The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Habermas and Licona - Part 7: Why (C2) Has a Low Probability

WHERE WE ARE

The conclusion of Phase 1 of the case for the resurrection of Jesus presented by Gary Habermas and Michael Licona is this:

(C2) Jesus rose from the dead.

They claim that they can show this conclusion to be at least somewhat more likely than "Somewhat Certain".  In Part 5 of this series, I argued that this means that (C2) can be shown to have a probability of at least .70. 

In Part 6 of this series, I argued that it is doubtful that they can show that (C2) has that degree of certainty or probability.  The problems I pointed to were these:

• Because the Standard of Evidence used by most NT and Jesus scholars might well be weak (i.e. the Preponderance of Evidence Standard or the Twelftree Historicity Standard), the probability of their key historical claims might well be significantly lower than .70.
• Because their inference to (C2) requires the truth of multiple key historical claims and assumptions, the probability of (C2) will require the multiplication of the probabilities of those key historical claims and assumptions, thus resulting in a probability of (C2) that is lower than the probabilities of their key historical claims and assumptions.

I realize that it is possible to formulate a correct inductive argument for a conclusion where the probability of the conclusion is higher than the probabilities of the premises, but the primary inference supporting (C2) is the conjunction of two historical claims: 

...while science cannot measure God's activity, there is no reason why we cannot consider non-supernatural portions of claims concerning the Resurrection.  For example, did Jesus die? Was he seen alive at some later time? The scientist or historian could evaluate the conclusion: "Jesus was seen alive after his death."  (CRJ, page 135)

They claim that they can show this conclusion to be at least somewhat more likely than "Somewhat Certain".  In Part 5 of this series, I argued that this means that (C2) can be shown to have a probability of at least .70.

The question "Did Jesus die?" is a bit vague; the real question at issue here is this: 

Did Jesus die on the cross? 

Similarly, whether Jesus was "seen alive at some later time" is also a bit vague and unclear.  The real question at issue is this: 

Was Jesus alive and walking around a few days after he had been crucified? 

Having clarified these two central questions, we can now see the core argument of Phase 1 of the case by Habermas and Licona:

DOC: Jesus was crucified and died on the cross. 

JAW: Jesus was alive and walking around a few days after he was crucified.

THEREFORE:

C2: Jesus rose from the dead. 

Both of the historical premises of this argument must be true in order for (C2) to be established.  That means that the probability of (DOC) must be multiplied times the probability of (JAW) in order to determine the probability of (C2). Thus, the probability of (C2) must be lower than the probabilities of those two key historical claims.

The probability of (DOC), based on the assumption that "nearly all scholars who study the crucifixion of Jesus accept (DOC)," will only be about .51 if most such scholars use the Preponderance of Evidence Standard, and will only be about .60 if most such scholars use the Twelftree Historicity Standard.  The probability of (DOC) will be about .70 only if most such scholars use the Reasonable Historical Certainty Standard described by Habermas and Licona, which is unlikely to be the case.

The probability of the second historical claim (JAW) is based primarily on this reasoning:

1. Jesus' disciples sincerely believed that Jesus rose from the dead and appeared to them sometime after he had been crucified.

2. IF Jesus' disciples sincerely believed that Jesus rose from the dead and appeared to them sometime after he had been crucified, THEN the probability of (JAW) is at least .70. 

THEREFORE:

3. The probability of (JAW) is at least .70. 

This argument, as stated above, does not work.  The problem is that we do not know that premise (1) is true.  That is to say, we don't know that (1) is completely certain.  At best, we have good reason to believe that (1) is probably true. As with the historical premise (DOC), the degree or probability that we can reasonably assign to premise (1) depends on which Standard of Evidence most NT and Jesus scholars use to determine whether to accept a historical claim. 

Suppose that we determine that most NT and Jesus scholars use the Twelftree Historicity Standard.  In that case, we would only have good reason to believe that the probability of premise (1) was at least .60.  Here is how the above argument would need to be reformulated to be acceptable in this case:

1a. The historical claim that Jesus' disciples sincerely believed that Jesus rose from the dead and appeared to them sometime after he had been crucified has a probability of at least .60.

2a. IF the historical claim that Jesus' disciples sincerely believed that Jesus rose from the dead and appeared to them sometime after he had been crucified has a probability of at least .60., THEN the probability of (JAW) is at least .60. x .70. (i.e. .42) 

THEREFORE:

3a. The probability of (JAW) is at least .42. 

Furthermore, if we assume that most of the relevant scholars also used the Twelftree Historicity Standard to determine whether or not to accept (DOC), then we would have good reason to conclude that the probability of (DOC) was at least .60. 

Now we can calculate the probability of (C2) by multiplying the estimated probabilities of (DOC) and (JAW):

.42 x .60 = .25

Based on the reasonable assumptions above, the likelihood of (C2) would be only about one chance in four, which is far below the target of seven chances in ten that Habermas and Licona imply that their argument shows. 

But the probability of (C2) is actually much lower than .25, as I will now show.  For this reason, Phase 1 of the case by Habermas and Licona is a complete and utter failure.  Not only have they failed to show that (C2) meets the weak Preponderance of Evidence Standard (i.e. is more probable than not), but they have not even shown that there is one chance in four that Jesus rose from the dead.

