William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 3: The Rest of the Core Argument

SEVEN CLAIMS IN CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT

In Part 2 of this series, I showed that the core argument of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus was a deductive argument that consists of at least the following claims:

1. IF these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts, THEN the preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

3. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts, THEN the preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts.

5. The preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

6. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

 7. Alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SEVEN CLAIMS 

The following argument diagram shows the logical relationships between these claims in Craig's core argument: 

The seven claims constitute three sub-arguments and three inferences in the core argument of Craig's case. The three inferences are represented by the red arrows in the above argument diagram, and they are all valid deductive inferences.

However, this is not the complete content of the core argument, because each of the above seven claims includes the phrase "these three facts" and this phrase has no meaning outside the context of the paragraph in which the seven claims were asserted by Craig.

Here is the previous part of the paragraph that provides the context for understanding what the phrase "these three facts" means:

In my estimation the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate.  The inductive grounds for the inference of this explanation consist primarily of the evidence of three independently established facts: (1) the tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion, (2) various individuals and groups thereafter experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearrances of Jesus alive, and (3) the first disciples came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions. ... (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360) 

In the context of this paragraph, the phrase "these three facts", which occurs repeatedly in the rest of the core argument, refers to the following three historical claims that are asserted in the above quotation[1]:

HC1:The tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion.

HC2: Beginning on the first day of the week following Jesus' crucifixion, various individuals and groups experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearances of Jesus alive. 

HC3: The first disciples of Jesus came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions.

Premise (1) uses the word "facts" in a confused and misleading way:

IF these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence...

If those three historical claims cannot be "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence", then those three historical claims are NOT historical facts! So, the wording of premise (1), and the closely related premise (2) need to be revised to avoid this confused and misleading use of the word "facts".  

This problem with the term "facts" will be eliminated later in this post by my proposal about how to clarify the phrase "these three facts".

The Meaning of the Phrase "These Three Facts"

To state the obvious, there are billions of facts, not just three! That is part of the reason the phrase "these three facts" is unclear and problematic.  In this context, however, we can specify the scope of "facts" with some qualifications.  First, Craig is concerned with "historical data", so his three facts are historical facts.  

Craig also uses the qualification "established". This term seems a bit redundant, because one should clearly distinguish between a historical claim and a historical fact, and this distinction corresponds directly to the question of whether the historical claim in question has been firmly established on the basis of evidence or not. If a historical claim has NOT been firmly established on the basis of evidence, then that claim does NOT constitute a historical fact.  Thus, the qualification "established" is redundant.  

However, this redundancy is a good reminder of the crucial distinction between historical claims and historical facts, so I am going to retain Craig's phrase "established facts" and just add the qualification "historical" to narrow down the general kind of facts that Craig has in mind: 

established historical facts

Nevertheless, it still remains the case that there are millions or billions of "established historical facts", so there is still something unclear and problematic about the phrase "these three established historical facts".

The context indicated in the first sentence of the key paragraph that we have been closely examining provides a further narrowing of the scope of "established historical facts":

In my estimation the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360) 

Craig is focused on "the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate." Some established historical facts are relevant to Jesus' final fate, and other established historical facts are NOT relevant to Jesus' final fate.  It is the former collection of established historical facts that Craig is interested in for the purpose of evaluating "the hypothesis 'God raised Jesus from the dead'".  So, the scope of facts to be considered has been narrowed to this:

established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate

HOW MANY SUCH FACTS EXIST? 

Because there are billions or trillions of "established facts", the phrase "these three facts" is both unclear and problematic.  However, we have narrowed the scope of facts that should be considered down to these: established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  

This narrowing of the scope helps to reduce the number of  facts that we need to consider, but it is still the case that there might well be hundreds or thousands of facts that fall within this scope.

Does Craig believe that there are ONLY THREE CLAIMS that constitute established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate? This assumption seems very dubious, especially in terms of the multitude of historical claims and beliefs of Christian apologists concerning the trials, crucifixion, death, and burial of Jesus, etc.

