William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 6: The Ultimate Conclusion of Craig's Case

WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION OF CRAIG'S CASE?

In Part 3 of this series, my initial analysis of the core argument of Craig's case for the resurrection had the following claim as the conclusion of that argument:

5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

But in Part 4 of this series, I argued that Craig had a stronger and more significant claim in mind that was the actual conclusion of his core argument:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

However, the key paragraph that I have been quoting from Craig's book Reasonable Faith is a bit longer than what I have previously quoted, and I now see that the final sentence of that paragraph asserts what is actually the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  Here are the final sentences of that key paragraph:

The significance of this event is then to be found in the religio-historical context in which it occurred, namely, as the vindication of Jesus' own unparalleled claim to divine authority.  I think that the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is such that a well-informed investigator ought to agree that it is more likely than not to have occured.  (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360)

The ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is this:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

This is clearly an inference that is based upon what I previously thought was the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case, namely, claim (8). 

This does not invalidate my previous analysis and clarification of Craig's core argument; it simply adds one more step to the end of that argument.

THE NEW FINAL INFERENCE OF CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT

With this additional step added to Craig's core argument, the final inference in that argument becomes this:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

THEREFORE:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

This is a fairly modest conclusion.  Craig is not trying to prove that God raised Jesus from the dead.  Craig is not claiming it to be an established fact that God raised Jesus from the dead. He is only trying to show that this claim is somewhat probable.  If the probability that God raised Jesus from the dead was merely .51  (if there was a 51% chance of this being true), then the weak claim asserted by (9) would be true.

Craig is here following in the footsteps of the great Christian philosopher Richard Swinburne, who in his masterpiece The Existence of God[1], argued for this very modest conclusion: 

On our total evidence theism [the belief that God exists] is more probable than not. (The Existence of God, 2nd ed., p.342)

Serious scholars and philosophers try not to make claims that are stronger than what they can support with their evidence and arguments.

EVALUATION OF THE NEW FINAL INFERENCE IN CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT

My previous criticism of the inference from (5a) to (8) still stands, so Craig has FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that claim (8) is true.  One obvious problem with the final sub-argument is that it is based on a dubious premise, namely, claim (8).

What about the inference from (8) to (9)?  This is not an instance of a valid form of deductive inference.  It is not a modus ponens, nor a modus tollens, nor a disjunctive syllogism, nor is it any other sort of valid inference form.

Does claim (8) logically imply claim (9)?  I don't think so, but Craig might think so. He does not explain his understanding of the nature of this inference.

Craig's method of comparing alternative hypotheses does not involve determining specific probabilities for each hypothesis. His method only allows us to make somewhat subjective judgments about the relative "plausability" of various alternative hypotheses. However, it seems reasonable to make some inferences about probability from conclusions about plausibility.  

If hypothesis A is more plausible than hypothesis B, then one might reasonably infer that hypothesis A is more likely to be true than hypothesis B.  If there were no such connection between plausability and probability, then Craig's method of relying on the comparative plausability of hypotheses would be of questionable significance.

In fact, Craig closely associates the degree of plausibility of an explanation with its degree of probability:

Any historical argument for Jesus' resurrection will have two steps, even if these are not clearly delineated: (1) to establish the facts which will serve as historical evidence and (2) to argue that the hypothesis of Jesus' resurrection is the best or most probable explanation of those facts.(Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.350, emphasis added)

My understanding is that the best explanation for a set of facts X, is the most plausible explanation of set of facts X (when we compare the explanatory excellence of various alternative hypotheses in terms of a specific set of criteria used for evaluating explanatory excellence).

Thus, in order for Craig's resurrection hypothesis (God raised Jesus from the dead) to be the best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate, it must be a more plausible explanation than any of the available alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate. This in turn implies that the resurrection hypothesis would be more probable than any of the available alternative hypotheses.

The problem I see here is that even if the resurrection hypothesis was more probable or more likely to be true than any of the available alternative hypotheses, it could still be the case that the resurrection hypothesis had a probability of less than .50 (had less than a 50% chance of being true).  If I am correct, then claim (8) does not logically imply (9), and the new final inference is a dubious inference.

A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THE FINAL INFERENCE

In Reasonable Faith, Craig discusses at least five different hypotheses that are alternatives to the resurrection hypothesis (God raised Jesus from the dead). He does not attempt to assign specific probabilities to any of the five alternative hypotheses. He only attempts to show that each of the skeptical alternatives provides an explanation of the established historical facts (that are relevant to Jesus' final fate) that is less plausible than the explanation provided by the resurrection hypothesis.

