William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 18: More Attempts to Fix Craig's Sub-Argument for (5c)

WHERE WE ARE

William Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c) fails, because the meanings of the premises of the sub-argument are too unclear to be rationally evaluated. So, as the argument stands, it fails to provide us with a good reason to believe that (5c) is true. Unless we can fix Craig's sub-argument by clarifying the meaning of its premises, the sub-argument should be rejected, and that will give us a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

In Part 17 of this series, I considered a possible clarification of the unclear phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" by means of a proposed definition of this phrase that was based upon listing "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" that Craig examines in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith. Although the proposed definition clarified the meaning of premise (B), it did not work to fix Craig's sub-argument because the proposed definition also made premise (C1) false.  Thus, using the proposed definition would make Craig's sub-argument unsound, and the sub-argument would fail.

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)

Here, once again, is Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c): 

D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

CRAIG'S HINT ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE "ALTERNATIVE NATURALISTIC HYPOTHESES"

Because Craig does not realize the significant unclarity of the phrase "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" in his sub-argument for premise (5c), he makes no serious attempt to clarify or define what that phrase means.  So, I suspect I will have to clarify the meaning of this phrase on my own, without much help from Craig.

However, Craig does provide a hint at what he means by this phrase:

An argument for Jesus' resurrection which conforms to actual historiographical practice will be formulated as an inference to the best explanation. According to this approach, we begin with the evidence available to us and then infer what would, if true, provide the best explanation of that evidence. Out of a pool of live options determined by our background beliefs, we select the best of various competing explanations to give a causal account of why the evidence is as it is and not otherwise. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360)

The last sentence in the above quote contains the hint that explanations or hypotheses should be considered from "a pool of live options determined by our background beliefs". In short, according to Craig, we can ignore any "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" that are NOT "live options" based on our "background beliefs".  

In Part 17 of this series, I mentioned that there was some unclarity of the scope of the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses", and that this phrase might refer to ALL such hypotheses, or to SOME such hypotheses, or to a subset of such hypotheses that are characterized in a specific way. We now have a specific characterization that limits the scope of "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" that need to be considered and evaluated: naturalistic hypotheses that are "live options" based on our "background beliefs".

Craig believes that God exists and that God sometimes intervenes in human affairs (i.e. performs miracles).  Thus, the Resurrection Hypothesis is a "live option" for Craig, and he should consider and evaluate that hypothesis to see whether it is a better or worse explanation of the relevant facts than other hypotheses, according to Craig's proposed criterion about the scope of hypotheses that should be considered and evaluated.

However, if Craig is allowed to ignore or set aside some "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" because they are not "live options" for him, based on his background beliefs, then I, and other skeptics, must also be allowed to ignore or set aside some "alternative supernatural hypotheses" if some such hypothesis is not a "live option" for us, because of our background beliefs.

There is an obvious problem here. Different people have different background beliefs.  I, for example, am an atheist.  I believe that God does not exist.  Thus, based on this background belief, I am free to ignore and set aside the Resurrection Hypothesis that Craig is so intent on persuading us all to believe.  

Recall that the Resurrection Hypothesis is the claim that "God raised Jesus from the dead."  Since my backgound belief is that there is no God, the Resurrection Hypothesis is NOT a "live option" for me. So, based on Craig's proposed methodology, I am free to ignore or toss aside the Resurrection Hypothesis before I even begin to consider and evaluate the relative merits of various competing alternative hypotheses.

Furthermore, even if Craig could persuade me to change my mind and to believe that God exists, that would not resolve the issues from the differences in our background beliefs.  As a skeptic, I believe that if God exists, God does not intervene in human affairs.  In other words, if I were to stop being an atheist and to start believing in God, I would be a deist rather than accepting traditional Christian theism.  Deists believe that God exists, but they also believe that God does NOT intervene in human affairs. Given this background belief, I would still be allowed, based on Craig's proposed criterion, to ignore and set aside the Resurrection Hypothesis before considering and evaluating the merits of this hypothesis in comparison with alternative hypotheses.