In a draft chapter of my book Thinking Critically about the Resurrection of Jesus, Volume 2: The Resuscitation of the Swoon Theory, I critically analyze and evaluate some objections by William Craig against the Swoon Theory.  In that chapter, I point out that one of Craig's objections to the Swoon Theory involves at least 45 different historical claims![2]

Perhaps Craig would say that those 45 historical claims were not all established historical facts.  But clearly, he would assert that they are more than just historical guesses or historical hunches; otherwise, they would provide a rather weak basis for his argument against the Swoon Theory. 

At the very least, he would have to say that each of those 45 historical claims was probably true, and I suspect he would claim that each of those 45 historical claims was (at least) very probable.  Craig might well claim that several of those 45 historical claims were established historical facts.  

Obviously, if those 45 historical claims are all relevant to the evaluation of the Swoon Theory (which is a skeptical theory that is an alternative to the hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead), then those 45 historical claims are all relevant to Jesus' final fate.

Two other Christian scholars and apologists, who are major defenders of the view that God raised Jesus from the dead, also make a case for the resurrection that focuses on just a few key historical claims that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  In their book The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus[3] (hereafter: CRJ), Gary Habermas and Michael Licona use what they call a "minimal-facts approach" to making their case for Jesus' resurrection (CRJ, p.44), implying that the key historical claims of their case are established historical facts:

MF1. Jesus died by crucifixion. (CRJ, p.48-49)

MF2. Jesus disciples sincerely believed He rose from the dead and appeared to them. (CRJ, p.61-63)

MF3. Paul, a persecutor of Christians, converted to Christianity because he firmly believed that he experienced an encounter of the risen Jesus. (CRJ, p.64-66)

MF4. James, a brother of Jesus who had been skeptical about Jesus being the Son of God, converted to Christianity. (CRJ, p.67-69)  

MF5. The tomb where Jesus body had been placed on Friday evening after his crucifixion was empty on the Sunday morning of the next week.[4]

Clearly, Habermas and Licona don't believe that there are only three established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  They believe that there are at least five such historical facts.

Note that (MF5) corresponds roughly with one of Craig's "three facts", namely with (HC1), and that (MF2) corresponds roughly with the remaining two facts of Craig's "three facts", namely (HC2) and (HC3). That leaves us with three additional historical claims: (MF1), (MF3), and (MF4). Habermas and Licona would assert that those additional claims are established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  

I strongly suspect that Craig would agree with that way of characterizing those three additional historical claims. That means that there are at least six different historical claims that are (according to Habermas, Licona, and probably also Craig) established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.

Furthermore, in his most recent book defending the resurrection of Jesus[5], Habermas spells out six "minimal historical facts" (in "Part 3: The Minimal Facts"), and then he goes on to provide another list of six more historical facts (in "Part 4: The Other Six Known Historical Facts"), all of which Habermas believes to be established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  I strongly suspect that Craig would have no objection to this characterization of those twelve historical claims put forward by Habermas.

That means that Habermas, and probably Craig as well, believes that there are at least one dozen historical claims that constitute established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.

THE PROBLEM OF CONFIRMATION BIAS

As I stated earlier, the context of the paragraph in which Craig summarizes his case for the resurrection makes it clear that the phrase "these three facts" refers to the specific historical claims asserted in (HC1), (HC2), and (HC3).

We now see that the three historical claims asserted in those premises are believed by Craig to fall into this general category of claims:

established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate 

We now also see that Habermas, and probably also Craig, believe there are at least a dozen such historical claims, and that it is quite possible that they believe there are dozens or even hundreds of such claims (e.g., Craig asserts at least 45 different historical claims in just one of his arguments against the Swoon Theory). 

Even if we know that the phrase "these three facts" refers to only the historical claims asserted in (HC1), (HC2), and (HC3) of the core argument in Craig's case, there remains a serious concern about the potential of a major problem in Craig's argument, a problem called Confirmation Bias. 