I take it that Craig would, on this basis, infer that each of the skeptical alternative hypotheses is less probable, less likely to be true, than the resurrection hypothesis.  Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that Craig is correct on both points. Does it follow that the resurrection hypothesis has a probability greater than .50 (that it has a better than 50% chance of being true)?  I don't think so.

Consider the following possible scenario:

• There is a 15% chance that the Conspiracy Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 10% chance that the Apparent Death Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 15% chance that the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 15% chance that the Displaced Body Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 20% chance that the Hallucination Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 25% chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true.

I'm not claiming that any of these claims are true.  I'm not claiming that there is a good reason to believe any of these claims are true.  I'm just saying that this is a possibility. Furthermore, apart from a careful and in-depth examination of these various theories and consideration of the relevant historical evidence, there is no obvious reason to think that any of these claims is false.  There is at least a degree of plausibility to this scenario.  Apart from a careful examination of evidence and arguments, each of these claims has some real chance of being correct. None of the above claims is absurd or obviously false.

If these probabilities were true and correct, and if we assume that relative probability corresponds with relative plausibility, then it would be the case that the Resurrection Hypothesis not only has a higher probability than any of the five skeptical hypotheses,  but that it also has a greater plausibility than any of the five skeptical hypotheses, as an explanation for the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate. 

If Craig's methodology works properly, then given this scenario we would end up concluding that the Resurrection Hypothesis was the best explanation for the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate. That is to say, if the above scenario were the case and Craig's method of determining which hypothesis provides the most plausible explanation of the established facts relevant to Jesus' final fate, then we would arrive at the conclusion that claim (8) was true.

However, on the above scenario, claim (9) would be FALSE, because on this scenario, the probability that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true would be .25 (it would have a 25% chance of being true).  That is a significantly lower probability than .50. So, not only would claim (9) be FALSE on this scenario, but it wouldn't even be close to being true.

Therefore, it is clear that claim (8) does NOT logically imply the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  Even if claim (8) were true, that would NOT show that claim (9) was true.

Furthermore, because the above imagined scenario is somewhat realistic, is somewhat plausible on its face, and because on that scenario claim (9) was not merely false, but was not even close to being true, premise (8) does not appear to provide significant inductive support for (9).  Therefore, the inference from premise (8) to the ultimate conclusion (9) is a weak and dubious inference.

Finally, in the above scenario, although the Resurrection Hypothesis is the best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate, it is very probable (on that scenario) that one of the skeptical hypotheses is true and that the Resurrection Hypothesis is false.  

On the above scenario, there would be a 75% chance that one of the skeptical hypotheses was true and that the Resurrection Hypothesis was false.  In that circumstance, it is unclear that accepting or believing the Resurrection Hypothesis would be the most reasonable position to take.  It seems more reasonable to take the position that one of the skeptical hypotheses is true, even though we could not be confident about which specific skeptical hypotheses is true. 

CONCLUSION

The final step in the core argument in Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is this sub-argument:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

THEREFORE:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

Premise (8) is a dubious claim, and the inference from (8) to (9) is a weak and dubious inference. Thus, Craig's core argument FAILS to give us a good reason to believe the ultimate conclusion of his case for the resurrection of Jesus, even though that conclusion was a fairly modest and weak claim in the first place.

William Craig was only trying to show that the resurrection of Jesus is somewhat probable, not that it is an established fact, and not even that it is very probable.  Yet, his argument FAILS to show even that this rather modest claim is true.

END NOTES 

1. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 5: Other Relevant Facts

BEATING A DEAD HORSE?

I probably come across to many people as a person who likes to beat a dead horse.  I'm not satisfied with finding just one serious problem with an argument presented by a Christian apologist. I always try to find two or three (or more) serious problems with arguments given in support of a basic Christian belief.  I almost always do manage to find two or three (or more) serious problems with such arguments.

Another way to look at this, however, is in terms of that common element in many horror movies, where the monster has just been defeated or knocked down, and the people the monster had been chasing are immediately relieved and then turn their backs on the monster, who is lying on the ground near them.  People are always IDIOTS in horror movies, and they usually fail to put a stake through the vampire's heart, or to cut off the head of the evil creature, or to light the body of Jason on fire to burn him to a crackly crisp.  

I don't want to be like the FOOLS in horror movies, so when I knock down an argument by a Christian apologist, I try to also pound a stake through the heart of the argument, and cut off its head, and then douse it in gasoline, and light it on fire.  This may seem to others like I'm "beating a dead horse", but I consider this to be just a reasonable way of ensuring that the threat will not raise its ugly head ever again.