(DOC) AND (JAW) ARE NOT INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 

One of the main reasons (C2) actually has a low probability is that (DOC) and (JAW) are not independent claims.  If (DOC) is true, then that impacts the probability of (JAW), and if (JAW) is true, then that impacts the probability of (DOC).  Skeptics have long recognized that the truth of (DOC) makes it highly improbable that (JAW) is true.  But this is difficult for Christians, even Christian philosophers, to understand.

I think the best way to help Christians understand this important point is to reverse the order of the traditional skeptical reasoning on this issue.  Suppose that (JAW) was true.  This would provide a very powerful reason to believe that (DOC) was false.  If it could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Elvis Presley was alive and walking around in 1978, this would be very powerful evidence that Elvis did NOT die in 1977.  

Similarly, if we grant the assumption that Jesus was alive and walking around just a few days after he had been crucified, then this would be very powerful evidence against the historical claim that Jesus was crucified and died on the cross. In other words, the truth of (JAW) would be very powerful evidence against (DOC) and would thus greatly reduce the probability that (DOC) was true.

This points out a serious problem with the question asked of NT and Jesus scholars in relation to the key historical claim (DOC).  Presumably, these scholars are asked a question along these lines:

Do you accept the historical claim that Jesus was crucified and died on the cross? 

This is the WRONG QUESTION to ask the scholars.  The right question would be something along these lines:

If you assume that it is completely historically certain that Jesus was alive and walking around a few days after he had been crucified, would you conclude that the historical claim that Jesus was crucified and died on the cross was more probable than not based on the available historical evidence?

I believe that many, perhaps even most, NT and Jesus scholars would answer that the probability of (DOC) in this scenario was LESS probable than not.  

In other words, scholars should not be asked to evaluate (DOC) independently of an evaluation of (JAW).  To separate these historical claims and to treat them as unrelated claims, as if these claims were independent of each other, is to ask the WRONG QUESTION.  The probability of (DOC) being true is greatly reduced if one assumes that (JAW) is true.  Thus, the question asked of NT and Jesus scholars must be more complex than the question that Habermas and Licona ask of these scholars about (DOC).  

Here is how I would calculate the probability of (C2):

P(JAW) x P(DOC) given (JAW) = P(C2) 

If I were using the opinions of NT and Jesus scholars to determine the probability of (JAW), and if I believed that most such scholars used the Twelftree Historicity Standard, then my calculation would look like this:

P(JAW) = .60

P(DOC) given (JAW) = .10

.60 x .10 = .06

As a skeptic, I am being extremely generous in granting that there would be one chance in ten that (DOC) was true given the assumption that (JAW) was true. Even with this generous estimate of the probability of (DOC) given (JAW), the resulting probability of (C2) is less than one chance in ten, which is significantly less than the .25 probability that we previously calculated for (C2) under that false assumption that (DOC) and (JAW) were independent claims.

CONCLUSIONS

We now have three good reasons to conclude that Habermas and Licona have failed to show that (C2) has a probability of at least .70:

• The probabilities of (DOC) and (JAW) based on the opinions of NT and Jesus scholars are likely to be less than .70, because of the various weaker Standards of Evidence that many of these scholars might well be using.

• The probability of (C2) will be less than the probabilities of (DOC) and (JAW), because we must multiply the probabilities of these two key historical claims.

• The probability of (DOC) is greatly reduced on the assumption that (JAW) is true.

It is clear at this point that the probability of (C2) fails to meet even the weak standard of the Preponderance of Evidence, and is at best .10, one chance in ten.

The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Habermas and Licona - Part 6: Three Standards of Evidence

THREE DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE

There are at least three different Standards of Evidence mentioned by Habermas and Licona in CRJ.

First, there is the Preponderance of Evidence standard used in civil lawsuits:

The standards of evidence [in legal matters] do not require that the case for something is irrefutable. Such 100% certainty is only possible in the rarest of circumstances. Rather, the standard requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases and proof that makes the truth of an accusation more probable than not in civil cases. (CRJ, page 32)

In civil cases, showing that the preponderance of evidence favors the accusation is sufficient to establish the truth of the accusation.  In such cases the accusation has been shown to have a chance greater than 50% of being true, or of having a probability of greater than .50.

Second, there is the somewhat more demanding standard of evidence put forward by the NT and Jesus scholar Graham Twelftree, quoted approvingly by Habermas and Licona:

Twelftree sets the standard for belief that something was really said or truly happened at the point when the reasons for accepting it significantly outweigh the reasons for rejecting it.   (CRJ, page 33)

Showing a claim to have a probability of .51 would meet the Preponderance of Evidence Standard used in civil cases, but showing a historical claim to have a probability of .51 would fall short of the Twelftree Historicity Standard because the reasons in favor of that claim would not "significantly outweigh" the reasons for rejecting it in such examples.

But, in terms of probability, how much stronger would the evidence need to be for a claim to satisfy the Twelftree Historicity Standard?  

It seems to me that if a claim could be shown to have a 55% chance of being true, then the evidence for that claim would "significantly outweigh" the evidence for rejecting it.  In any case, it is clear that if a claim could be shown to have a 60% chance of being true, then the reasons for that claim must "significantly outweigh" the reasons for rejecting the claim.  So, we may reasonably infer that the Twelftree Historicity Standard would be satisfied if a historical claim could be shown to have a probability of .60 or greater.