Craig has selected just three facts out of a wider collection of established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate. That wider collection might well contain dozens or even hundreds of historical facts.  Perhaps Craig has focused on a few facts that favor his belief that God raised Jesus from the dead, and perhaps Craig has also ignored many facts that run against his belief that God raised Jesus from the dead.  If so, then Craig's core argument suffers from the very common problem of confirmation bias.

WHAT IS CONFIRMATION BIAS?

Google AI provides a good explanation of confirmation bias, so I will present a part of that information here:

The complete Google AI response on confirmation bias is included in an endnote below.[6] 

CLARIFICATION OF CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT  

My concern with the potential problem of confirmation bias in Craig's core argument relates to doing an evaluation of this core argument.  But for right now, my main focus is on the analysis of this argument, and specifically the need for clarification of the problematic phrase "these three facts" which occurs repeatedly in the premises in Craig's core argument.

I propose that instead of the phrase "these three facts", we use the following more accurate and more descriptive phrase:

Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate

Here are the revised premises: 

1a. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

3a. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4a. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate.

5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

6a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

7a. Alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible. 

I do not think that we need to add any further claims to the above seven claims in order to accurately represent Craig's core argument.  

However, we should clarify the newly added phrase by means of a definition:

A claim C is one of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate  IF AND ONLY IF claim C is equivalent to either (HC1) or (HC2) or (HC3).

Of course, we also need to specify the claims represented by the abbreviations in this definition:

HC1:The tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion.

HC2: Beginning on the first day of the week following Jesus' crucifixion, various individuals and groups experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearances of Jesus alive. 

HC3: The first disciples of Jesus came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions.

Given the above revisions of the seven claims, and given this clarification of the meaning of the newly added phrase ("Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate"), we can keep the same analysis of the logical structure of Craig's deductive core argument; we just need to revise the numbers designating the claims (by adding an "a" after the number of each revised premise) in the argument diagram: 

I believe we have completed the initial analysis and clarification of Craig's core argument, so we should be able to begin evaluation of that argument in the next post. 

END NOTES

1. Craig asserts that these are "independently" established facts, but it is not clear what he means by this, and it is not clear why this is significant.  So, I have dropped that qualification for now.  If at some point in Craig's presentation of his case, he explains what he means by this term and why this is significant, then we might need to add this qualification back into the clarified statement of his core argument. 

2. You may download a PDF of the relevant DRAFT chapter here:

The Case Against the Swoon Theory by William Craig

3. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2004).

4. Although Habermas and Licona argue in support of "the empty tomb" in CRJ (pages 69-74), they do not bother to state or specify the historical claim they have in mind! This is very sloppy reasoning and writing by Habermas and Licona. 

In his most recent book defending the resurrection of Jesus, Habermas provides something more like an actual historical claim: "...the tomb in which Jesus was buried was later found empty." (On the Resurrection, Volume 1: Evidences, p.598).  

However, even this claim is a bit too vague. WHEN was Jesus body placed into the tomb? WHEN was the tomb found empty? What does the word "later" mean? If Jesus' tomb was found empty two years after the crucifixion of Jesus, would that be of any real significance? I don't think so.  I don't think that would help make the case for the resurrection of Jesus. 

My assumption is that Habermas believes that Jesus' tomb was "found empty" on Sunday morning following the burial of Jesus in that tomb on Friday evening when Jesus was (allegedly) removed from the cross, which is the standard Christian belief.  My assumption is that when Habermas uses the vague word "later" about the discovery of the empty tomb, he has in mind the historical claim that the tomb was found empty early on Sunday morning (about 6am), about 36 hours after Jesus was placed into the tomb on Friday evening (about 6pm).

5. Gary Habermas, On the Resurrection, Volume 1: Evidences (Brentwood, TN: B&H Academic, 2024).

6. Here is the complete Google AI response to the question "What is confirmation bias?":

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 2: The Logic of the Core Argument

IS THE CORE ARGUMENT A DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT?