Suppose that Craig persuades me not only to believe that God exists and that God sometimes intervenes in human affairs, that would still not resolve all of the significant differences in our background beliefs.  I am also an agnostic concerning the plans, purposes, and motivations of God.  In other words, one of my background beliefs is that even if God exists and sometimes intervenes in human affairs, no human being can determine when such interventions have occured, because no human being knows the plans, purposes, or motivations of God. 

This background belief of mine would allow me to ignore and toss aside the Resurrection Hypothesis even before considering and evaluating it in comparison with alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.

Believing in the existence of God is not sufficient to make the Resurrection Hypothesis a "live option" for me.  Also, I do not share Craig's background belief that God sometimes intervenes in human affairs. Furthermore, unlike Craig, I do not believe that humans are able to determine when God has intervened in human affairs, because to do so would require knowing about God's purposes, plans, and motivations, but humans don't have such knowledge, according to my background beliefs.

I'm pretty sure that Craig would not want atheists and skeptics to ignore or toss aside the Resurrection Hypothesis before even considering it and evaluating its plausibility as an explanation for the relevant historical facts about Jesus' final fate. In order to ensure that atheists and skeptics don't simply ignore or toss aside the Resurrection Hypothesis as not being a "live option" based on the background beliefs of atheists and skeptics, Craig might try to lower the requirements for a hypothesis to be a "live option".

For example, Craig might point out that most atheists and skeptics are not 100% certain that there is no God. He might use this idea in order to make the Resurrection Hypothesis into a "live option" even for most atheists and skeptics.  Craig might say that as long as there is a small chance (say a 1% chance) that God exists and that God sometimes intervenes in human affairs, and that humans can know about the plans, purposes, or motivations of God, one should view the Resurrection Hypothesis as a live option.  On this lowered standard, it might well be the case that most atheists and skeptics would be rationally obligated to consider and evaluate the Resurrection Hypothesis in comparison to alternative hypotheses, such as various alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

If Craig wishes to lower the bar for what counts as "a live option" such as that a hypothesis need only have a 1% chance of being true in view of the background beliefs of the person who is doing the investigation, then the bar for alternative naturalistic hypotheses must ALSO be lowered, so that any alternative naturalistic hypothesis that has only a 1% chance of being true in view of the background beliefs of religious people and people who believe in God, and in divine intervention into human affairs, must ALSO be counted as a "live option" for such investigators of Jesus' final fate.  I doubt that Craig would be willing to lower the bar this much for alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

In any case, narrowing the scope of hypotheses that should be considered by using the criterion of whether a hypothesis is "a live option" based on the "background beliefs" of the investigator of the question at issue is problematic both because different people have different background beliefs, and also because the idea of being "a live option" is both vague and subjective. I don't see how Craig's sub-argument can be rescued on the basis of definitions of the unclear phrases "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" and "the alternative supernatural hypotheses" that are grounded in the vague and subjective criterion suggested by Craig.

SCOPE IS THE MAIN ISSUE 

There is actually no obvious problem with the meaning of the term "alternative" nor with the meaning of the term "naturalistic" nor with the meaning of the term "hypotheses", so why is the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" unclear and problematic? 

The problem here is one of scope.  Given Craig's comment implying that some hypotheses can reasonably be set aside based on whether the hypothesis is "a live option" in view of the "background beliefs" of the person who is investigating the question at issue (e.g. What was Jesus' final fate?), it is clear that Craig does not believe that one must consider and evaluate ALL "alternative hypotheses" in order to arrive at a justified conclusion as to which hypothesis is the best explanation of the relevant evidence.  

But if we don't have to consider and evaluate ALL of "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" nor ALL of "the alternative supernatural hypotheses", then how do we determine which hypotheses must be considered and evaluated? How do we determine that we have considered enough alternative hypotheses to arrive at a solid and well-justified conclusion about which hypothesis is the best explanation of the relevant facts?