Habermas and Licona have defined the "reasonable historical certainty" Standard as being satisfied when evidence shows that a historical claim has at least a somewhat greater likelihood than "Somewhat Certain".  In Part 5 of this series, I argued that this may reasonably be understood as applying to cases where the evidence shows the historical claim to have at least a 70% chance of being true, that is, a probability of .70 or greater.

We now have at least three different Standards of Evidence that could be applied to the evaluation of historical claims:

WHICH STANDARD IS USED BY NEW TESTAMENT AND JESUS SCHOLARS?

The case for (C2), the conclusion of Phase 1 of the case for the resurrection of Jesus by Habermas and Licona, attempts to show that the claim (C2) has a "reasonable historical certainty" which means (C2) is at least somewhat more likely than "Somewhat Certain", which we may reasonably interpret to mean that (C2) can be shown to have a probability of at least .70.

 

But what about the Standard of Evidence used by New Testament and Jesus scholars?  The "Minimum Facts Approach" taken by Habermas and Licona makes a case for Jesus' resurrection that is based in large part on a few historical claims that are such that "they are granted by nearly every scholar who studies the subject" (CRJ, page44), or that "nearly every scholar accepts them" (CRJ, page 44), or that "they are considered historical by virtually all who study the subject" (CRJ, page 46).

Suppose that most of the NT and Jesus scholars that Habermas and Licona survey use the Preponderance of Evidence Standard, and those scholars accept a historical claim when the evidence makes the claim more likely to be true than not. 

If this were the case, then we could not legitimately infer from "nearly every scholar accepts" the claim that Jesus died as a result of crucifixion that this claim has "reasonable historical certainty".  The fact that nearly all scholars agree that the probability of this claim is greater than .50 does not provide a good reason for the conclusion that nearly all scholars agree that the probability of this claim is at least .70.  Such a conclusion would follow ONLY IF most NT and Jesus scholars used the Reasonable Historical Certainty Standard suggested by Habermas and Licona.

Similarly, suppose that most of the NT and Jesus scholars that Habermas and Licona surveyed use the Twelftree Historicity Standard.  In that case, we could not legitimately infer from the premise that "nearly every scholar accepts" the claim that Jesus died as a result of crucifixion that this claim has reasonable historical certainty.  The fact that nearly all scholars agree that the probability of this claim is at least .60 does not provide a good reason for the conclusion that nearly all scholars agree that the probability of this claim is at least .70.  Such a conclusion would follow ONLY IF most NT and Jesus scholars used the Reasonable Historical Certainty Standard suggested by Habermas and Licona.

I don't know which of these three Standards of Evidence are used by most NT and Jesus scholars. I suspect that Habermas and Licona also don't know which of these three Standards of Evidence are used by most NT and Jesus scholars. It seems likely that a significant portion of such scholars use each of these Standards of Evidence, so it might not be the case that most NT and Jesus scholars use the same Standard of Evidence.  

Furthermore, the standard used by a specific scholar might well vary depending on the sort of historical question at issue, so specific scholars don't necessarily always use the same Standard of Evidence for all of the historical questions they investigate.  I suspect that a significant portion of NT and Jesus scholars are not aware of the specific Standard of Evidence that they use, and that many would hesitate to fully endorse one of these three Standards of Evidence.

Given the unclarity and uncertainty surrounding the use of these different Standards of Evidence by various NT and Jesus scholars, I think we must reject the following inference drawn by Habermas and Licona:

...most scholars, even skeptical ones, grant that some things are true in the Bible. When they do agree, the point they accept must be pretty well established by available historical data. (CRJ, page 46)

 

Most scholars do grant or accept some historical claims in the Bible, but the acceptance of such a historical claim by "nearly all scholars who study the subject" does NOT show that the claim is well established by available historical data.  That is to say, many, perhaps most, such scholars might not use the Reasonable Historical Certainty Standard in order to determine which historical claims in the Bible to accept. It might well be the case that most such scholars use the weaker standard of either the Preponderance of Evidence Standard or the Twelftree Historicity Standard.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF A WEAKER STANDARD OF EVIDENCE

Suppose that most NT and Jesus scholars use the Preponderance of Evidence Standard when determining whether the historical claim "Jesus died as a result of crucifixion" is a true claim.  If so, then agreement between "nearly all scholars who study the subject" accepting this historical claim would tell us only that most such scholars believe this claim has a probability greater than .50.

If we are inclined to follow the opinions of these scholars on this historical question, we might then reasonably conclude that the available historical evidence shows that the probability that "Jesus died as a result of crucifixion" is greater than .50.  This conclusion will not be of much use to Habermas and Licona.  That is because the death of Jesus by crucifixion is just a necessary condition of Jesus rising from the dead, the conclusion of Phase 1 of their case.  All, or nearly all, people who die, don't come back to life a few days later.

In order to get to the conclusion (C2), they need to also establish that Jesus was alive and walking around a few days after he was crucified.  That claim will in turn depend on the probability of other historical claims, such as that "Jesus' disciples sincerely believed that Jesus rose from the dead and that they saw Jesus alive sometime after he had been crucified and buried". 