The first comment I received on Part 1 was an objection about how I characterized the logic of the core argument of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus:

It seems to me that in restating Craig’s argument as a deductive proof, you are disregarding the original type and intent of the argument that Craig put forth in  Reasonable Faith. 

My initial response was that I had NOT restated Craig's core argument as a deductive argument.  I never stated that his core argument was a deductive argument.  I never implied that his core argument was a deductive argument. Furthermore, the core argument, as I stated it, did not have the form of a valid deductive inference (e.g., it was not in the form of a modus ponens or a modus tollens or a disjunctive syllogism).

However, when I took a second look at the long paragraph I had quoted from Craig, which was the basis for my statement of the core argument in his case, it became clear to me that the core argument is, in fact, a deductive argument.

THE LOGICAL FORM OF THE MAIN PREMISE

The logical form of the main premise in the core argument of Craig's case is a conditional statement.  That is to say, the main premise has this form:

IF P, THEN Q

This is a big clue indicating that the logical form of the core argument is a modus ponens:

IF P, THEN Q

P

THEREFORE:

Q 

I will now show that the main premise in the core argument is a conditional statement.  

Craig put the main premise of his core argument into one long sentence. In fact, nearly the entire core argument is contained in that one sentence:

...If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence (and it seems to me they can) and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible (and the consensus of scholarship is that they can), then unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors (and my experience in debating the comparative merits of the hypotheses convinces me that it cannot), then the preferred explanation ought to be the one given in the documents [of the New Testament] themselves: God raised Jesus from the dead. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition, p.360) 

Notice that Craig asserts three different claims in three parenthetical remarks.  Those three claims are three premises in Craig's core argument. But they are separate from the main premise of the core argument, so let's delete the parenthetical remarks to focus on just the main premise:

...If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence... and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible... , then unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors... , then the preferred explanation ought to be the one given in the documents [of the New Testament] themselves: God raised Jesus from the dead. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition, p.360) 

Now I will use different color fonts to identify four different statements that constitute parts of this complex sentence:

If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible, then unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors, then the preferred explanation ought to be the one given in the documents [of the New Testament] themselves: God raised Jesus from the dead.   

(Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition, p.360) 

We can assign letters to each of these parts of the above complex sentence:

R: These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

S: Alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

T: The resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts.

U: The preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

Now we can more easily see the logical structure of Craig's complex sentence by replacing these ideas/statements with the letters we have just assigned to them:

IF R and S, THEN unless T, then U. 

This is a conditional statement in which the first part of the conditional, called the antecedent, is the conjunction of two claims:

R AND S

The second part of the conditional statement, called the consequent, can itself be understood as a conditional statement:

IF NOT T, THEN U

This is a reasonable way to represent the logic of the statement "Unless T, then U". 

Using parentheses, we can represent the main premise of Craig's core argument, using the above abbreviations:

IF (R AND S), THEN (IF NOT T, THEN U).

We can simplify this representation of the main premise a bit further by using the letter P to stand for the conjunction in the antecedent: (R AND S), and we can use the letter Q to stand for the conditional in the consequent: (IF NOT T, THEN U):

IF P, THEN Q

Now it is very clear that the main premise of Craig's core argument is a conditional statement.  

THE CORE ARGUMENT INCLUDES A MODUS PONENS

The fact that the main premise is a conditional statement strongly suggests that the core argument includes a modus ponens inference:

 IF P, THEN Q

P

THEREFORE:

Q     

In fact, in addition to the main premise, Craig clearly implies that the antecedent of the conditional statement (that constitutes the main premise) is true. This confirms my suspicion that the core argument has a modus ponens inference. 

Recall that P represents a conjunction of two statements:

R AND S

Craig asserts that R is the case in a parenthetical remark:

...If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence (and it seems to me they can)...   (Reasonable Faith, p.360) 

The parenthetical remark here basically asserts the claim that "these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence", and that is the claim that R represents:

R: These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

Craig also asserts that S is the case in a parenthetical remark:

...if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible (and the consensus of scholarship is that they can)...

