William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 11: Clarification of the Sub-Argument for (3b)

 CRAIG'S SUB-ARGUMENT FOR THE KEY PREMISE (5c)

If Craig's sub-argument in support of (5c) is a weak or defective argument, then he has failed to give us a good reason to believe that (5c) is true, and since (5c) is not obviously or self-evidently true, we should then conclude that premise (5c) is dubious.  Because (5c) is a key premise in Craig's core argument, this would be a third good reason to reject Craig's core argument and to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

Here, again, is Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c):

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4b. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE: 

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

My initial evaluation of premise (3b) is that this premise is false. In Part 9 of this series, I gave a good reason to believe that (3b) is false.  However, Craig has provided a sub-argument in support of (3b), so we should consider that sub-argument before forming a final evaluation of the truth or falsehood of (3b). If Craig's sub-argument is weak or defective, then we should conclude that premise (3b) is false, based on my initial evaluation.

CRAIG'S SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3b) 

 Here, again, is Craig's sub-argument in support of premise (3b):

1b. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key  historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best  explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

 A. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

THEREFORE: 

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

In Part 10 of this series, I argued that all three premises of this sub-argument for (3b) are unclear, and their unclarity is significant enough that it precludes rational evaluation of the truth or falsity of these premises. For this reason, Craig's sub-argument fails to provide us with a good reason to believe that (3b) is true.

However, problems of clarity of premises or conclusions can often be fixed by clarifying or defining the meaning of problematic words or phrases in such premises or conclusions. We should attempt to clarify the problematic words or phrases in Craig's sub-argument before we reject the premises of this sub-argument, and before we conclude that the sub-argument is a weak or defective argument.

There are at least two unclear phrases in the premises of Craig's sub-argument for (3b):

 "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence"

"shown to be implausible"

CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE "HISTORICALLY ESTABLISHED WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE"

Because premise (A) is basically giving a definition of the phrase "historically established fact", and because the term "fact" is usually reserved for claims that are KNOWN to be true, the degree of confidence that is specified in this definition ought to be a fairly high degree of confidence.  

The claim "I know that such-and-such is the case" usually implies certainty, or at least a degree of confidence that is very close to certainty. Because the word "fact" is usually reserved for claims that are known to be true, the word "fact" implies or strongly suggests that the speaker is certain of the truth of the claim being asserted, or is very close to being certain of the truth of that claim.

However, in the context of ancient history, there is little if anything that is known with certainty.  So, in the context of ancient history (such as claims about the historical Jesus), the words "know" and "fact" might well be used without implying certainty or even a level of confidence that is very close to certainty.  Reasonable educated people understand that certainty is very rare or non-existent when it comes to claims made about ancient historical events. 

In most contexts, the word "know" and the word "fact" imply a very high degree of confidence.  In terms of probability, these words suggest the claim in question has at least a 90% chance of being true. In contexts where the stakes are high, these words imply an even higher degree of probability, like a 95% chance of being true.

But in the context of claims of "fact" or "knowledge" concerning ancient history, a probability claim of 90% chance of truth seems too high. A probability of 80% seems like a more reasonable implication for a claim of "fact" or "knowledge" concerning persons or events in ancient history.

Craig does not offer clarification in terms of a numerical characterization of the chances or probabilities of a historical claim being true.  However, it does seem that he has in mind the idea of a historical claim being determined to be "highly likely" on the basis of relevant historical evidence:

It's strange that Allison doesn't seem to notice that that the same arguments which lead to his unqualified verdict of "highly likely" for the burial by Joseph also support the historicity of the empty tomb, which he deems "with great hesitation" to be "historically likely"...(Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., footnote #49, p.367)

Craig clearly thinks that Allison should have concluded that the historicity of the empty tomb was also "highly likely".  This implies that Craig believes the relevant historical evidence makes his empty tomb claim highly likely (or very probable).

It seems to me that asserting a historical claim to be highly likely (or very probable) means something like asserting that the historical claim has at least an 80% chance of being true. 

This lines up with my previous thinking about how the words "fact" and "knowledge" normally indicate certainty or a level of confidence that is nearly certain, but that the context of claims about ancient history weaken the implications of these words, so that instead of implying at least a 90% chance of being true, they imply at least an 80% chance of being true.

I propose that we interpret the phrase "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence" as pointing to historical claims that are supported by historical evidence that is sufficient to make those claims "highly likely" or "very probable", i.e., so that the claims have at least an 80% chance of being true. 

CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE "SHOWN TO BE IMPLAUSIBLE" 

I have previously pointed out that there is a problem of vagueness in this phrase.  Because there is a wide range of plausibility and implausibility, it is unclear where to draw the line between hypotheses that are plausible and hypotheses that are implausible.

There also appears to be an ambiguity of meaning in the phrase "shown to be implausible".  Craig's methodology is based upon comparative claims, such as: "Hypothesis A is MORE PLAUSIBLE than hypothesis B" or "Hypothesis B is MORE IMPLAUSIBLE than hypothesis A". As a result, there does not appear to be any clear way to make categorical claims about plausibility or implausibility, such as: "Hypothesis A is plausible" or "Hypothesis B is implausible".  

Given that such categorical claims don't fit with Craig's methodology, it might well be the case that Craig's use of the phrase "shown to be implausible" was a sloppy and careless way of referring to a comparative claim about implausibility rather than referring to a categorical claim about implausibility. If this is the case, then what Craig meant, and he ought to have written, is the phrase: "shown to be MORE implausible than" the alternative hypotheses.

Thus, we have an ambiguity between a comparative claim and a categorical claim:

"shown to be categorically implausible" (without reference to the plausibility or implausibility of the alternative hypotheses)

"shown to be comparatively more implausible" (than the alternative hypotheses)

On the comparative interpretation, there is no problem of vagueness.  The claim "Hypothesis A is MORE PLAUSIBLE than hypothesis B" is not a vague or unclear claim in this context, nor is the claim "Hypothesis B is MORE IMPLAUSIBLE than hypothesis A".

However, on the categorical interpretation, the problem of vagueness remains: where should we draw the line between plausible hypotheses and implausible hypotheses?

I have already mentioned two reasons to prefer the comparative interpretation.  First, Craig's methodology is based on comparative plausibility. His method is aimed at determining which hypothesis provides the MOST plausible explanation for a given collection of historical data.  

Second, if we interpret the phrase "shown to be implausible" in terms of comparative plausibility, then there would be no problem of vagueness or unclarity in that phrase, but if we interpret this phrase in terms of categorical implausibility, then this phrase would remain vague and unclear.

However, there is also a reason to prefer the interpretation of this phrase in terms of categorical implausibility. When Craig examines various naturalistic explanations of his three key historical facts, he implies that they are categorically implausible as explanations of the alleged empty tomb, not just that they are MORE implausible than the Resurrection Hypothesis:

There simply is no plausible natural explanation available today to account for how Jesus' tomb became empty. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.377)

This is not a comparison of the plausibility of naturalist hypotheses with the plausibility of the Resurrection Hypothesis.  This is a statement by Craig that the naturalistic hypotheses are all categorically not plausible, meaning that they are all categorically implausible.

Craig makes a similar categorical claim about the naturalistic hypotheses in relation to the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus:

So once again, if we reject the resurrection of Jesus as the only reasonable explanation of the resurrection appearances, we are left with an inexplicable mystery. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.387) 

Craig here asserts that the Resurrection Hypothesis is "the only reasonable explanation" of the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. That implies that none of the naturalistic hypotheses provides a "reasonable explanation" of this alleged key historical fact.  

To divide hypotheses into the two categories of those that provide "reasonable explanations" and those that do not provide "reasonable explanations" is much the same as dividing hypotheses into the two categories of those that provide "plausible explanations" and those that do not provide "plausible explanations". It appears that Craig is using the word "reasonable" here as a synonym for the word "plausible". 

Because there are two good reasons to interpret Craig's phrase "shown to be implausible" in terms of comparative plausibility, and at least one good reason to interpret this phrase in terms of categorical plausibility, it remains unclear which interpretation is correct.  

Thus, we should consider both interpretations, one at a time.  The interpretation of this phrase that makes the premises of Craig's argument true or that makes those premises the most plausible should, other things being equal, be the interpretation that we use to evaluate Craig's sub-argument for premise (3b).  

By giving his sub-argument the best chance of success, we can avoid committing the Straw Man fallacy. The Straw Man fallacy occurs when someone mischaracterizes an argument presented by an opponent in order to make the argument seem weak or defective.  This is a dishonest and unfair way of treating the arguments of other people. People who care about critical thinking try to be fair to the arguments of others, and thus avoid mischaracterizing arguments in order to make those arguments seem weak or defective.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 10: The Sub-Argument for (3b)

 A GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE (3b) IS FALSE

In Part 9 of this series, I proposed the initial evaluation that premise (3b) is false.  I argued that (3b) is false because it is a conditional statement and the first part of the conditional (the antecedent) does not logically imply the second part of the conditional (the consequent).

However, because Craig has provided a sub-argument in support of premise (3b), we should consider that argument before making a final determination about whether (3b) is true or false. If his sub-argument fails to provide a good reason to believe that (3b) is true, then we should conclude that (3b) is false on the basis of my initial evaluation, which gave us a good reason to believe (3b) is false.

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3b)

Here is Craig's sub-argument in support of premise (3b):

1b. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

 A. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

THEREFORE: 

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

Because (3b) talks about "established historical facts" while premise (1b) and premise (2a) talk about "historical claims", I previously introduced premise (A) in order to bridge the logical gap between the premises of this sub-argument and the conclusion of this sub-argument.

Also, because (3b) talks about "the best explanation" for a specific collection of historical data, while premise (1a) talks about "the preferred explanation", I modified premise (1a), so that version (1b) uses the same terminology as (3b), and now talks about "the best explanation".  I assume that "the preferred explanation" and "the best explanation" are just two alternative expressions that Craig uses that have the same meaning.

THESE PREMISES CANNOT BE RATIONALLY EVALUATED

Clarity is one of the most important standards of critical thinking. Dr. Richard Paul and Dr. Linda Elder, who are critical thinking experts, emphasize the importance of clarity as a universal intellectual standard of thinking:

Clarity is a gateway standard. If a statement is unclear, we cannot determine whether it is accurate or relevant.  In fact, we cannot tell anything about it because we don’t yet know what it is saying.[1]    

But all three premises in this sub-argument for (3b) are unclear.  As they currently stand, these premises cannot be rationally evaluated as being either true or false because they are too vague and unclear.

This is not a decisive and devastating objection, because it is  possible to clarify an unclear claim, or to define an unclear word or phrase.  If we are able to clarify the meanings of the three premises, then we might well be able to make a reasonable determination of whether they are true or false.

Let's start with premise (A).  This premise could be viewed as a definition of the phrase "established historical fact".  The problem with this definition is that it is an unclear definition.  The definition requires that a claim be "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence."  I understand the phrase "historically established".  This means that there must be historical evidence that supports the claim in question. 

The remaining part of the definition is where the problem of unclarity resides: "with a reasonable degree of confidence."  What constitutes the achievement of a reasonable degree of confidence?  How can one determine that this degree of confidence has been obtained?  This is like telling a six-year-old child to eat a reasonable amount of candy on Halloween.  What the heck is a reasonable amount of candy for a young child to eat?  That instruction is too unclear and too vague to be of any significant help or guidance.

Given the unclarity and vagueness of the phrase "a reasonable degree of confidence", we cannot form a rational judgment about whether a specific historical claim meets this standard or not.  This definition is too unclear to be of any significant help or guidance.  This unclear phrase occurs in all three of the premises of Craig's sub-argument for (3c), so all three premises, as they currently stand, are too unclear to be rationally evaluated as being either true or false.

Premise (1b) and premise (2a) include another unclear and vague phrase: "shown to be implausible". I understand the meaning of the first words "shown to be...". This is talking about providing evidence in support of some claim or view.  In this case, the claim in question is that "such-and-such hypothesis is implausible". I also understand the general meaning of the word "implausible".  The problem here is that, as Craig and I are both well aware, there is a wide range of degrees of plausibility and of implausibility.  Because of this fact about plausibility (and the related concept of probability), it is unclear where to draw the line between hypotheses that are plausible and hypotheses that are implausible.

For example, suppose that the Resurrection Hypothesis has a 20% chance of being true. Does that mean that this hypothesis is implausible?  I don't know.  Suppose that the Resurrection Hypothesis has a 40% chance of being true. Does that mean this hypothesis is implausible? I don't know.  What if this hypothesis has a 50% chance of being true? Does that mean it is implausible? I don't know.  

Obviously, if the Resurrection Hypothesis had a 90% chance of being true, then it would be silly to say this hypothesis was implausible.  But when the chance of this hypothesis being true is down to somewhere between 10% and 50%, I'm not sure where to draw the line between the hypothesis being plausible and it being implausible.  That is too wide a range of uncertainty for the concept of being "implausible" to constitute a useful standard or guideline.

Because premise (1b) and premise (2a) include this unclear and vague phrase "shown to be implausible", it is not possible to rationally evaluate whether these premises are true or false, as they stand, without further clarification.