Suppose that nearly all scholars who study the subject accept the historical claim that "Jesus' disciples sincerely believed that Jesus rose from the dead and that they saw Jesus alive sometime after he had been crucified and buried".  Suppose, again, that most of these scholars use the Preponderance of Evidence Standard to determine whether to accept this historical claim.  In that case, we can infer from this consensus of scholars only that the available historical evidence is sufficient to show that the probability of this historical claim is greater than .50.

In order to determine the probability of Jesus rising from the dead, we must determine the probability that it is BOTH the case that "Jesus died as a result of crucifixion" AND that it is also the case that "Jesus' disciples sincerely believed that Jesus rose from the dead and that they saw Jesus alive sometime after he had been crucified and buried." To do this we must multiply the probabilities of these two historical claims.

Using the opinions of the relevant scholars, we can only assume that the probability of the first claim is at least .51 and that the probability of the second claim is at least .51. The probability of BOTH of these historical claims being true is at least .26, which is about one chance in four: 

.51 x .51 = .26

The probability might be higher,  but we cannot determine that it is higher, based on the assumption that most of the relevant scholars accept a historical claim when it has a probability of greater than .50.

Now, even if we granted BOTH of these alleged "facts" about Jesus and his disciples, it does not follow that Jesus was actually alive sometime after his crucifixion and burial, nor does it follow that his disciples actually saw a living and physically embodied Jesus after his crucifixion and burial.  The assumption that BOTH key historical claims are true would only make it probable to some degree that Jesus was actually alive sometime after his crucifixion and burial.  

Let's be very generous and say that if both of these historical claims were true, then the probability that Jesus rose from the dead  would be .70.  

This is clearly not sufficient to show that (C2) has a probability of at least .70, because we must multiply the probability of BOTH of the key historical claims being true times the probability of (C2) being true on the assumption of those two key historical claims being true:

.26 x .70 = .18

Based on these assumptions, we could only infer a probability of about .18 for (C2), which is clearly well below the target probability of .70 implied by Habermas and Licona in claiming that the resurrection of Jesus could be shown to be somewhat more likely than "Somewhat Certain".  Two chances in ten is much less likely than seven chances in ten.

Similar reasoning can be used if we assume that most of the relevant scholars use the Twelftree Historicity Standard to determine whether or not to accept a historical claim about Jesus.

The two key historical claims could be inferred to each have a probability of at least .60.  We would multiply those probabilities together to get the probability that BOTH of those claims were true:

.60 x .60 = .36

If we again assume that the truth of these historical claims would make the probability of (C2) about .70, then we would need to multiply the probability of BOTH key historical claims being true times the probability of (C2) assuming those claims were true:

.36 x .70 = .25

Given these assumptions, the probability that Jesus rose from the dead would be at least .25, but we could not infer that the probability was higher given that most relevant scholars would accept the two historical claims if the probability of those claims was at least .60.

A probability of .25 is clearly still far short of the target probability of .70 that is implied by the Reasonable Historical Certainty Standard that Habermas and Licona claim that (C2) can be shown to meet.

THE CASE FOR (C2) FAILS EVEN IF MOST SCHOLARS USE THE REASONABLE HISTORICAL CERTAINTY STANDARD

Because of the need to multiply the probabilities of key historical claims, even if we knew that most of the relevant scholars used the Reasonable Historical Certainty Standard, we could still not show that the probability of (C2) would reach the target probability of at least .70.

The probability of BOTH key historical claims being true would be determined by multiplying the probabilities of those two claims.  If the relevant scholars would accept a claim if the evidence for the claim shows that the claim had a probability of at least .70, then we could only infer from acceptance of nearly all scholars who study the subject that each key historical claim had a probability of at least .70:

.70 x .70 = .49

So, the probability of BOTH key historical claims being true could be inferred, in this case, to be at least .49.  This probability would then need to be multiplied times the probability that (C2) would have assuming that the two historical claims were true:

.49 x .70 = .34

Once again, the probability of (C2) can only be inferred to be at least .34, which is significantly less than the target probability of .70.  Three chances in ten is significantly less than seven chances in ten.  Thus, even if we very generously grant the (questionable) assumption that most of the relevant scholars use the Reasonable Historical Certainty Standard laid out by Habermas and Licona, they would still not be able to achieve this level of certainty for this conclusion of Phase 1 of their case:

(C2) Jesus rose from the dead.

The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Habermas and Licona - Part 5: Reasonable Historical Certainty

WHAT DEGREE OF CERTAINTY DO THEY CLAIM TO SHOW?

The conclusion of Phase 1 of the case by Habermas and Licona is this:

(C2) Jesus rose from the dead.

Do Habermas and Licona attempt to prove this initial conclusion? Here is what they say on this matter:

Can Jesus' resurrection from the dead be proven? The answer may vary depending on one's definition of what constitutes proof. When it comes to any event that occurred in antiquity, the historian attempts to decide the matter with some degree of historical certainty. (CRJ, page 30)

This seems entirely reasonable, but leaves the question unanswered as to how certain they think they can show their initial conclusion to be.

They imply that the level of certainty is something less than 100% certainty:

When it comes to history, we can only speak of probability, not 100% certainty. However, do not be discouraged that in historical terms Jesus' resurrection cannot be established with absolute certainty. (CRJ, page 31)

 

Again, this is perfectly reasonable, but doesn't specify the degree of certainty they think they can show (C2) to have.