The parenthetical remark here basically asserts the claim that "alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible", and that is the claim that S represents:

S: Alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

So, in the complex sentence where Craig summarizes the core argument of his case, he asserts claim R, and he also asserts claim S.  We can draw a valid deductive inference from these two assertions to this conjunction:

R AND S

Recall that this conjunction is the antecedent of the conditional statement that constitutes the main premise of Craig's core argument:

IF (R AND S), THEN (IF NOT T, THEN U)

By the valid deductive inference known as modus ponens, we may now infer the consequent of the main premise:

1. IF (R AND S), THEN (IF NOT T, THEN U)

2. R AND S

THEREFORE: 

 3. IF NOT T, THEN U

Furthermore, in the complex sentence that we have been examining, Craig also asserts that NOT T is the case; in other words, Craig asserts that T is not the case:

...unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors (and my experience in debating the comparative merits of the hypotheses convinces me that it cannot)...

The parenthetical remark here basically asserts the claim that it is not the case that "the resurrection hypothesis has been shown to be more implausible than alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts", and that is the denial of the claim that T represents:

T: The resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts.

 So, Craig is asserting that claim T is NOT the case:

4. NOT T

If we combine this assertion with the conclusion of the above modus ponens argument, then we can make another valid deductive inference: 

3. IF NOT T, THEN U

4. NOT T

THEREFORE: 

5. U

We can now represent the core argument of Craig's case in terms of two valid deductive inferences: 

1. IF (R AND S), THEN (IF NOT T, THEN U)

2. R AND S

THEREFORE: 

 3. IF NOT T, THEN U

4. NOT T

THEREFORE: 

5. U 

Let's fill in the statements that the various letters stand for, to return to a more meaningful statement of the core argument:

1. IF these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts, THEN the preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

THEREFORE: 

3. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts, THEN the preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts.

THEREFORE: 

5. The preferred explanation for these three facts ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

This is clearly a deductive argument.  

There is also a valid deductive sub-argument for premise (2):

6. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

 7. Alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

THEREFORE:

2. These three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for these three facts can be shown to be implausible.

Here is the new and improved argument diagram showing the logical structure of the deductive argument that constitutes Craig's core argument:

There is, however, a significant problem with the meaning of each premise in this core argument.  The phrase "these three facts" occurs in all seven premises. But that phrase has no meaning outside of the context of the paragraph from which these statements or premises were taken.  

So, we need to either replace this unclear phrase with the "facts" to which it refers, or we need to add more premises to the core argument to define the meaning of the phrase "these three facts".

I will attempt to fix this problem in the next post about Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus. 

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 1: An Overview of Craig's Case

 WHO IS WILLIAM CRAIG?

Here is how Craig is described by a fellow Christian philosopher and apologist:

It is hard to overstate the impact of William Lane Craig has had for the cause of Christ. He is simply the finest Christian apologist of the last half century, and his academic work justifies ranking him among the top one percent of practicing philosophers in the Western world. I do not know of a single thinker who has done more to raise the bar of Christian scholarship in our generation than Craig.  He is one of a kind and I thank God for his life and work. - J.P. Moreland, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Talbot School of Theology

(from the back cover of the 3rd edition of Reasonable Faith)

If Craig is the finest Christian apologist of the last half century, and if his academic work justifies ranking him among the top one percent of practicing philosophers in the Western world, then Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus should be taken very seriously. 

Furthermore, if Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails, then that would be significant evidence for the claim that it is probable that no Christian apologist has ever provided a strong and solid case for the resurrection of Jesus.  If Craig cannot do the job in the 21st century, then it is unlikely that any other Christian apologist has ever managed to do the job.

A SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT ABOUT THE RESURRECTION

Here is one of my skeptical arguments about the resurrection of Jesus:

1. If William Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails, then it is probable that no Christian apologist has ever produced a strong and solid case for the resurrection of Jesus.