RELEVANT HISTORICAL FACTS NOT INCLUDED BY CRAIG

Here are some other relevant facts that are not included in Craig's three key historical facts:

1. People who were crucified by the Romans would usually hang on the cross for at least two or three days before dying.

2. The authors of the Gospels believed that Jesus was removed from the cross after hanging on the cross for less than half of a day (i.e., for somewhere between 2 hours and 10 hours).

3. Three friends of the Jewish historian Josephus were crucified, and hung on crosses for a few hours and then were removed from their crosses while they were still alive.  Two of the crucified people died hours or days later while under the care of a physician, but one survived and recovered.

4. There are a number of different medical theories about how Roman crucifixion caused people to die; we don't actually know how Roman crucifixion caused death. 

 5. Victims of Roman crucifixion were usually burried in mass graves and were not permitted to have an honorable burial. 

6. The authors of the Gospel of Mark and the Gospel of Matthew believed that the first appearances of the allegedly risen Jesus to his male disciples took place in Galilee about a week or more after Jesus was crucified. 

7. The authors of the Gospel of Luke and the Gospel of John believed that the first appearances of the allegedly risen Jesus to his male disciples took place in Jerusalem about 48 hours after Jesus had been crucified and buried. 

8. Jesus was a sexist, who worshipped and obeyed Jehovah, the sexist god of the Israelites.

9. Jesus worshipped and obeyed Jehovah, the genocidal god of the Israelites, who (according to Moses) commanded the massive slaughter of men, women, children, and babies of the inhabitants of Palestine.

10. Jesus worshipped and obeyed Jehovah, the god of the Israelites who (according to Moses) commanded the theft of land from the inhabitants of Palestine.

11. Jesus worshipped and obeyed Jehovah, the god of the Israelites who (according to Moses) demanded that they practice slavery.

12. Jesus believed and taught that the end of the world would take place sometime in his generation (i.e., within a few decades of his death).

13. Jesus believed that mental illness and physical disabilities were often caused by demons. 

14. Jesus believed that Adam and Eve were the first humans to exist, and that Adam and Eve lived a few thousand years before his time.

In my view, these are all established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate. Yet NOT ONE of these historical facts is included in Craig's three historical claims, and NOT ONE of these historical facts is included in the twelve historical claims that Gary Habermas focuses upon in his latest case for the resurrection of Jesus.

The first seven historical facts above are obviously relevant to Jesus' final fate.  However, some people might question the relevance of the last seven historical facts in the above list.  

Those other facts are relevant to Jesus' final fate, because they provide evidence that Jesus was a morally and intellectually flawed human being, and thus NOT the Son of God, NOT God incarnate, and that the beliefs and values of Jesus did NOT come from clear communication between God (who is all-knowing and perfectly good, by definition) and Jesus. 

If Jesus was a morally and intellectually flawed human, and thus Jesus was NOT the Son of God and NOT God incarnate, then it would have been a great deception by God to have raised Jesus from the dead, because such a miracle, as Christian apologists themselves assert, would be an indication from God that Jesus was a true prophet, the Messiah, and the Son of God or God incarnate (assuming Jesus had claimed be the Son of God or God incarnate). God, if God exists, is all-knowing and perfectly good, so God would not ever perform a miracle that would cause a great deception.

Therefore, historical facts that provide evidence for the claim that Jesus was a morally and intellectually flawed human are historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.

Why is it that NONE of the fourteen historical facts above are included in Craig's three key facts? Why is it that NONE of the fourteen historical facts above are included in the list of twelve key facts referenced by Habermas in his most recent case for the resurrection of Jesus?  

It seems fairly obvious that the reason why Craig and Habermas don't consider these to be key historical facts is that these facts tend to run against the conclusion that they firmly believe and that they are trying to promote.  

In short, none of the above fourteen historical facts are included in Craig's three key facts because his selection of historical facts was influenced by confirmation bias.  The same reason explains why none of the above facts are included in the twelve key facts focused on by Habermas.

CONCLUSION

In Part 4 of this series, I pointed out a problem with Craig's core argument that I believe means his case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead On Arrival.  

Specifically, we have no good reason to believe that Craig's three key historical facts are a good or accurate representation of the larger body of established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  

Therefore, the final inference of his core argument from premise (5a) to the conclusion (8) is a weak and dubious inference, because it is based on a very questionable assumption:

5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

THEREFORE:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

Now it is no longer a mere possibility that Craig's selection of just three historical facts was influenced by confirmation bias. I have provided more than a dozen established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate, and NONE of those facts were included in Craig's three key historical claims or facts.  