In Chapter 1 of CRJ, Habermas and Licona claim that the evidence for (C2) is very strong:

Christians should be delighted to find that the evidence for Jesus' resurrection is extremely compelling, even when using only a small collection of strongly attested historical facts to support the event. (CRJ, page 28)

At the beginning of their discussion of the concept of "reasonable historical certainty",  Habermas and Licona ask the question "Can Jesus' resurrection from the dead be proven?" (CRJ, page 30). Because this is their opening question, that suggests that they believe their case for (C2) shows that this conclusion has "reasonable historical certainty". 

At the end of their discussion about "reasonable historical certainty", they clearly imply that their case shows that (C2) has this level of certainty:

Therefore, when it comes to proving any historical event, we must remember that we are looking for whether we can ascertain with a reasonable amount of certainty that the event occurred. ...

...for the Christian, there is a difference between knowing that Jesus rose from the dead with reasonable historical certainty and living on the personal assurance that Christianity is true....The historical certainty we have of Jesus' resurrection only reinforces that God's Spirit has indeed spoken to us. (CRJ, page 33, emphasis added)

Now we just need to figure out what the phrase "reasonable historical certainty" means.

WHAT IS "REASONABLE HISTORICAL CERTAINTY"?

They get more specific in relation to a "spectrum of historical certainties":

In historical inquiry, professional historians talk in terms of the strength of probability that an event occurred. In fact, we can think in terms of a line graph with a full spectrum of historical certainties. (CRJ, page 31)

 

No probabilities are assigned to this line graph, but we can reasonably estimate probabilities for each category in the graph. The category that is in the exact middle of the line graph is "Uncertain", and given that the category immediately to the left of it is "Somewhat Doubtful" and the category immediately to the right is "Somewhat Certain", it is clear that "Uncertain" means about a 50/50 chance of being true, which is a probability of about .50. 

On the far right end is the category "Very Certain", which implies something less than absolute certainty, and given that this graph represents levels of historical certainty, "Very Certain" is presumably somewhat less than 100% certainty.  We may reasonably assign about a 95% chance of being true to a claim that is "Very Certain", which is a probability of about .95.

That gives us a range from about .50 to about .95 between "Uncertain" and "Very Certain".  The other categories between these two categories are evenly spread out between "Uncertain" and "Very Certain".  Since this range includes a difference of .45 probability, we can reasonably assign a range of .15 probability between each category starting from "Uncertain" and ending at "Very Certain".  There are also three evenly spaced categories to the left of "Uncertain", so we can also assign a range of .15 probability between those categories:

Habermas and Licona specify what they mean by "reasonable historical certainty" in relationship to the "spectrum of historical certainties":

In reference to Jesus' resurrection, we are inquiring to see what we can know with reasonable historical certainty when historical inquiry is applied. Where does "reasonable historical certainty" start on our graph? This is a somewhat subjective question. We would place it somewhere to the right of "somewhat certain" and continue on to the "very certain" point of the spectrum. (CRJ, page 32)

Given the probabilities I have assigned to these categories of historical certainty, I would interpret this to mean starting a little higher than a probability of about .65 and ending with a probability of about .95.  So, I take it that by "reasonable historical certainty" Habermas and Licona are indicating a range of probabilities from about .70 to about .95. 

Therefore, I take their claim to show that Jesus rose from the dead has a reasonable historical certainty to mean that they can show that their initial conclusion (C2) has a probability somewhere between about .70 and .95. In short, they imply that (C2) can be shown to have a probability of at least .70.

The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Habermas and Licona - Part 4: The Conclusion Revisited

CONCLUSION (C2) HAS A DIFFERENT MEANING THAN CONCLUSION (C3)

Although I got the ultimate conclusion of the case by Habermas and Licona right in  Part 2  of this series, there is an important distinction that I failed to make clear. I thought that Habermas and Licona were being sloppy and were using the following two claims interchangably, as if both claims had the same meaning:

C2: Jesus rose from the dead.

C3: God raised Jesus from the dead.

(C3) is indeed the ultimate conclusion of their case, for the reasons I gave in Part 2.  However, in later chapters of CRJ, Habermas and Licona make it clear that they understand that these two claims have different meanings.  

In fact, they make it clear that only (C2) can be established on the basis of historical evidence and reasoning (plus some scientific evidence and reasoning), but that (C3) cannot be established only on the basis of historical and scientific evidence.  Philosophical arguments are required to establish claims about God's involvement in human affairs, including in the alleged resurrection of Jesus.

There are at least four passages in CRJ where Habemas and Licona make or imply the distinction between (C2) and (C3).  Here is such a passage from Chapter 8 of CRJ:

...while science cannot measure God's activity, there is no reason why we cannot consider non-supernatural portions of claims concerning the Resurrection.  For example, did Jesus die? Was he seen alive at some later time? The scientist or historian could evaluate the conclusion: "Jesus was seen alive after his death."  However, in his capacity as a scientist or historian, he perhaps could not draw the conclusion: "God raised Jesus from the dead," since he is unable to detect God's actions with the tools of his trade.

...On the other hand, the philosopher or theologian can argue that God raised Jesus based on other well-founded data (see pp. 174-81). (CRJ, page 135)

This suggests that while the conclusion (C2) can be established on the basis of historical and scientific arguments, the conclusion (C3) cannot be established only on the basis of such arguments, and that philosophical arguments are required in order to establish (C3).