2. William Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

THEREFORE:

3. It is probable that no Christian apologist has ever produced a strong and solid case for the resurrection of Jesus.

I have previously written a book (not yet published), showing that the case for the resurrection of Jesus made by the philosopher and Christian apologist Peter Kreeft fails.[1] Based on that conclusion, we could make the above skeptical argument stronger: 

1a. If Peter Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails and William Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails, then it is probable that no Christian apologist has ever produced a strong and solid case for the resurrection of Jesus.

2a. Peter Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails and William Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

THEREFORE:

3a. It is probable that no Christian apologist has ever produced a strong and solid case for the resurrection of Jesus.

In the future, I plan to write another book showing that the case for the resurrection of Jesus made by the philosopher and Christian apologist Gary Habermas fails.  

Since Gary Habermas has made what appears to be the best and strongest case for the resurrection ever made by any Christian apologist[2], showing that his case fails would allow me to further enhance the above skeptical argument:

1b. If Peter Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails and William Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails and Gary Habermas's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails, then it is very probable that no Christian apologist has ever produced a strong and solid case for the resurrection of Jesus.

2b. Peter Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails and William Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails and Gary Habermas's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

THEREFORE:

3b. It is very probable that no Christian apologist has ever produced a strong and solid case for the resurrection of Jesus.

It will be a year or two before I can make this enhanced version of my skeptical argument, because that requires me to provide a strong justification of the claim that Gary Habermas's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.  However, for now, I will focus on showing that William Craig's case fails. 

THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF CRAIG'S CASE

Before we can reasonably evaluate or criticize Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus, we must first have a clear understanding of his case.  A clear understanding of Craig's case requires understanding the logical structure of his case and understanding the basic assumptions and claims of his case.

Craig presents his case for the resurrection of Jesus in many different books and articles.  I will focus on one of the more recent presentations of his case, specifically on the case he makes in Chapter 8 of the 3rd edition of his book Reasonable Faith.[3]

Craig nicely lays out the high-level logical structure of his case:

Any historical argument for Jesus' resurrection will have two steps, even if they are not clearly delineated: (1) to establish the facts which will serve as historical evidence and (2) to argue that the hypothesis of Jesus' resurrection is the best or most probable explanation of those facts. Step (1) will involve an investigation of the historicity of events such as the discovery of Jesus' empty tomb; step (2) will assess the comparative merits of rival hypotheses offered as explanations of the facts established in step (1).  (Reasonable Faith, p. 350) 

THE CLAIMS OR PREMISES OF CRAIG'S CASE 

Craig also summarizes his case for the resurrection of Jesus, including his main premises, in one paragraph:

In my estimation the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate.  The inductive grounds for the inference of this explanation consist primarily of the evidence of three independently established facts: (1) the tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion, (2) various individuals and groups thereafter experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearrances of Jesus alive, and (3) the first disciples came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions. If these three facts can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence (and it seems to me they can) and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts can be shown to be implausible (and the consensus of scholarship is that they can), then unless the resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more implausible than its failed competitors (and my experience in debating the comparative merits of the hypotheses convinces me that it cannot), then the preferred explanation ought to be the one given in the documents [of the New Testament] themselves: God raised Jesus from the dead. ...           (Reasonable Faith, p.360) 

Based on these two paragraphs by Craig, we can spell out the core argument of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus[4]:

1. It is an established historical fact that the tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion.

2. It is an established historical fact that beginning on the first day of the week following Jesus' crucifixion, various individuals and groups experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearances of Jesus alive. 

3. It is an established historical fact that the first disciples of Jesus came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions.

4. Alternative explanations (i.e., alternatives to the Christian resurrection hypothesis) for claims (1), (2), and (3) can be shown to be implausible.

5. The Christian resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead) has not been shown to be more implausible than alternative explanations. 

THEREFORE:

6. The best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate is the Christian resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

Here is the argument diagram for this core argument:

I suspect that the logical structure of the core argument might be a bit more complex than this diagram indicates, but this diagram will suffice for now. 