This evidence indicates that Craig's selection of his three key historical claims was significantly influenced by confirmation bias, and that Craig's three key facts are NOT a good and accurate representation of the full set of established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.

Therefore: 

Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is indeed Dead On Arrival.

Nevertheless, I will continue my effort to put a stake through the heart of Craig's core argument, and to cut off the head of his argument, and then to douse it in gasoline and light it on fire, in order to burn it to a crackly crisp. 

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 4: The Conclusion of Craig's Core Argument

THE FINAL INFERENCE OF CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT 

According to my analysis of the core argument in William Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus (in Part 3 of this series), the final inference of that argument is this:

3a. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4a. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE: 

5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

THE REAL CONCLUSION OF CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT 

However, this conclusion seems somewhat anti-climactic and unimpressive.  This is especially the case given my previously mentioned concern about the potential problem of confirmation bias in Craig's selection of his three key historical claims.  

Since Craig is a devout Christian believer, and since he is the person who selected the three historical claims, it might well be the case that those three claims leave important historical facts out of the picture.  In that case, even if the resurrection hypothesis were the best explanation of Craig's three historical claims, it might well NOT be the best explanation for a more complete set of relevant historical facts.

In short, claim (5a) seems to be a significantly weaker claim than what Craig actually wants to establish. Furthermore, Craig makes a somewhat different claim at the beginning of the key paragraph where he lays out a summary of his core argument, and that claim is a bolder and stronger claim than (5a):

In my estimation the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360) 

Note that Craig here is talking about the best explanation of "the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate."  This scope of historical facts, as we have seen, is broader than just Craig's three key historical claims. This is the same scope of facts that I pointed out in Part 3 of this series:

established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate

This scope of the facts that we should consider seems right to me, but it is clear that Craig's three key historical claims constitute only a portion of this larger collection of facts.  Therefore, the ultimate conclusion of Craig's core argument is actually this stronger claim:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).  

Because Craig's core argument is clearly aimed at supporting claim (5a), the ultimate conclusion of the core argument is presumably based upon (5a).

THE REVISED ARGUMENT DIAGRAM 

Given that claim (8) is the actual conclusion of Craig's core argument, we need to revise the argument diagram representing the core argument:

THE NEW FINAL INFERENCE IN CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT

Here is the final inference in the above revised representation of Craig's core argument:

5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

THEREFORE:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

This is NOT a formally valid deductive inference, because it is not an instance of any valid deductive form.  For example, it is not a modus ponens, nor a modus tollens, nor a disjunctive syllogism, nor is it an instance of any other valid deductive form.

Also, premise (5a) does NOT logically imply the conclusion (8) for the reason that I mentioned previously.  It is clear that Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate do not encompass ALL of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  

Thus, it is quite possible that some of the relevant facts that are not included in Craig's three key historical claims could change the outcome so that the resurrection hypothesis was no longer the best explanation, and so that some alternative skeptical hypothesis was actually the best explanation of the full set of relevant historical facts. 

There is also no obvious inductive inference to be made from (5a) to (8).  Furthermore, even if we declare this inference to be an inductive inference, it is clearly a very weak and dubious inference, because apart from further argument and explanation, we have no reason to believe that the three historical claims selected by Craig are somehow representative of the entire collection of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  

Perhaps, Craig has done a great job of selecting just a few historical claims that somehow nicely represent the entire body of relevant historical facts, but it also might well be the case that he has done a lousy job of this, and that cognitive bias has led Craig to ignore important facts that go against the conclusion that he desires to establish.  

I am unaware of any argument or explanation by Craig that gives us a good reason to rely upon his ability to select just a few historical claims such that they accurately represent a significantly larger body of relevant historical facts.  This is especially problematic, given that confirmation bias is a strong and widespread tendency of human thinking.   

CONCLUSION  

Although I plan to continue to examine other parts of Craig's core argument in his case for the resurrection of Jesus, it seems to me that his core argument is Dead On Arrival.  The core argument FAILS if the final inference from (5a) to (8) is a weak and dubious inference, and at this point, it certainly appears to be a weak and dubious inference.

It is clearly NOT a valid deductive inference; it also does not appear to exemplify any standard sort of legitimate inductive inference, and the inference appears to be based upon a very questionable assumption.

If, as I suspect, Craig makes no effort to justify or explain why we should believe that the three historical claims that he has chosen to focus on are somehow representative of the full collection of established historical facts that are relevant to the final fate of Jesus, then Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus FAILS in the final inference from premise (5a) to the ultimate conclusion (8).  This is true even if his argument in support of premise (5a) is a strong and solid argument.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 3: The Rest of the Core Argument

SEVEN CLAIMS IN CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT

In Part 2 of this series, I showed that the core argument of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus was a deductive argument that consists of at least the following claims:

1. IF these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts, THEN the preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

3. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts, THEN the preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts.

