in the previous century. 

I hesitate to say this principle is "true", but it does seem like a reasonable principle, one that seems acceptable in relation to the practical constraints on the time and energy one can invest in this important question.

This proposed scoping of the two problematic phrases in Craig's sub-argument for (5c) has at least three advantages: (a) it casts a fairly wide net for gathering alternative hypotheses, (b) it does place a practical constraint on how many alternative hypotheses should be considered and evaluated, and (c) it is NOT based on subjective criteria such a being "a live option" or a passing a preliminary assessment based on an investigator's particular set of "background beliefs". 

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 17: "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses"

WHERE WE ARE 

In Part 16 of this series, I pointed out a serious problem with Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c).  The premises of this sub-argument are too UNCLEAR to be rationally evaluated. Thus, Craig's sub-argument, as it stands, fails to provide a good reason to believe that premise (5c) is true.

The only chance for Craig's sub-argument supporting premise (5c) to be successful is for us to figure out the meaning of his unclear premises, so that it will be possible to rationally evaluate whether those premises are true or false, probable or improbable. Otherwise, Craig's sub-argument for (5c) fails, and that would give us a third good reason to conclude that his case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)

Here, again, is the sub-argument for the key premise (5c):

D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

I have put the UNCLEAR phrases in red italicized font, showing that all three premises in this sub-argument are infected with unclarity because of the problematic phrases.  

NOTES ON MY REVISIONS TO CRAIG'S PHRASE

On page 360 of the 3rd edition of Reasonable Faith, where Craig summarizes his case for the resurrection, Craig actually uses a slightly different phrase: 

"alternative naturalistic explanations"  

However, when Craig discusses various examples of "alternative naturalistic explanations" later in the same chapter, he refers to them as "hypotheses" and "theories" as well as calling them "explanations".  It is clear that Craig uses these various terms as more-or-less equivalent expressions.  

In order to make the logic of Craig's argument clear, I regularized the vocabulary in the argument when I restated it.  Because in his discussion, later in the chapter where he evaluates the various "naturalistic explanations," Craig usually refers to these explanations as "hypotheses", I have set aside the other terms (like "explanations" and "theories") and instead consistently use the term "hypotheses".  That makes it easier to see logical connections between the premises. For, example to show a clear logical connection between premise (B) and premise (C1).

I have also inserted the definite article "the" at the front of Craig's original phrase from page 360. I have done so because the lack of the definite article makes the phrase somewhat vague.  

The phrase "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" might be a reference to some such hypotheses, or to all such hypotheses, or to a specifically-characterized subset of such hypotheses.  By inserting the word "the" at the start of the phrase, I draw attention to the potential vagueness of the scope of what is being referenced by this phrase.  This potential vagueness should be eliminated, if possible, to make it clear what this phrase actually means. The use of the definite article "the" pushes us to clarify this phrase further. 

ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO CLARIFY THE UNCLEAR PHRASE "THE ALTERNATIVE NATURALISTIC HYPOTHESES"

Back in Part 3 of this series, it was necessary to clarify the meaning of this unclear phrase in Craig's argument: 

"these three facts"

I suggested that we revise this phrase so that it was more descriptive and so it did not use the misleading term "facts":

 "Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate"

I also suggested that we clarify the meaning of this new phrase by means of a definition:

A claim C is one of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate  IF AND ONLY IF claim C is equivalent to either (HC1) or (HC2) or (HC3). 

In order for this definition to be meaningful, we also needed to specify the claims that the abbreviations, such as (HC1),  represent:

HC1:The tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion.

HC2: Beginning on the first day of the week following Jesus' crucifixion, various individuals and groups experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearances of Jesus alive. 

HC3: The first disciples of Jesus came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions.

Someone might well suggest that we provide a similar definition of the unclear phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" which would include abbreviations that stand for each of the various naturalistic hypotheses, and then also provide a list of the specific naturalistic hypotheses corresponding to the abbreviations in the definition.