In future posts, I will examine the logic and the premises of this core argument, and this will include analysis and evaluation of the sub-arguments that Craig gives in support of the premises of the above core argument in his case. 

 END NOTES

1. See this blog post about the book on the resurrection that I'm working on getting published: 

Thinking Critically about the Resurrection of Jesus, Volume 1

2. See this blog post about Gary Habermas's case for the resurrection of Jesus:

Gary Habermas is the Leading Defender of the Resurrection of Jesus

3. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008).

4. It should be noted that Craig's current case for the resurrection of Jesus, which is now (in 2026) presented on his Reasonable Faith website, includes one additional historical claim:

After his crucifixion, Jesus was buried in a tomb by Joseph of Arimathea. 

"The Resurrection of Jesus", an article by William Craig on the Reasonable Faith website (viewed 4/6/26):

The Resurrection of Jesus

The Lousy Track Record of Psychics

PEOPLE CANNOT SEE THE FUTURE

There are at least two different kinds of evidence about whether precognition (the alleged supernatural ability to see the future) exists.  First, one can focus on individuals who claim to be psychics and who claim to see the future, to determine if some of them actually have the ability to see the future. Second, one can focus on people in general to determine if some or most people have some ability to see the future (by means of experiments about precognition).

In this series of posts about psychics, I will focus on the first sort of evidence.  Here are some of the most well-known psychics who have claimed to see the future:

• Nostradamus
• Edgar Cayce
• Jeane Dixon
• Baba Vanga
• Sylvia Browne
• Uri Geller

If these famous psychics do not have the ability to see the future, then that would be a good reason to conclude that nobody has the ability to see the future:

1. IF Nostradamus, Edgar Cayce, Jeane Dixon, Baba Vanga, Sylvia Browne, and Uri Geller do not have the ability to see the future, THEN it is very likely that nobody has the ability to see the future.

2. Nostradamus, Edgar Cayce, Jeane Dixon, Baba Vanga, Sylvia Browne, and Uri Geller do not have the ability to see the future.

THEREFORE:

3. It is very likely that nobody has the ability to see the future.

THE WIDE RANGE OF HUMAN ABILITIES

Human abilities almost always come in a wide range of levels or degrees.  For example, the ability to lift weights in a bench press comes in a wide range of levels:

A woman with no training in lifting weights might only be able to bench press about 80 pounds, while a man who is a competitive weight-lifting athlete with several years of training and experience might be able to bench press 360 pounds or more.  

Obviously, young children are not able to lift as much weight as adults. Furthermore, some people cannot lift any weight in a bench press because their arms are missing, severely damaged, or paralyzed.  The ability to lift weights in a bench press ranges from 0 pounds to 782 pounds (the current world record for bench press).[1]

The ability to run long distances also occurs in a wide range of levels or degrees: 

Most people can run half a mile without stopping. With a few weeks of consistent training, most people can run about two miles without stopping.  Trained athletes with years of training and experience in long-distance running can run for about 100 miles.  One long-distance athlete ran 450 miles in 4.5 days.

Some people cannot run any distance because their legs are missing, severely damaged, or paralyzed. Thus, the distance that people can run without stopping ranges from 0 miles to 450 miles. 

Human intellectual abilities also occur in a wide range of levels or degrees.  For example, the ability to read varies widely:

• 21% of adults in the U.S. have low literacy or are functionally illiterate. 
• 33% of adults in the U.S. are literate but read below a sixth-grade level. 
• 46% of adults in the U.S. read at or above a sixth-grade level. 

Furthermore, over 98% of young children (ages 1 to 5) cannot read:

There is also a significant range of ability to read and write among Americans who are literate, as can be seen by the range of scores achieved on standardized college-entrance exams.  