Obviously, there is no magic number of alternative hypotheses that must be considered and evaluated or that will guarantee that we have examined enough alternative hypotheses.  For some issues, there might be only a handful of hypotheses that need to be considered and evaluated. But for other issues, we might well need to consider and evaluate dozens of alternative hypotheses.

ANOTHER PROPOSED CLARIFICATION

I don't think Craig has provided a useful suggestion in terms of clarification of the problematic phrases in his sub-argument for premise (5c). So, I think I will have to come up with my own suggested clarification, in order to try to make it so that we can rationally evaluate the truth or falsity of the premises of this sub-argument.

Although I cannot think of a good general criterion that could be used to determine which alternative hypotheses should be considered and evaluated, I can make what I believe to be a reasonable suggestion concerning this specific issue, concerning the question "What was Jesus' final fate?"  I think that, in general, the more alternative hypotheses we consider and evaluate the better and more justified our conclusions will be about which hypothesis is the best explanation of the relevant facts.  

However, there are practical limits in terms of the time and effort required to gather up alternative hypotheses to consider and evaluate. There are also practical limits on the time and effort required to do a careful comparison of the relative merits of the various alternative hypotheses.  

I suggest that we limit ourselves to alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate that have been mentioned or discussed by Christian thinkers and scholars, as well as by non-Christian and skeptical thinkers and scholars, who have published books or articles that touch on the question of Jesus' final fate in the current century and in the previous two centuries. If an alternative hypothesis has not been mentioned or discussed in such published books or articles in that time period, it seems reasonable to ignore or set aside such a hypothesis.

Some might complain that this is too wide of a net, and that it would take too much time and effort to identify all such alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.  We could further narrow the scope by limiting the time frame to the current century and the previous century, although I doubt that this would eliminate more than just a few alternative hypotheses from being considered and evaluated.

This suggestion leaves the methodological principle stated in premise (C1) unclear and undefined, because my suggestion is only concerned with the specific issue "What was Jesus' final fate?"  I have not provided a general way of determining when a hypothesis is one that should be considered and evaluated in comparison to other hypotheses in order to arrive at a solid and justified conclusion about which hypothesis is the best explanation for the relevant facts.  So, we still cannot rationally evaluate the truth or falsehood of premise (C1), as it stands.

However, we could narrow the scope of (C1) itself, so that it too is only concerned with the specific issue "What was Jesus' final fate?":

C2. A hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses that have been mentioned or discussed in books or articles published by Christian thinkers or scholars or by non-Christian or skeptical thinkers or scholars in this century or in the previous century. 

I hesitate to say this principle is "true", but it does seem like a reasonable principle, one that seems acceptable in relation to the practical constraints on the time and energy one can invest in this important question.

This proposed scoping of the two problematic phrases in Craig's sub-argument for (5c) has at least three advantages: (a) it casts a fairly wide net for gathering alternative hypotheses, (b) it does place a practical constraint on how many alternative hypotheses should be considered and evaluated, and (c) it is NOT based on subjective criteria such a being "a live option" or a passing a preliminary assessment based on an investigator's particular set of "background beliefs". 

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 17: "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses"

WHERE WE ARE 

In Part 16 of this series, I pointed out a serious problem with Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c).  The premises of this sub-argument are too UNCLEAR to be rationally evaluated. Thus, Craig's sub-argument, as it stands, fails to provide a good reason to believe that premise (5c) is true.

The only chance for Craig's sub-argument supporting premise (5c) to be successful is for us to figure out the meaning of his unclear premises, so that it will be possible to rationally evaluate whether those premises are true or false, probable or improbable. Otherwise, Craig's sub-argument for (5c) fails, and that would give us a third good reason to conclude that his case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)

Here, again, is the sub-argument for the key premise (5c):

D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

I have put the UNCLEAR phrases in red italicized font, showing that all three premises in this sub-argument are infected with unclarity because of the problematic phrases.  