CONCLUSIONS

All three premises of Craig's sub-argument for (3c) are unclear, and their unclarity is significant enough that it precludes rational evaluation of the truth or falsity of these premises. Only if we can somehow manage to clarify the meaning of these premises will we be in a position to determine whether we should accept or reject the premises in this sub-argument.

END NOTES

1. The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking, 4th edition (Dillon Beach, CA: The Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2006), p.10.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 9: The Sub-Argument for (5c)

 CRAIG'S CASE IS DEAD ON ARRIVAL

Before I evaluate the sub-argument for premise (5c) in Craig's core argument, I would like to reiterate my evaluation of the last two inferences in Craig's core argument:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

THEREFORE:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

THEREFORE:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

The inference from premise (5c) to premise (8) is weak and dubious because we have no good reason to believe that Craig's selection of his three key established historical facts constitutes a good and representative sample of the general collection of established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  Furthermore, in Part 5, I provided a good reason to believe that Craig's selection of three established historical facts was significantly influenced by Confirmation Bias. 

This is a serious problem with the inference from premise (5c) to premise (8) that is sufficient to sink Craig's core argument, and to make his case for the resurrection of Jesus Dead on Arrival.

However, there is also a serious problem with the inference from premise (8) to the conclusion (9). In Part 6, I showed that premise (8) does not logically imply the conclusion (9) and that premise (8) also falls short of providing significant inductive confirmation of conclusion (9).  This final inference is thus also weak and dubious, providing another sufficient reason to reject Craig's core argument, and another good reason to conclude that his case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead on Arrival. 

Therefore, even if Craig has provided a strong and solid argument for premise (5c), the two weak and dubious inferences at the end of his argument make Craig's core argument a bad argument and cause his case for the resurrection to fail.

CRAIG'S SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)

Here is the sub-argument for premise (5c):

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4b. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE: 

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

The inference here is a modus ponens, so the inference in this sub-argument is a valid deductive inference. Thus, the logic of this sub-argument is fine. If there is a problem with this sub-argument for (5c), it would be a problem with the truth of one or both premises.

INITIAL EVALUATION OF PREMISE (3b) 

Craig provides a sub-argument in support of premise (3b), so we need to consider that argument before we form a final evaluation of premise (3b).  However, at this point, my initial evaluation is that (3b) is FALSE. If I am correct about this, then that would make this sub-argument an unsound argument for premise (5c), and would give us a third good reason to reject Craig's core argument, and to reject his case for the resurrection of Jesus.

Premise (3b) is a conditional statement.  Thus, it asserts that the antecedent of that statement (i.e., IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.) logically implies the consequent of that statement (i.e., The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis.)  But it seems clear that the antecedent of (3b) does NOT logically imply the consequent of (3b).

The problem is that the antecedent statement only claims that the resurrection hypothesis is not more implausible than the alternative hypotheses.  That does NOT imply that it is more plausible than the alternative hypotheses.  But an explanation is "the best explanation" only if it is the most plausible explanation of the available alternatives. 

Suppose that the Resurrection Hypothesis and the skeptical alternatives that Craig evaluates all have the same probability:

• There is a 16% chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Conspiracy Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Apparent Death Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Displaced Body Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Hallucination Hypothesis is true.  
• There is a 4% chance that some other hypothesis is true.

Craig assumes that there is a correlation between the relative plausability of alternative explanations and the relative probability of those alternative explanations. Given the above scenario where the Resurrection Hypothesis has the same probability as each of the various skeptical hypotheses, we may infer that they have the same relative plausibility. 

Thus, if Craig's methodology for determining the relative plausibility of alternative hypotheses leads us to a correct evaluation of the relative plausibility of these hypotheses, then using his methodology would lead us to the conclusion that NONE of these hypotheses is more plausible than the other alternative hypotheses. 

In this scenario, the antecedent of premise (3b) would be true, but the consequent would be false. Although none of the other hypotheses would, in this scenario, be more plausible than the Resurrection Hypothesis, it is also the case that the Resurrection Hypothesis would not be more plausible than any of the skeptical hypotheses. In this scenario, the Resurrection Hypothesis would NOT be "the best explanation" of the relevant facts. 

Therefore, the antecedent of (3b) can be true and yet the consequent of (3b) could be false.  That means that the conditional statement asserted by premise (3b) is false.

Furthermore, in the above scenario, the chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true is 16%, which is far smaller than what the conclusion of Craig's core argument asserts.  According to the conclusion (9), the chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true is greater than 50%.