People who are not literate usually won't bother to take the SAT college-entrance exam, because they know they don't understand most of the questions on the SAT, so they have almost no chance of achieving even a modest score on the SAT.  Among the mostly literate students who take the SAT, there is a wide range of scores for the reading and writing portion of the exam:

A wide range of scores are acheived on the reading and writing portion of the SAT[2]:

• A score of 780 or higher puts one in the top 1% of SAT test takers.
• A score of 680 puts one in the top 10% of SAT test takers.
• A score of 630 puts one in the top 20% of SAT test takers.
• A score of 520 puts one in the top 50% of SAT test takers.
• A score of 490 puts one in the bottom 40% of SAT test takers.
• A score of 430 puts one in the bottom 20% of SAT test takers.
• A score of 390 puts one in the bottom 10% of SAT test takers.
• A score of 320 or less puts one in the bottom 1% of SAT test takers.

So, among mostly literate college-bound students in the U.S. there is a wide range of abilities in reading and writing, with SAT reading and writing scores that range from 200 (very poor) to 800 (excellent).

There are three-year-old children in the U.S. who cannot read or write a single word of English, and there are college-bound teenagers and young adults who score in the top 1% of the reading and writing portion of the SAT. Clearly, the range of the ability to read and write varies widely among humans. 

The sensory abilities of humans also include a wide range of levels or degrees.  For example, the sensory ability of vision varies widely among people.  The designation "20/20 Vision" refers to normal visual acuity:

The ability to see clearly varies widely among people:

A very small portion of people have better than 20/15 vision.[3]

There are, of course, various degrees of visual impairment among people who cannot achieve 20/20 vision even with prescription eyewear:

The ability to see varies from total blindness (no light perception), to legal blindness, to vision impairment (where 20/20 vision cannot be achieved even with prescription eyewear), to 20/20 vision achieved with eyewear, to 20/20 vision without eyewear, to 20/15 vision without eyewear, to 20/10 vision without eyewear.

The sensory ability of hearing also occurs in a wide range of levels or degrees among humans.[4]

PREMISE (1) OF MY SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT

Because human abilities almost always have a wide range of levels or degrees, we may infer a significant conclusion:

4. Human physical abilities almost always have a wide range of levels or degrees.

5. Human intellectual abilities almost always have a wide range of levels or degrees.

6. Human sensory abilities almost always have a wide range of levels or degrees.

THEREFORE:

7. IF people have the ability to see the future, THEN it is very likely that at least a few people will clearly have a strong ability to see the future.

This conclusion supports premise (1) of my skeptical argument, because we have good reason to believe that if humans have the ability to see the future, then there should be at least a few humans who have this ability to a high level or high degree, and thus there would be at least a few humans who would clearly have a strong ability to see the future. 

If there are at least a few people who clearly have a strong ability to see the future, then we would expect that such people would notice they have this ability and would tell others about it.  Such people would often claim to be psychics or seers or prophets. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine famous psychics who claim to see the future, to determine if they actually have the ability to see the future.  If famous psychics don't have this ability, then we may conclude that it is very likely that NOBODY has this ability.

The above is the thinking behind premise (1) of my skeptical argument:

1. If Nostradamus, Edgar Cayce, Jeane Dixon, Baba Vanga, Sylvia Browne, and Uri Geller do not have the ability to see the future, then it is very likely that nobody has the ability to see the future.

In future posts on this topic, I will examine these six psychics to determine whether any of them have the ability to see the future (i.e. whether they have the supernatural ability known as precognition). Those future posts will provide support for premise (2) of my skeptical argument:

2. Nostradamus, Edgar Cayce, Jeane Dixon, Baba Vanga, Sylvia Browne, and Uri Geller do not have the ability to see the future.

END NOTES

1. "The raw (unequipped) bench press world record is 355 kg (782.6 lbs), set by Julius Maddox on February 21, 2021." - Google AI response to "what is the world record for bench press" viewed 4/5/26. Here is a YouTube video about this world record: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ezySzMd5unE&t=30s

2. Percentiles given here are based on this table:

3.  About 1% of people in the U.S. have better than 20/15 vision:

4.