5. The preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

6. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

 7. Alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SEVEN CLAIMS 

The following argument diagram shows the logical relationships between these claims in Craig's core argument: 

The seven claims constitute three sub-arguments and three inferences in the core argument of Craig's case. The three inferences are represented by the red arrows in the above argument diagram, and they are all valid deductive inferences.

However, this is not the complete content of the core argument, because each of the above seven claims includes the phrase "these three facts" and this phrase has no meaning outside the context of the paragraph in which the seven claims were asserted by Craig.

Here is the previous part of the paragraph that provides the context for understanding what the phrase "these three facts" means:

In my estimation the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate.  The inductive grounds for the inference of this explanation consist primarily of the evidence of three independently established facts: (1) the tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion, (2) various individuals and groups thereafter experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearrances of Jesus alive, and (3) the first disciples came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions. ... (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360) 

In the context of this paragraph, the phrase "these three facts", which occurs repeatedly in the rest of the core argument, refers to the following three historical claims that are asserted in the above quotation[1]:

HC1:The tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion.

HC2: Beginning on the first day of the week following Jesus' crucifixion, various individuals and groups experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearances of Jesus alive. 

HC3: The first disciples of Jesus came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions.

Premise (1) uses the word "facts" in a confused and misleading way:

IF these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence...

If those three historical claims cannot be "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence", then those three historical claims are NOT historical facts! So, the wording of premise (1), and the closely related premise (2) need to be revised to avoid this confused and misleading use of the word "facts".  

This problem with the term "facts" will be eliminated later in this post by my proposal about how to clarify the phrase "these three facts".

The Meaning of the Phrase "These Three Facts"

To state the obvious, there are billions of facts, not just three! That is part of the reason the phrase "these three facts" is unclear and problematic.  In this context, however, we can specify the scope of "facts" with some qualifications.  First, Craig is concerned with "historical data", so his three facts are historical facts.  

Craig also uses the qualification "established". This term seems a bit redundant, because one should clearly distinguish between a historical claim and a historical fact, and this distinction corresponds directly to the question of whether the historical claim in question has been firmly established on the basis of evidence or not. If a historical claim has NOT been firmly established on the basis of evidence, then that claim does NOT constitute a historical fact.  Thus, the qualification "established" is redundant.  

However, this redundancy is a good reminder of the crucial distinction between historical claims and historical facts, so I am going to retain Craig's phrase "established facts" and just add the qualification "historical" to narrow down the general kind of facts that Craig has in mind: 

established historical facts

Nevertheless, it still remains the case that there are millions or billions of "established historical facts", so there is still something unclear and problematic about the phrase "these three established historical facts".

The context indicated in the first sentence of the key paragraph that we have been closely examining provides a further narrowing of the scope of "established historical facts":

In my estimation the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360) 

Craig is focused on "the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate." Some established historical facts are relevant to Jesus' final fate, and other established historical facts are NOT relevant to Jesus' final fate.  It is the former collection of established historical facts that Craig is interested in for the purpose of evaluating "the hypothesis 'God raised Jesus from the dead'".  So, the scope of facts to be considered has been narrowed to this:

established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate

HOW MANY SUCH FACTS EXIST? 

Because there are billions or trillions of "established facts", the phrase "these three facts" is both unclear and problematic.  However, we have narrowed the scope of facts that should be considered down to these: established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  

This narrowing of the scope helps to reduce the number of  facts that we need to consider, but it is still the case that there might well be hundreds or thousands of facts that fall within this scope.

Does Craig believe that there are ONLY THREE CLAIMS that constitute established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate? This assumption seems very dubious, especially in terms of the multitude of historical claims and beliefs of Christian apologists concerning the trials, crucifixion, death, and burial of Jesus, etc.

In a draft chapter of my book Thinking Critically about the Resurrection of Jesus, Volume 2: The Resuscitation of the Swoon Theory, I critically analyze and evaluate some objections by William Craig against the Swoon Theory.  In that chapter, I point out that one of Craig's objections to the Swoon Theory involves at least 45 different historical claims![2]

Perhaps Craig would say that those 45 historical claims were not all established historical facts.  But clearly, he would assert that they are more than just historical guesses or historical hunches; otherwise, they would provide a rather weak basis for his argument against the Swoon Theory. 

At the very least, he would have to say that each of those 45 historical claims was probably true, and I suspect he would claim that each of those 45 historical claims was (at least) very probable.  Craig might well claim that several of those 45 historical claims were established historical facts.  