Craig discusses and evaluates a number of "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" later in the chapter[1], and names those hypotheses:

• The Conspiracy Hypothesis (CH): "the disciples stole the body of Jesus and lied about his postmortem appearances, thus faking the resurrection."[2]
• The Apparent Death Hypothesis (ADH): "Jesus was not completely dead when he was taken down from the cross. He revived in the tomb and escaped to convince his disciples he had risen from the dead."[3] 
• The Wrong Tomb Hypothesis (WTH): "belief in Jesus' empty tomb was based on a simple mistake." Some women followers of Jesus went on Sunday morning to visit Jesus' tomb, and they found "an unoccupied tomb", but that was the "Wrong Tomb", not the tomb where Jesus had been buried on Friday evening.[4]
• The Displaced Body Hypothesis (DBH): Someone moved Jesus' body to a different tomb after Jesus was initially buried and before the women went to visit the tomb on Sunday morning.[5]
• The Hallucination Hypothesis (HH): "the resurrection appearances [of Jesus] were merely hallucinations on the part of the disciples."[6]

In his discussion about the origin of "the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection",[7] Craig does not use the term "hypothesis" nor the term "theory", but he examines three alternative explanations of this alleged historical fact. To keep the terminology of his argument consistent, I will refer to these three explanations as hypotheses:

• The Christian Influence Hypothesis (CIH): "the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection...[was] a result of Christian influences" on their thinking.[7]
• The Pagan Influence Hypothesis (PIH):"the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection" was "the result of pagan influences" on their thinking.[7] 
• The Jewish Influence Hypothesis (JIH): "the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection...[was] a result of Jewish influences" on their thinking.[8]

Since the above alternative hypotheses are the ones that Craig discusses in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith, we could define the unclear phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" as follows:

A hypothesis H is one of the alternative naturalistic hypotheses IF AND ONLY IF: hypothesis H is equivalent to one of the following hypotheses: (CH), (ADH), (WTH), (DBH), (HH), (CIH), (PIH), or (JIH).

 In order to be meaningful, this definition would need to be accompanied by the above descriptions of the eight hypotheses represented by the eight abbreviations referenced in the proposed definition.

WHY THIS SOLUTION DOES NOT WORK

Although this proposed solution would help to clarify premise (B) and make it possible to rationally evaluate premise (B), this solution will not work. It will not help Craig's sub-argument to be successful.

The problem is that the same phrase is used in premise (C1), so the proposed definition of the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" would also have to be applied to clarify the meaning of premise (C1). 

But if we use the proposed definition to clarify that phrase in (C1), then premise (C1) would clearly be false. That would make Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c) an UNSOUND argument. Thus, Craig's sub-argument would fail, and this would give us a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

THE PROPOSED DEFINITION MAKES (C1) FALSE

Here, once again, is the premise (C1):

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

Note that (C1) provides a very general principle concerning the rational evaluation of hypotheses.  It is the generality of this principle that makes the principle appear plausible and true.  This is not a principle that is just about the resurrection issue.  It is a general epistemic principle.  We could restrict the principle to just historical hypotheses, and the principle would still retain its plausibility.  

But even if we were to restrict the scope of this principle to just historical hypotheses, the principle would clearly be false if we interpreted the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" to refer only to eight historical hypotheses that are all about Jesus' final fate. The life and death of Jesus is only one of thousands of historical subjects or isssues that historians study.  

Premise (C1) states a very general principle that could be applied to virtually any historical issue. In order for this principle to make sense and to have some degree of plausibility, we cannot restrict the meaning of the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" so that it refers ONLY to historical hypotheses about Jesus' final fate. Therefore, we cannot accept the proposed definition of the unclear phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses".  Any acceptable definition of this phrase must allow premise (C1) to make sense, and to be plausible.   

END NOTES

1. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), p.371-387. See also pages 390-395.

2. Reasonable Faith, p.371.

3. Reasonable Faith, p.373.

4. Reasonable Faith, p.374. Craig provides more details than what I mention here, based on Kirsopp Lake's specific version of this hypothesis. The details are unnecessary and actually make the hypothesis less probable, so I am ignoring those details. Additional details give the illusion of plausibility, but actually make the hypothesis less likely to be true.

5. Reasonable Faith, p.376. As with the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis, Craig adds unnecessary details based on Joseph Klausner's specific version of the Displaced Body Hypothesis. The additional details give the illusion of plausibility, but actually make the hypothesis less likely to be true.  So, I am ignoring those additional details.

6. Reasonable Faith, p.354.

7. Reasonable Faith, p.390.

8. Reasonable Faith, p.393.