NOTES ON MY REVISIONS TO CRAIG'S PHRASE

On page 360 of the 3rd edition of Reasonable Faith, where Craig summarizes his case for the resurrection, Craig actually uses a slightly different phrase: 

"alternative naturalistic explanations"  

However, when Craig discusses various examples of "alternative naturalistic explanations" later in the same chapter, he refers to them as "hypotheses" and "theories" as well as calling them "explanations".  It is clear that Craig uses these various terms as more-or-less equivalent expressions.  

In order to make the logic of Craig's argument clear, I regularized the vocabulary in the argument when I restated it.  Because in his discussion, later in the chapter where he evaluates the various "naturalistic explanations," Craig usually refers to these explanations as "hypotheses", I have set aside the other terms (like "explanations" and "theories") and instead consistently use the term "hypotheses".  That makes it easier to see logical connections between the premises. For, example to show a clear logical connection between premise (B) and premise (C1).

I have also inserted the definite article "the" at the front of Craig's original phrase from page 360. I have done so because the lack of the definite article makes the phrase somewhat vague.  

The phrase "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" might be a reference to some such hypotheses, or to all such hypotheses, or to a specifically-characterized subset of such hypotheses.  By inserting the word "the" at the start of the phrase, I draw attention to the potential vagueness of the scope of what is being referenced by this phrase.  This potential vagueness should be eliminated, if possible, to make it clear what this phrase actually means. The use of the definite article "the" pushes us to clarify this phrase further. 

ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO CLARIFY THE UNCLEAR PHRASE "THE ALTERNATIVE NATURALISTIC HYPOTHESES"

Back in Part 3 of this series, it was necessary to clarify the meaning of this unclear phrase in Craig's argument: 

"these three facts"

I suggested that we revise this phrase so that it was more descriptive and so it did not use the misleading term "facts":

 "Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate"

I also suggested that we clarify the meaning of this new phrase by means of a definition:

A claim C is one of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate  IF AND ONLY IF claim C is equivalent to either (HC1) or (HC2) or (HC3). 

In order for this definition to be meaningful, we also needed to specify the claims that the abbreviations, such as (HC1),  represent:

HC1:The tomb of Jesus was found empty by a group of his women followers on the first day of the week following his crucifixion.

HC2: Beginning on the first day of the week following Jesus' crucifixion, various individuals and groups experienced on different occasions and under varying circumstances appearances of Jesus alive. 

HC3: The first disciples of Jesus came sincerely to believe in Jesus' resurrection in the absence of sufficient antecedent historical influences from either Judaism or pagan religions.

Someone might well suggest that we provide a similar definition of the unclear phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" which would include abbreviations that stand for each of the various naturalistic hypotheses, and then also provide a list of the specific naturalistic hypotheses corresponding to the abbreviations in the definition.

Craig discusses and evaluates a number of "alternative naturalistic hypotheses" later in the chapter[1], and names those hypotheses:

• The Conspiracy Hypothesis (CH): "the disciples stole the body of Jesus and lied about his postmortem appearances, thus faking the resurrection."[2]
• The Apparent Death Hypothesis (ADH): "Jesus was not completely dead when he was taken down from the cross. He revived in the tomb and escaped to convince his disciples he had risen from the dead."[3] 
• The Wrong Tomb Hypothesis (WTH): "belief in Jesus' empty tomb was based on a simple mistake." Some women followers of Jesus went on Sunday morning to visit Jesus' tomb, and they found "an unoccupied tomb", but that was the "Wrong Tomb", not the tomb where Jesus had been buried on Friday evening.[4]
• The Displaced Body Hypothesis (DBH): Someone moved Jesus' body to a different tomb after Jesus was initially buried and before the women went to visit the tomb on Sunday morning.[5]
• The Hallucination Hypothesis (HH): "the resurrection appearances [of Jesus] were merely hallucinations on the part of the disciples."[6]

In his discussion about the origin of "the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection",[7] Craig does not use the term "hypothesis" nor the term "theory", but he examines three alternative explanations of this alleged historical fact. To keep the terminology of his argument consistent, I will refer to these three explanations as hypotheses:

• The Christian Influence Hypothesis (CIH): "the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection...[was] a result of Christian influences" on their thinking.[7]
• The Pagan Influence Hypothesis (PIH):"the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection" was "the result of pagan influences" on their thinking.[7] 
• The Jewish Influence Hypothesis (JIH): "the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection...[was] a result of Jewish influences" on their thinking.[8]

Since the above alternative hypotheses are the ones that Craig discusses in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith, we could define the unclear phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" as follows:

A hypothesis H is one of the alternative naturalistic hypotheses IF AND ONLY IF: hypothesis H is equivalent to one of the following hypotheses: (CH), (ADH), (WTH), (DBH), (HH), (CIH), (PIH), or (JIH).

 In order to be meaningful, this definition would need to be accompanied by the above descriptions of the eight hypotheses represented by the eight abbreviations referenced in the proposed definition.

WHY THIS SOLUTION DOES NOT WORK

Although this proposed solution would help to clarify premise (B) and make it possible to rationally evaluate premise (B), this solution will not work. It will not help Craig's sub-argument to be successful.

The problem is that the same phrase is used in premise (C1), so the proposed definition of the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" would also have to be applied to clarify the meaning of premise (C1). 

But if we use the proposed definition to clarify that phrase in (C1), then premise (C1) would clearly be false. That would make Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c) an UNSOUND argument. Thus, Craig's sub-argument would fail, and this would give us a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

THE PROPOSED DEFINITION MAKES (C1) FALSE

Here, once again, is the premise (C1):

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

Note that (C1) provides a very general principle concerning the rational evaluation of hypotheses.  It is the generality of this principle that makes the principle appear plausible and true.  This is not a principle that is just about the resurrection issue.  It is a general epistemic principle.  We could restrict the principle to just historical hypotheses, and the principle would still retain its plausibility.  

But even if we were to restrict the scope of this principle to just historical hypotheses, the principle would clearly be false if we interpreted the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" to refer only to eight historical hypotheses that are all about Jesus' final fate. The life and death of Jesus is only one of thousands of historical subjects or isssues that historians study.  

Premise (C1) states a very general principle that could be applied to virtually any historical issue. In order for this principle to make sense and to have some degree of plausibility, we cannot restrict the meaning of the phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" so that it refers ONLY to historical hypotheses about Jesus' final fate. Therefore, we cannot accept the proposed definition of the unclear phrase "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses".  Any acceptable definition of this phrase must allow premise (C1) to make sense, and to be plausible.   

END NOTES

1. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), p.371-387. See also pages 390-395.

2. Reasonable Faith, p.371.

3. Reasonable Faith, p.373.

4. Reasonable Faith, p.374. Craig provides more details than what I mention here, based on Kirsopp Lake's specific version of this hypothesis. The details are unnecessary and actually make the hypothesis less probable, so I am ignoring those details. Additional details give the illusion of plausibility, but actually make the hypothesis less likely to be true.

5. Reasonable Faith, p.376. As with the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis, Craig adds unnecessary details based on Joseph Klausner's specific version of the Displaced Body Hypothesis. The additional details give the illusion of plausibility, but actually make the hypothesis less likely to be true.  So, I am ignoring those additional details.

6. Reasonable Faith, p.354.

7. Reasonable Faith, p.390.

8. Reasonable Faith, p.393.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 16: The Final Argument for Premise (5c) Fails

 THE FINAL SUB-ARGUMENT FOR THE KEY PREMISE (5c)

The argument for the key premise (5c) consists of five inferences or sub-arguments, as can be seen in the argument diagram below:

Each red arrow represents an inference in the argument supporting premise (5c).  I am going to focus on the final sub-argument in this post, and in the next few posts. Here is the final sub-argument supporting premise (5c):

D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

All of the other premises and inferences in the argument for (5c) provide support for premise (B), so it is clear that Craig's primary concern is to show that there is a good reason to believe that premise (B) is true. No evaluation of Craig's case for the resurrection would be complete without comments about whether Craig has provided us with a good reason to believe that (B) is true.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OTHER TWO PREMISES

However, the success of the final sub-argument for (5c) also depends on whether the other two premises are true or false, probable or improbable. If premise (D) is false or dubious, then Craig's argument for the key premise (5c) fails, and that would mean that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus also fails.