Obviously, if those 45 historical claims are all relevant to the evaluation of the Swoon Theory (which is a skeptical theory that is an alternative to the hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead), then those 45 historical claims are all relevant to Jesus' final fate.

Two other Christian scholars and apologists, who are major defenders of the view that God raised Jesus from the dead, also make a case for the resurrection that focuses on just a few key historical claims that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  In their book The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus[3] (hereafter: CRJ), Gary Habermas and Michael Licona use what they call a "minimal-facts approach" to making their case for Jesus' resurrection (CRJ, p.44), implying that the key historical claims of their case are established historical facts:

MF1. Jesus died by crucifixion. (CRJ, p.48-49)

MF2. Jesus disciples sincerely believed He rose from the dead and appeared to them. (CRJ, p.61-63)

MF3. Paul, a persecutor of Christians, converted to Christianity because he firmly believed that he experienced an encounter of the risen Jesus. (CRJ, p.64-66)

MF4. James, a brother of Jesus who had been skeptical about Jesus being the Son of God, converted to Christianity. (CRJ, p.67-69)  

MF5. The tomb where Jesus body had been placed on Friday evening after his crucifixion was empty on the Sunday morning of the next week.[4]

Clearly, Habermas and Licona don't believe that there are only three established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  They believe that there are at least five such historical facts.

Note that (MF5) corresponds roughly with one of Craig's "three facts", namely with (HC1), and that (MF2) corresponds roughly with the remaining two facts of Craig's "three facts", namely (HC2) and (HC3). That leaves us with three additional historical claims: (MF1), (MF3), and (MF4). Habermas and Licona would assert that those additional claims are established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  

I strongly suspect that Craig would agree with that way of characterizing those three additional historical claims. That means that there are at least six different historical claims that are (according to Habermas, Licona, and probably also Craig) established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.

Furthermore, in his most recent book defending the resurrection of Jesus[5], Habermas spells out six "minimal historical facts" (in "Part 3: The Minimal Facts"), and then he goes on to provide another list of six more historical facts (in "Part 4: The Other Six Known Historical Facts"), all of which Habermas believes to be established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  I strongly suspect that Craig would have no objection to this characterization of those twelve historical claims put forward by Habermas.

That means that Habermas, and probably Craig as well, believes that there are at least one dozen historical claims that constitute established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.

THE PROBLEM OF CONFIRMATION BIAS

As I stated earlier, the context of the paragraph in which Craig summarizes his case for the resurrection makes it clear that the phrase "these three facts" refers to the specific historical claims asserted in (HC1), (HC2), and (HC3).

We now see that the three historical claims asserted in those premises are believed by Craig to fall into this general category of claims:

established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate 

We now also see that Habermas, and probably also Craig, believe there are at least a dozen such historical claims, and that it is quite possible that they believe there are dozens or even hundreds of such claims (e.g., Craig asserts at least 45 different historical claims in just one of his arguments against the Swoon Theory). 

Even if we know that the phrase "these three facts" refers to only the historical claims asserted in (HC1), (HC2), and (HC3) of the core argument in Craig's case, there remains a serious concern about the potential of a major problem in Craig's argument, a problem called Confirmation Bias. 

Craig has selected just three facts out of a wider collection of established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate. That wider collection might well contain dozens or even hundreds of historical facts.  Perhaps Craig has focused on a few facts that favor his belief that God raised Jesus from the dead, and perhaps Craig has also ignored many facts that run against his belief that God raised Jesus from the dead.  If so, then Craig's core argument suffers from the very common problem of confirmation bias.

WHAT IS CONFIRMATION BIAS?

Google AI provides a good explanation of confirmation bias, so I will present a part of that information here:

The complete Google AI response on confirmation bias is included in an endnote below.[6] 

CLARIFICATION OF CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT  

My concern with the potential problem of confirmation bias in Craig's core argument relates to doing an evaluation of this core argument.  But for right now, my main focus is on the analysis of this argument, and specifically the need for clarification of the problematic phrase "these three facts" which occurs repeatedly in the premises in Craig's core argument.

I propose that instead of the phrase "these three facts", we use the following more accurate and more descriptive phrase:

Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate

Here are the revised premises: 

1a. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

3a. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4a. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate.

5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

6a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

7a. Alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible. 

I do not think that we need to add any further claims to the above seven claims in order to accurately represent Craig's core argument.  

However, we should clarify the newly added phrase by means of a definition:

A claim C is one of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate  IF AND ONLY IF claim C is equivalent to either (HC1) or (HC2) or (HC3).