This point is further confirmed by a passage in Chapter 12 of CRJ:

Can the historian establish that it was God who raised Jesus? The historian can conclude that Jesus rose from the dead. But the historian cannot conclude from historical inquiry alone that God raised Jesus from the dead. ...historical inquiry alone cannot answer the question of the cause of Jesus' resurrection. It can only address whether the event occurred. (CRJ, page 183)

The conclusion section of CJR also includes a comment that implies this distinction between the meaning of (C2) and the meaning of (C3):

...the complete inability of opposing theories to account for the data leaves Jesus' resurrection as the only plausible explanation to account for the known historical facts. And it seems that if Jesus rose from the dead, we have good evidence that God exists and has actually revealed himself to mankind in Jesus Christ.  (CRJ, page 214, emphasis added)

In saying that (C2) provides some "good evidence that God exists", Habermas and Licona imply that (C2) does not assume that God exists, but obviously (C3), the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead does assume that God exists.  If (C2) assumed that God exists, it would beg the question to use (C2) as evidence that God exists.  Clearly, Habermas and Licona understand that (C2) has a different meaning than (C3) and that these two claims have different implications.

There is a passage in the Appendix of CRJ that confirms the distinction between the claim (C2) and the claim (C3):

D. Other Challenges

1. Jesus' resurrection does not prove the existence of God. (p. 182)

 a. The question has become who raised Jesus or how was he raised; not whether the Resurrection occurred. (CRJ, page 243)

The distinction between the question of "whether the Resurrection occurred" and the question of "who raised Jesus" implies the distinction between the claim "Jesus rose from the dead" (which answers the question of whether the resurrection occurred) and the claim "God raised Jesus from the dead" (which answers the question of who raised Jesus).

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN (C2) and (C3)?

Because Habermas and Licona recognize that (C2) and (C3) have different meanings and different implications, and because they believe that only (C2) can be established on the basis of historical and scientific arguments, while (C3) requires support from philosophical arguments, we need to distinguish two phases of their case, whether they formulate their case in two phases or not:

Phase 1:  Did Jesus rise from the dead?  

Answered in terms of only historical and scientific arguments.

Phase 2: Did God raise Jesus from the dead? 

Answered in terms of philosophical arguments, at least in part.

It makes no sense to investigate the question of how Jesus rose from the dead until one first determines whether Jesus rose from the dead.  If one concludes that Jesus did NOT rise from the dead, then one may reasonably skip the Phase 2 question about whether God caused that alleged event to happen. 

The logical order is thus to first investigate the question of whether Jesus rose from the dead, and then investigate the question of whether God raised Jesus from the dead.  Similarly, we should analyze and evaluate the case by Habermas and Licona in terms of the above two phases, and in that order. 

The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Habermas & Licona - Part 3: Case Summaries

AN OUTLINE OF THEIR CASE

In their book The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (hereafter: CRJ), Gary Habermas and Michael Licona provide a detailed outline of their case on pages 219 to 247.  That is a 29-page outline, so there are lots of details.  But here are just the top two levels of that outline:

Because I'm limiting the total content of this series of posts to about 20 pages, I cannot cover all of these topics.  In Section I (Introductory Information), I have previously touched on (a).  I will skip over (b), but will cover (c) and (d) in this current post.

Because Section II (The Facts) is basically their positive case, I will cover all of that section.

There are many alternative theories discussed in Section III (Opposing Theories), so I will not be able to discuss all of them in this brief series of posts, but will discuss three or four alternative theories. This section also includes replies to various objections, and I will probably cover a few, but not all, of those objections and replies.

For Section IV (Other Issues), I will cover (a) and (c), but not (b) or (e). If I have enough space, I might cover a few of the objections discussed in (d).

THE MINIMAL FACTS APPROACH

Habermas and Licona use a "minimal facts approach" to the issue of the resurrection of Jesus:

This approach considers only those data that are so strongly attested historically that they are granted by nearly every scholar who studies the subject, even the rather skeptical ones....Most facts we use meet two criteria: They are well evidenced and nearly every scholar accepts them.     (CRJ, page 44)

An important motivation for using this approach is to avoid getting side-tracked into questions about the historical reliability of the Gospels and other New Testament writings. 

THE ARGUMENT FOR JESUS' RESURRECTION

Habermas and Licona summarize their case on pages 75-76, 149, 207 to 209, and 220.  Here is the summary they give in the Appendix (CRJ, page 220):

1. Jesus' disciples sincerely believed he rose from the dead and appeared to them.

2. External evidence and events support the authenticity of their belief in his resurrection: the conversion of the church persecutor Paul, the conversion of the skeptic James, and the empty tomb. 

3. Since no plausible opposing theories exist that can account for the historical facts, Jesus' resurrection is the only plausible explanation.

Also, the Appendix (CRJ, pages 219 to 247) provides a summary of CRJ and the case that it contains. 