If premise (C1) is false or dubious, then Craig's argument for the key premise (5c) fails, and that would mean that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus also fails.

Thus, even though Craig focuses almost all of his attention on arguing for premise (B), the other two premises of the final sub-argument for (5c) are also crucially important for the success of his case for the resurrection of Jesus. 

THE FINAL SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c) FAILS

 All three premises of Craig's final sub-argument for premise (5c) have a very serious problem: 

They are too UNCLEAR to be rationally evaluated.

In order to provide us with a good reason to believe the key premise (5c), the premises of Craig's final sub-argument for (5c) must be clear enough for us to rationally evaluate whether they are true or false, probable or improbable. But none of the three premises is sufficiently clear to be subject to rational evaluation.  Therefore, the final sub-argument for (5c) fails to provide us with a good reason to believe that the key premise (5c) is true.

The unclarity of the premises in the final sub-argument for (5c) is due to the unclarity of two phrases that occur in those premises:

"the alternative supernatural hypotheses"

"the alternative naturalistic hypotheses"

It is not at all clear what these two phrases mean, so the final sub-argument for the key premise (5c) cannot be rationally evaluated. Therefore, Craig's argument for (5c) fails to provide us with a good reason to believe that (5c) is true, and that means that we have a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

THE ONLY HOPE FOR CRAIG'S FINAL SUB-ARGUMENT FOR (5c)

In order for someone to correctly evaluate the premises of Craig's final sub-argument for (5c) as being true or probable, the meaning of those premises must be clear enough to make it possible for them to be rationally evaluated.  So, the only hope for this argument to be successful, and to provide us with a good reason to believe that premise (5c) is true, is to figure out what the above two unclear phrases mean, and then either revise the wording of the three premises in this sub-argument or else provide clear definitions of the meaning of the two unclear phrases.

I suspect that premises (D) and (B) are dubious or false, but I cannot be confident of this unless and until I have a clear understanding of the meaning of those two premises. As things stand, I am not clear about what the two above unclear phrases mean, so I don't have a clear understanding of the meaning of premises (D) and (B).

CONCLUSION

As it stands, Craig's argument for the key premise (5c) fails, because the premises in the final sub-argument for (5c) are too unclear to be rationally evaluated.  Thus, Craig has failed to give us a good reason to believe that premise (5c) is true.

The only hope for Craig's argument for (5c) to be successful, is to figure out what the above two unclear phrases mean.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 15: The Transition from Historical Claims to Historical Facts

HISTORICAL CLAIMS VS. HISTORICAL FACTS

In Part 13 of this series, I figured out how to make the logical transition between premises talking about Craig's three key historical claims and premises talking about Craig's three key established historical facts.  However, when I recently clarified and revised the sub-argument for premise (5c), I lost track of that important bit of reasoning in Craig's core argument.  

Here is the way I represented that bit of reasoning in Part 13:

2c. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true, AND the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

 A1. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established as highly likely to be true.

THEREFORE:

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

NOTE: Sometimes Craig refers to naturalistic explanations, and sometimes he refers to naturalistic hypotheses. To make the logic of his core argument clearer, I have now regularized the vocabulary so that the argument consistently refers to naturalistic hypotheses. 

I think it would be clearer and helpful to separate the two claims made in premise (2c) into two premises:

2d. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true.

2e. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

Premise (2e) can now be the premise that is supported by the two lines of reasoning that I described in Part 14 (one focused on comparative plausibility and the other focused on categorical plausibility), instead of premise (B).  

Given these revisions, we also need to revise the premises in the sub-arguments for (2e) so that they refer to Craig's three key historical claims, rather than to his three established historical facts. 