Of course, we also need to specify the claims represented by the abbreviations in this definition:

HC1:The tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion.

HC2: Beginning on the first day of the week following Jesus' crucifixion, various individuals and groups experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearances of Jesus alive. 

HC3: The first disciples of Jesus came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions.

Given the above revisions of the seven claims, and given this clarification of the meaning of the newly added phrase ("Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate"), we can keep the same analysis of the logical structure of Craig's deductive core argument; we just need to revise the numbers designating the claims (by adding an "a" after the number of each revised premise) in the argument diagram: 

I believe we have completed the initial analysis and clarification of Craig's core argument, so we should be able to begin evaluation of that argument in the next post. 

END NOTES

1. Craig asserts that these are "independently" established facts, but it is not clear what he means by this, and it is not clear why this is significant.  So, I have dropped that qualification for now.  If at some point in Craig's presentation of his case, he explains what he means by this term and why this is significant, then we might need to add this qualification back into the clarified statement of his core argument. 

2. You may download a PDF of the relevant DRAFT chapter here:

The Case Against the Swoon Theory by William Craig

3. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2004).

4. Although Habermas and Licona argue in support of "the empty tomb" in CRJ (pages 69-74), they do not bother to state or specify the historical claim they have in mind! This is very sloppy reasoning and writing by Habermas and Licona. 

In his most recent book defending the resurrection of Jesus, Habermas provides something more like an actual historical claim: "...the tomb in which Jesus was buried was later found empty." (On the Resurrection, Volume 1: Evidences, p.598).  

However, even this claim is a bit too vague. WHEN was Jesus body placed into the tomb? WHEN was the tomb found empty? What does the word "later" mean? If Jesus' tomb was found empty two years after the crucifixion of Jesus, would that be of any real significance? I don't think so.  I don't think that would help make the case for the resurrection of Jesus. 

My assumption is that Habermas believes that Jesus' tomb was "found empty" on Sunday morning following the burial of Jesus in that tomb on Friday evening when Jesus was (allegedly) removed from the cross, which is the standard Christian belief.  My assumption is that when Habermas uses the vague word "later" about the discovery of the empty tomb, he has in mind the historical claim that the tomb was found empty early on Sunday morning (about 6am), about 36 hours after Jesus was placed into the tomb on Friday evening (about 6pm).

5. Gary Habermas, On the Resurrection, Volume 1: Evidences (Brentwood, TN: B&H Academic, 2024).

6. Here is the complete Google AI response to the question "What is confirmation bias?":

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 2: The Logic of the Core Argument

IS THE CORE ARGUMENT A DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT?

The first comment I received on Part 1 was an objection about how I characterized the logic of the core argument of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus:

It seems to me that in restating Craig’s argument as a deductive proof, you are disregarding the original type and intent of the argument that Craig put forth in  Reasonable Faith. 

My initial response was that I had NOT restated Craig's core argument as a deductive argument.  I never stated that his core argument was a deductive argument.  I never implied that his core argument was a deductive argument. Furthermore, the core argument, as I stated it, did not have the form of a valid deductive inference (e.g., it was not in the form of a modus ponens or a modus tollens or a disjunctive syllogism).

However, when I took a second look at the long paragraph I had quoted from Craig, which was the basis for my statement of the core argument in his case, it became clear to me that the core argument is, in fact, a deductive argument.

THE LOGICAL FORM OF THE MAIN PREMISE

The logical form of the main premise in the core argument of Craig's case is a conditional statement.  That is to say, the main premise has this form:

IF P, THEN Q

This is a big clue indicating that the logical form of the core argument is a modus ponens:

IF P, THEN Q

P

THEREFORE:

Q 

I will now show that the main premise in the core argument is a conditional statement.  

Craig put the main premise of his core argument into one long sentence. In fact, nearly the entire core argument is contained in that one sentence:

...If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence (and it seems to me they can) and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible (and the consensus of scholarship is that they can), then unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors (and my experience in debating the comparative merits of the hypotheses convinces me that it cannot), then the preferred explanation ought to be the one given in the documents [of the New Testament] themselves: God raised Jesus from the dead. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition, p.360) 

Notice that Craig asserts three different claims in three parenthetical remarks.  Those three claims are three premises in Craig's core argument. But they are separate from the main premise of the core argument, so let's delete the parenthetical remarks to focus on just the main premise:

...If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence... and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible... , then unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors... , then the preferred explanation ought to be the one given in the documents [of the New Testament] themselves: God raised Jesus from the dead. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition, p.360) 

Now I will use different color fonts to identify four different statements that constitute parts of this complex sentence:

If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible, then unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors, then the preferred explanation ought to be the one given in the documents [of the New Testament] themselves: God raised Jesus from the dead.   

(Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition, p.360) 

We can assign letters to each of these parts of the above complex sentence:

R: These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

S: Alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

T: The resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts.

U: The preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

Now we can more easily see the logical structure of Craig's complex sentence by replacing these ideas/statements with the letters we have just assigned to them:

IF R and S, THEN unless T, then U. 

This is a conditional statement in which the first part of the conditional, called the antecedent, is the conjunction of two claims:

R AND S

The second part of the conditional statement, called the consequent, can itself be understood as a conditional statement:

IF NOT T, THEN U

This is a reasonable way to represent the logic of the statement "Unless T, then U". 

Using parentheses, we can represent the main premise of Craig's core argument, using the above abbreviations:

IF (R AND S), THEN (IF NOT T, THEN U).

We can simplify this representation of the main premise a bit further by using the letter P to stand for the conjunction in the antecedent: (R AND S), and we can use the letter Q to stand for the conditional in the consequent: (IF NOT T, THEN U):

IF P, THEN Q

Now it is very clear that the main premise of Craig's core argument is a conditional statement.  

THE CORE ARGUMENT INCLUDES A MODUS PONENS

The fact that the main premise is a conditional statement strongly suggests that the core argument includes a modus ponens inference:

 IF P, THEN Q

P

THEREFORE:

Q     

In fact, in addition to the main premise, Craig clearly implies that the antecedent of the conditional statement (that constitutes the main premise) is true. This confirms my suspicion that the core argument has a modus ponens inference. 

Recall that P represents a conjunction of two statements:

R AND S

Craig asserts that R is the case in a parenthetical remark:

...If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence (and it seems to me they can)...   (Reasonable Faith, p.360) 

The parenthetical remark here basically asserts the claim that "these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence", and that is the claim that R represents:

R: These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

Craig also asserts that S is the case in a parenthetical remark:

...if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible (and the consensus of scholarship is that they can)...

The parenthetical remark here basically asserts the claim that "alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible", and that is the claim that S represents:

S: Alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

So, in the complex sentence where Craig summarizes the core argument of his case, he asserts claim R, and he also asserts claim S.  We can draw a valid deductive inference from these two assertions to this conjunction:

R AND S

Recall that this conjunction is the antecedent of the conditional statement that constitutes the main premise of Craig's core argument:

IF (R AND S), THEN (IF NOT T, THEN U)

By the valid deductive inference known as modus ponens, we may now infer the consequent of the main premise:

1. IF (R AND S), THEN (IF NOT T, THEN U)

2. R AND S

THEREFORE: 

 3. IF NOT T, THEN U

Furthermore, in the complex sentence that we have been examining, Craig also asserts that NOT T is the case; in other words, Craig asserts that T is not the case:

...unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors (and my experience in debating the comparative merits of the hypotheses convinces me that it cannot)...

The parenthetical remark here basically asserts the claim that it is not the case that "the resurrection hypothesis has been shown to be more implausible than alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts", and that is the denial of the claim that T represents:

T: The resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts.

 So, Craig is asserting that claim T is NOT the case:

4. NOT T

If we combine this assertion with the conclusion of the above modus ponens argument, then we can make another valid deductive inference: 

3. IF NOT T, THEN U

4. NOT T

THEREFORE: 

5. U

We can now represent the core argument of Craig's case in terms of two valid deductive inferences: 

1. IF (R AND S), THEN (IF NOT T, THEN U)

2. R AND S

THEREFORE: 

 3. IF NOT T, THEN U

4. NOT T

THEREFORE: 

5. U 

Let's fill in the statements that the various letters stand for, to return to a more meaningful statement of the core argument:

1. IF these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts, THEN the preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

THEREFORE: 

3. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts, THEN the preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts.

THEREFORE: 

5. The preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

This is clearly a deductive argument.  

There is also a valid deductive sub-argument for premise (2):

6. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

 7. Alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

THEREFORE:

2. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

Here is the new and improved argument diagram showing the logical structure of the deductive argument that constitutes Craig's core argument:

There is, however, a significant problem with the meaning of each premise in this core argument.  The phrase "these three facts" occurs in all seven premises. But that phrase has no meaning outside of the context of the paragraph from which these statements or premises were taken.  

So, we need to either replace this unclear phrase with the "facts" to which it refers, or we need to add more premises to the core argument to define the meaning of the phrase "these three facts".

I will attempt to fix this problem in the next post about Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus.