WHERE WE ARE
Premise (3b) is part of a sub-argument for the key premise (5c) in Craig's core argument for the resurrection of Jesus. In Part 9 of this series, I gave a good reason to believe that premise (3b) is false.
However, Craig provided a sub-argument in support of premise (3b), so we should give serious consideration to that sub-argument before making a final determination about the truth or falsehood of premise (3b).
As it stands, however, Craig's sub-argument for premise (3b) fails to give a good reason for believing that (3b) is true. That is because the premises of that sub-argument are too unclear for them to be rationally evaluated in terms of their truth or falsehood.
One of the unclear phrases used in the premises of the sub-argument for (3b) is this:
"shown to be implausible"
In Part 11 of this series, I pointed out that the phrase "shown to be implausible" was ambiguous between two possible interpretations:
"shown to be categorically implausible" (without reference to the plausibility or implausibility of the alternative hypotheses)
"shown to be comparatively more implausible" (than the alternative hypotheses)
Because it is not clear which of these interpretations is correct, and because the comparatively-implausible interpretation makes the meaning of the premises clear, while the categorically-implausible interpretation leaves the meaning of the premises vague (and thus requires additional effort of further clarification), I decided to try out the comparatively-implausible interpretation first.
THE REVISED AND CLARIFIED VERSION OF THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3b)
Here is the revised and clarified version of the sub-argument for the third premise, using the comparatively-plausible interpretation of the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible":
1c. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true AND the alternative naturalistic explanations can be shown to be comparatively more implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Resurrection Hypothesis, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
2b. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true AND the alternative naturalistic hypotheses can be shown to be comparatively more implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Resurrection Hypothesis.
A1. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established as highly likely to be true.
THEREFORE:
3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
On this interpretation, the first premise contains redundant requirements and is thus more complicated and cumbersome than is necessary, and the second premise now appears to make a strong claim that could be the basis for a simpler and clearer argument for the key premise (5c) (on these points see Part 12).
If we go with the comparatively-implausible interpretation of the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible", then it would be best to ignore Craig's sub-argument for premise (3b) and re-state that argument as a simpler and clearer argument that directly supports the key premise (5c).
THE RE-STATED SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)
Here is the re-stated sub-argument for the key premise (5c):
2c. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true, AND the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.
A1. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established as highly likely to be true.
THEREFORE:
B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.
THEREFORE:
5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
This is how we should understand Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c) if we clarify the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible" in terms of the comparatively-implausible interpretation of that phrase.
NOTE: I dropped the unnecessary phrase "can be shown to be" from the second claim asserted in the second premise, and I substituted the simpler and more straightforward word "is". Craig is making a claim here that he will back up with evidence and arguments later in the chapter. In presenting the summary of his argument, Craig should simply assert this claim for now and then later on attempt to show the claim to be true. There is no need while presenting a summary of his case to hint at his upcoming effort (later in the chapter) to back up this claim with evidence and arguments.
As I mentioned in Part 12 of this series, the above re-stated argument for the key premise (5c) appears to correctly capture Craig's reasoning, because it lines up well with a one-sentence summary that Craig gave of his argument for the resurrection of Jesus:
If these three facts can be established, and no plausible natural explanation can account for them as well as the resurrection hypothesis, then one is justified in inferring Jesus' resurrection as the most plausible explanation of the data. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.361)
EVALUATION OF THE RE-STATED SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)
I don't have a problem with the definition of "an established historical fact" given in premise (A1), assuming it is understood as implying that the relevant evidence shows that there is at least an 80% chance that the historical claim is true.
Both of the claims asserted in premise (2c) are strong claims that appear to me to be false or dubious, so this sub-argument is not acceptable as it stands. Further argument by Craig is required to support the two strong claims made in premise (2c).
The inference to premise (B) appears to be a valid deductive inference. Premise (B) is logically implied by the combination of premises (2c) and (A1). The argument does not have a standard deductive form, but Craig's three historical claims, according to premise (2c) have the characteristics required by the definition given in (A1), so we may infer from (2c) that those three claims are "established historical facts".
The inference from (B) to (5c), however, is logically invalid. Premise (B) does not logically imply the conclusion (5c). Thus, this argument is unsound, at least as it stands.
Because the final inference in this sub-argument for (5c) is invalid, we should reject this sub-argument, and that means that Craig has failed to provide a good reason to believe the key premise (5c). Since premise (5c) is neither obviously true nor self-evident, Craig's failure to give us a good reason to believe (5c) means that this key premise of his core argument is dubious. Therefore, we have a third good reason to conclude that Craig's core argument for the resurrection of Jesus fails.
However, there might be a way to fix the problem with this final inference in the sub-argument for the key premise (5c). Before we reject this sub-argument, we should make an effort to repair it.
THE INFERENCE FROM (B) TO (5c)
There is a logical gap between premise (B) and premise (5c).
One reason for this gap is that (B) talks about the Resurrection Hypothesis being a more plausible explanation than the other hypotheses, while (5c) talks about the Resurrection Hypothesis being the best explanation. We can bridge this particular gap by adding a definition of "the best explanation" to the final inference of the sub-argument:
B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.
C. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.
THEREFORE:
5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
The inference from premises (B) and (C) to (5c) appears to be a valid deductive inference. Those premises logically imply the key premise (5c).
However, the definition of "the best explanation" given in premise (C) is clearly mistaken. There are other supernatural hypotheses besides the Resurrection Hypothesis. It is possible that some other supernatural hypothesis explains Craig's three historical facts as well as (or better than) the Resurrection Hypothesis. In that case, the Resurrection Hypothesis would NOT be the best explanation of Craig's three key facts, contrary to the definition given in premise (C). Therefore, premise (C) is false, and the above sub-argument is unsound and should be rejected.
The definition given in premise (C) can be modified to get around the counterexample of an alternative supernatural explanation to the Resurrection Hypothesis:
C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.
But if we make this modification to the definition of "the best explanation", then the inference in the above sub-argument would become logically invalid. There is nothing in the premises of the sub-argument that rules out the existence of a supernatural explanation that is as plausible as (or more plausible than) the Resurrection Hypothesis.
The definition of "the best explanation" will either be mistaken (false) because it neglects the possiblity of alternative supernatural explanations, or the definition will be correct (true) because it includes a reference to alternative supernatural explanations, but then the inference in the sub-argument will be logically invalid.
So, the sub-argument for (5c) cannot be repaired simply by adding a definition of "the best explanation" to it.
REPAIRED INSTANCE OF THE SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF CRAIG'S SUB-ARGUMENT FOR (5c)
We can, however, fix the argument by adding another premise, namely premise (D), about alternative supernatural explanations:
D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.
B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.
C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.
THEREFORE:
5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
This modification of the simplified version of Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c) appears to be logically valid, and the definition of "the best explanation" in premise (C1) appears to be correct. So, this is probably about the best we can do to repair Craig's otherwise failing sub-argument for premise (5c). In the next part of this series, I will critically examine this modified instance of the simplified version of Craig's argument for (5c).