THE REVISED COMPARATIVE-PLAUSIBILITY SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (2e)

Here is the revised comparative-plausibility sub-argument for premise (2e):

10a. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Conspiracy Hypothesis.  

11a. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Apparent Death Hypothesis. 

  

12a. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis. 

 

13a. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Displaced Body Hypothesis. 

 

14a. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Hallucination Hypothesis.

K. The alternative naturalistic hypotheses that are competing with the Resurrection Hypothesis are: the Conspiracy Hypothesis, the Apparent Death Hypothesis, the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis, the Displaced Body Hypothesis, and the Hallucination Hypothesis.

THEREFORE: 

2e. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

NOTE: I have added premise (K) to this sub-argument because that premise is needed to get from the five numbered premises about specific naturalistic hypotheses, to the conclusion (2e) with makes a claim about "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" in general.

THE REVISED CATEGORICAL-PLAUSIBILITY SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (2e)

Here is the revised categorical-plausibility sub-argument for premise (2e):

15a. The alternative naturalistic hypotheses are categorically-implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate.

16a. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a categorically- plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate.

E1. IF a hypothesis X is a categorically-plausible explanation of a specific set of historical claims, and  a hypothesis Y is a categorically implausible explanation for the same specific set of historical claims, THEN hypothesis X is a more plausible explanation for that specific set of historical claims than hypothesis Y.

THEREFORE:

 2e. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

The premises of the sub-argument supporting premise (15a) also need to be revised to talk about historical claims rather than established historical facts:

F1. The Conspiracy Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate. 

 
G1. The Apparent Death Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate. 

 
H1. The Wrong Tomb Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate. 

I1. The Displaced Body Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate. 

J1. The Hallucination Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate. 

K. The alternative naturalistic hypotheses that are competing with the Resurrection Hypothesis are: the Conspiracy Hypothesis, the Apparent Death Hypothesis, the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis, the Displaced Body Hypothesis, and the Hallucination Hypothesis.

THEREFORE: 

15a. The alternative naturalistic hypotheses are categorically-implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate.

NOTE: I have added premise (K) to this sub-argument because that premise is needed to get from the five other premises about specific naturalistic hypotheses, to the conclusion (15a) with makes a claim about "the alternative naturalistic hypotheses" in general.

THE REVISED ARGUMENT DIAGRAM SHOWING THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR (5c)

The final inference or sub-argument supporting the key premise (5c) is this:

D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 14: Craig's Two Lines of Reasoning for the Resurrection

WHERE WE ARE

Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus can be summarized this way:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

THEREFORE: 

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

THEREFORE:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

In Part 6 of this series, I argued that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus was Dead on Arrival, because the final inference from (8) to (9) is weak and dubious. 

In Part 4 and Part 5 of this series, I argued that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus was Dead on Arrival because the inference from (5c) to (8) is weak and dubious.[1]  

Thus, it is clear that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus was Dead on Arrival. 

DID CRAIG PROVIDE A GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE PREMISE (5c)?

Because the key premise (5c) is neither obviously true nor self-evident, Craig needs to give us a good reason to believe that this key premise of his core argument is true. If Craig has failed to give us a good reason to believe that (5c) is true, then we may reasonably conclude that premise (5c) is dubious, and that would be a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus (in Chapter 8 of the 3rd edition of Reasonable Faith) FAILS.

I previously indicated that I would be critically evaluating a modified instance of a simplified version of Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c) in his core argument. This particular sub-argument is based on one interpretation of the ambiguous phrase "shown to be implausible" in Craig's argument for premise (5c). 

This ambiguous phrase has two possible meanings:

"shown to be categorically implausible" (without reference to the plausibility or implausibility of the alternative hypotheses)

"shown to be comparatively more implausible" (than the alternative hypotheses)

I had decided to try out the comparative-plausibility interpretation first, because that interpretation immediately clarified Craig's sub-argument, while the categorical-plausibility interpretation left the meaning of his premises vague (thus requiring further effort to clarify those premises). 