THE (ALLEGED) FACTS (4+1)

Their case is supposedly based primarily on four "minimal facts" plus one other fact that comes close to meeting the criteria for being a minimal fact.  The four "minimal facts" are:

1. Jesus died by crucifixion. (CRJ, pages 48 to 50)

2. Jesus' disciples sincerely believed he rose from the dead and appeared to them. (CRJ, pages 50 to 63)

3. The church persecutor Paul suddenly converted to Christianity. (CRJ, pages 64 to 66)

4. The skeptic James, brother of Jesus, suddenly converted to Christianity (CRJ, pages 67 to 69)

The fifth alleged "fact" is this:

5. The tomb where Jesus had been buried was found to be empty. (CRJ, pages 69 to 74). 

Although (5) is not accepted by nearly every scholar who studies the subject, Habermas and Licona believe there is strong evidence for it, and that it is "accepted as a fact of history by an impressive majority of critical scholars." (CRJ, page 70).

The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Habermas & Licona - Part 2: The Conclusion of the Case

CASES VS. ARGUMENTS

A case for the resurrection of Jesus is basically an argument for the resurrection of Jesus.  The difference between a case and an argument is that a case is a complex argument. The main thing that makes a case complex is that it involves arguments within an argument.  

A simple argument involves one or more premises and just one conclusion. The following argument has two premises and one conclusion:

1. Either the butler killed Mr. Smith or the maid killed Mr. Smith.

2. The maid did not kill Mr. Smith.

THEREFORE:

3. The butler killed Mr. Smith.

Suppose that a homicide detective presents this argument to the head of the detective department, and the detective's boss asks, "How do you know that it must have been either the butler or the maid who killed Mr. Smith? What about the cook, a neighbor, or Mrs. Smith?" If the detective replies to this objection, the detective will probably give another argument, such as this one:

4. Mr. Smith was stabbed to death in the dining room of his home.

5. Based on video evidence, the only other people in the house at the time of the killing were the butler and the maid.

THEREFORE:

1. Either the butler killed Mr. Smith or the maid killed Mr. Smith.

Now we have an argument for premise (1) of the original simple argument.  

The detective's boss might also ask, "How do you know that the maid is not the killer?"  Again, the detective will probably reply by giving an argument for premise (2) of the original simple argument. The detective has now started building a case, a complex argument where the premises of a "core argument" are supported by other arguments.

Another complexity of cases is that they usually include replies to objections and objections to alternative views. A person making a case for a claim will usually present a positive case for the claim, then also respond to anticipated objections to that claim, reply to anticipated objections to the arguments in their positive case, and also raise objections to alternative views.  The combination of a positive case, replies to objections, and objections to alternative views constitutes a typical case for a claim. 

You can see this structure of cases in the first two volumes of Habermas's On the Resurrection series. Volume 1: Evidences presents a positive case for the resurrection of Jesus, and Volume 2: Refutations presents replies to objections and objections to alternative views.

CLARITY IS A BASIC STANDARD OF THINKING

In order to think critically about a claim or belief or argument, one must continually strive to conform one's thinking to the standards of thinking.  One of the most basic and important standards is: CLARITY.  

Before one can critically evaluate a case or an argument, one must obtain a clear understanding of that case or argument: Don't criticize what you don't understand.  That is a fundamental principle of critical thinking.

There are two main kinds of clarification needed when one is analyzing a case or an argument: 

• clarification of vague or unclear words and phrases
• clarification of the logical structure of the case or argument

THE FIRST STEPS IN CLARIFYING A CASE 

A case consists of more than one argument and more than one premise. Usually, a case, like an argument, will have just one conclusion, although the conclusion of a case may be stated and re-stated multiple times, often in different words. Sometimes, the conclusion will only be implied, and will not be stated at all. 

The first step of clarifying a case is to identify the statement(s) or claim(s) that express the conclusion of the case.  That is a clarification of the logical structure.  Most of the statements or claims in a case will be reasons or premises, and a case usually has only one ultimate conclusion, even when multiple statements or claims express the conclusion. 

The second step of clarifying a case or an argument is to get a clear understanding of the meaning of the statement or claim that appears to be the conclusion.  This may require clarification of vague or unclear words and phrases in that statement or claim.  It is often necessary to revise the wording of the conclusion to make its intended meaning clear.

IDENTIFYING THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE BY HABERMAS & LICONA 

One big clue about the conclusion of the case by Habermas and Licona is the title of their book:

The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus 

Their case is in support of: "the Resurrection of Jesus".  However, "the Resurrection of Jesus" is just a phrase; it is not a complete sentence.  A conclusion asserts a claim, and a claim is expressed by a complete sentence.  We need both a subject and a predicate in order to have a clearly expressed claim. 

But it is easy to see what they had in mind.  We can just add a couple of words to turn the phrase "the Resurrection of Jesus" into a complete sentence:

C1: The resurrection of Jesus actually happened.

This is a claim, and this appears to be the conclusion of their case. This interpretation is confirmed in Chapter 1 of The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (hereafter: CRJ):

Jesus asserted that he was speaking the truth from God. When someone makes such a lofty claim, critics rightly ask for the evidence. Jesus' critics asked him for a sign, and he said he would give them one--his resurrection. It is the test by which we could know that he was telling the truth. (CRJ, page 27)

Of course, the test of Jesus' resurrection is not very useful, if we cannot determine whether it actually occured. Is there enough evidence for a rational person to be justified in concluding that Jesus' resurrection was a real event in history? (CRJ, page 28, emphasis added)

This discussion of the resurrection as a test in the opening chapter confirms that (C1) is the conclusion of their case. 