However, since publishing Part 13, it has occurred to me that Craig might well have had BOTH interpretations of this ambiguous phrase in mind.  I suspect he was confused and failed to clearly distinguish these two different ideas.  

However, we can separate these two ideas and specify two different lines of reasoning supporting a premise in the sub-argument for (5c).  Rather than trying to figure out which interpretation of this ambiguous phrase is correct, I think it is better, and more charitable to Craig, to clarify his reasoning supporting a premise of his sub-argument for (5c) by splitting that reasoning into two different lines of reasoning. That is what I am going to do in this post.

THE COMPARATIVE-PLAUSIBILITY SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)

In Part 13, I worked out a simplified and improved version of Craig's sub-argument for his key premise (5c), based on the comparative-plausibility interpretation of the ambiguous phrase "shown to be implausible":

D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

THE COMPARATIVE-PLAUSIBILITY SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (B) 

Premise (B) makes a comparative plausibility claim. Furthermore, Craig actually argues for premise (B) based on the following more specific comparative plausibility claims:

10. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the Conspiracy Hypothesis.  

11. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the Apparent Death Hypothesis. 

  

12. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis. 

 

13. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the Displaced Body Hypothesis. 

 

14. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the Hallucination Hypothesis.

However, Craig also strongly hints at a different line of reasoning that supports premise (B) on the basis of categorical-plausibility claims.

THE CATEGORICAL-PLAUSIBILITY SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (B)

I believe that Craig had in mind another line of reasoning that supports premise (B), whether he realized this or not:

15. The alternative naturalistic hypotheses are categorically implausible explanations of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.

16. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a categorically plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.

E. IF a hypothesis X is a categorically plausible explanation of a specific set of facts, and  a hypothesis Y is a categorically implausible explanation for the same specific set of facts, THEN hypothesis X is a more plausible explanation for that specific set of facts than hypothesis Y.

THEREFORE:

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.

Premise (E) appears to be a self-evident analytic truth. If we divide various hypotheses into the categories of "plausible" and "implausible", then the hypotheses that are determined to be plausible are obviously going to be more plausible than the hypotheses that we have determined to be implausible.  So, premise (E) allows us to infer a comparative-plausibility claim, like (B), from categorical-plausibility claims, like (15) and (16).

THE CATEGORICAL-PLAUSIBILITY SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (15)

Premise (15) needs to be argued for on the basis of these more specific categorical-plausibility claims:

F. The Conspiracy Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate. 

 
G. The Apparent Death Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.  

 
H. The Wrong Tomb Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.  

I. The Displaced Body Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.  

J. The Hallucination Hypothesis is a categorically-implausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.  

I'm not sure (at this point) that Craig actually argues for all of these specific categorical-plausibility claims (while I am sure that Craig argues for all of the specific comparative-plausibility claims), but in making the more general claim (15) about the alternative naturalistic hypotheses, Craig implies that these more specific claims are all true.

ARGUMENT DIAGRAM FOR THE CLARIFIED VERSION OF CRAIG'S SUB-ARGUMENT FOR THE KEY PREMISE (5c)

Here is my revised argument diagram of the sub-argument supporting the key premise (5c), which includes both the comparative-plausibility line of reasoning and the categorical-plausibility line of reasoning for premise (B):

CONCLUSION

There is no need to determine which of the two possible interpretations of the ambiguous phrase "shown to be implausible" is the correct interpretation, because we can use both senses of this phrase in two different lines of reasoning in support of premise (B), which is a premise in the clarified instance of a simplified version of Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c).  

I'm confident that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus includes the comparative-plausibility line of reasoning in support of premise (B).  I'm not as confident that Craig's case also includes the categorical-plausibility line of reasoning in support of premise (B), but there are significant indications that Craig also had that other line of reasoning in mind. So, my current understanding and interpretation of Craig's case includes both lines of reasoning in support of premise (B).

END NOTES

1. Actually, I argued that the inference from (5a) to (8) was weak and dubious. But the same objection to that inference (i.e., the problem of confirmation bias) applies to the inference from (5c) to (8).