This statement of their conclusion, however, is not entirely clear, so we should look for other similar statements in their book to see if they provide a clearer statement of the conclusion.

CLARIFYING THE CONCLUSION

Here are more quotes from Chapter 1 of CRJ that suggest an alternative statement of their conclusion:

Paul wrote that belief in Jesus' resurrection from the dead is required for eternal life. In fact, Paul was so adamant about the importance of Jesus' resurrection that he wrote, "And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is worthless; you are still under condemnation for your sins.  In that case, all who have died believing in Christ have perished!" For Paul, if Jesus did not rise from the dead, Christianity is false, we will be judged for our sins by the true God, and Christians who have died are lost. (CRJ, page 26, emphasis added)

If Jesus did not rise from the dead, he was a false prophet and a charlatan whom no rational person should follow. Conversely, if he did rise from the dead, this event confirmed his radical claim. (CRJ, page 27, emphasis added) 

The above quotes suggest this alternative way of stating the conclusion of their case:

C2: Jesus rose from the dead.

Here is one more quote from Chapter 1 of CRJ that indicates an alternative statement of the conclusion of their case:

The apostle Paul wrote that this message [i.e. the Gospel or the good news] "is near you; it is in your mouth and in your heart'--that is, the word of faith we are proclaiming: That if you confess with your mouth 'Jesus is Lord,' and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved." The message was that, in order to have eternal life, one must acknowledge and be committed to Jesus as the Son of God, the Sovereign over all things, and the Savior who died for us and was raised from the dead by God. (CRJ, page 26, emphasis added)

This suggests the following statement of the conclusion of their case:

C3: God raised Jesus from the dead.

Here are three different statements that could be taken to be the conclusion of the case by Habermas and Licona:

C1: The resurrection of Jesus actually happened.

C2: Jesus rose from the dead.

C3: God raised Jesus from the dead.

I believe that (C3) is the clearest statement of their conclusion, because it is the only statement that explicitly asserts the involvement of God in this alleged event. The idea that some person died and then came back to life a couple of days later is odd and striking, but such an event has no obvious religious or theological implications in itself. 

We can infer religious or theological conclusions from the resurrection of Jesus only if we can determine that God was the cause of this event.  Habermas and Licona are interested in making a case for the resurrection of Jesus because they believe this alleged event has religious and theological implications.  When they discussed the resurrection as being a "test" of Jesus' claims and teachings, they included the following End Note:

10. The apostle Paul wrote that Jesus' resurrection vindicated him as the Son of God (Rom. 1:4). The event was God's endorsement of Jesus and his teachings. (CRJ, page 253)

So, Habermas and Licona need to show not only that "Jesus rose from the dead"; they need to show that this happened because God made it happen. Otherwise, this odd event would lack religious or theological significance.

The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Habermas & Licona - Part 1: Introduction

According to the apostle Paul, whether one will live eternally in heaven depends on whether one believes that God raised Jesus from the dead (Romans 10:9). Paul also asserted this:

17 If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile, and you are still in your sins. 18 Then those also who have died in Christ have perished. 19 If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all people most to be pitied. (1 Corinthians 15:17-19)

The alleged death of Jesus on a cross, and his alleged resurrection a couple of days later, are the most important events in human history, from a Christian point of view. 

So, if it turns out that either (a) Jesus did not die on the cross, or (b) Jesus died on the cross but stayed dead, then the Christian faith is worthless, and Christian believers are to be pitied for foolishly believing in Jesus' alleged death and resurrection.

If you want to figure out whether Jesus actually rose from the dead, you should probably read and study some cases for the resurrection of Jesus written by leading Christian defenders of the resurrection of Jesus, and also read and study some well-informed skeptical views on this question.

The best case for the resurrection of Jesus currently available in the English language is presented by Dr. Gary Habermas in the first two volumes of his series On the Resurrection, Volume 1: Evidences, and Volume 2: Refutations.[1]  The first volume makes a positive case, and the second volume focuses on responses to skeptical objections, especially responses to alternative theories that attempt to explain the relevant historical evidence in terms of natural causes (by non-supernatural, non-miraculous explanations). 

However, On the Resurrection, Volume 1 is over a thousand pages! And On the Resurrection, Volume 2 is over 850 pages.  Most people are not going to read, study, and think critically about a case for the resurrection of Jesus that is nearly 2,000 pages long.

Fortunately, there is a shorter case for the resurrection of Jesus that was written by Gary Habermas along with another Christian scholar named Michael Licona.  So, you can get a good feel for the best case by Habermas by reading, studying, and thinking critically about The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, which is a little over 200 pages (not including a long Appendix and a long End Notes section).

For those who are unsure whether to invest the time and effort to read, study, and think critically about the 218-page case by Habermas and Licona, you can dip your toes in the water by continuing to read this series of articles, where I will summarize their case, and also present some skeptical objections and skeptical evaluations of it.

I will keep the total content of this series of blog posts to under 20 pages, so that readers can become acquainted with the best case for the resurrection of Jesus along with some skeptical comments and objections in about 1/10 the time and effort required to read and study The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, and about 1/100th the time and effort required to read and study the first two volumes of On the Resurrection.  

END NOTES

1. See my post on this at The Secular Frontier: Gary Habermas is the Leading Defender of the Resurrection of Jesus