Finally, given the above scenario, the chance that one or the other of the five skeptical hypotheses considered by Craig is true is 80% (5 skeptical hypotheses x 16% each = 80%), compared to the small 16% chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true.  So, in this scenario, it seems much more reasonable to believe that one or the other of the five skeptical hypotheses is true than to believe that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true.

CONCLUSION

Because Craig has provided a sub-argument in support of premise (3b), we should leave open the possibility that my initial evaluation of this premise is incorrect, at least until we consider the sub-argument for (3b). However, if Craig's sub-argument fails to give us a good reason to believe that (3b) is true, then we ought to conclude that premise (3b) is false, based on the above line of reasoning.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 8: Established Historical Facts

 THE SCOPE OF DATA TO BE CONSIDERED

It should be clear by now that a crucial aspect of thinking critically about the alleged resurrection of Jesus is being clear about the scope of the data that should be considered.

As I showed in Part 3 of this series, William Craig implies that the scope of data that should be considered is this:

established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate

This suggestion seems right to me, or, at least, this suggestion by Craig is a good place to start.  Some further clarification of this scope will probably be helpful to people who want to think critically about this issue.

THIS IS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ISSUE 

First, although it is probably the case that most of the relevant information is "historical" evidence, there is some evidence from other fields that is also relevant.  

Medical facts and evidence are clearly relevant to having a good understanding of crucifixion and of Jesus' alleged death by crucifixion.  Here is what Craig says about the skeptical view called the Apparent Death Hypothesis:

The Apparent Death Hypothesis is massively disconfirmed by medical facts concerning what would happen to a person who has been scourged and crucified. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.374)

If we limit ourselves to "established historical facts", then Craig cannot make this objection to the Apparent Death Hypothesis in order to try to show that this skeptical view is "implausible".  

Although this claim by Craig has implications for questions about the alleged historical event of the crucifixion of Jesus, and although this claim is based in part on historical assumptions or facts about the nature of Roman crucifixion, this claim also (obviously) requires evidence in terms of medical facts, which are outside the scope of the expertise of ancient historians.  Medical facts come from the field of medicine, NOT from the field of history.

Therefore, Craig undermines his own objections to the Apparent Death Hypothesis by limiting the scope of relevant evidence to just established historical facts.

Psychological facts and evidence are clearly relevant to having a good understanding of the alleged responses of Jesus' disciples to his crucifixion and of their alleged experiences of the risen Jesus. In discussing the Conspiracy Hypothesis, Craig makes the following objection to that skeptical view:

...one cannot plausibly deny that the earliest disciples at least sincerely believed that Jesus was risen from the dead, a conviction on which they staked their very lives.... The transformation in the lives of the disciples is not credibly explained by the hypothesis of a conspiracy. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.372)

I grant that this is the sort of reasoning that historians often engage in.  However, it is clear that there are more than just strictly historical assumptions being made here.  When we are talking about "a conviction on which" someone stakes his or her life, and about a significant "transformation in the lives" of a group of people, we are making assumptions about human psychology, assumptions which can be confirmed or disconfirmed by experts and experiments in psychology.

An even clearer reference to the field of psychology occurs when Craig discusses the Hallucination Hypothesis.  Here is an objection to that hypothesis by Craig:

Although Allison makes a great deal out of the alleged similarities between the postmortem appearances of Jesus and visions of the recently departed on the part of the bereaved, the overriding lesson of such fascinating stories is that the bereaved do not as a result of such experiences, however real and tangible they may seem, conclude that the deceased has returned to life--rather the deceased is seen in the afterlife.  (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.384)

Craig is discussing here the nature of "visions of the recently departed on the part of the bereaved" which is a subject of investigation in the field of psychology. The facts here are facts of psychology, NOT historical facts.  

The "lessons" or implications of those facts are what is discussed and argued by experts in psychology in journals of psychology.  If Craig wants to limit relevant evidence and facts to established historical facts, then he will not be able to draw on the facts and findings of psychologists to support his objection against the Conspiracy Hypothesis.

Philosophical considerations are also clearly relevant to the evaluation of the claim "God raised Jesus from the dead".  One must have a clear idea of what the term "God" means in this sentence, otherwise the conclusion of Craig's core argument is UNCLEAR.  

The probability of the claim "God raised Jesus from the dead" depends on the probability of other philosophical claims, such as "God exists" and "God sometimes intervenes in human affairs"  and "God believes that humans are in need of a divine savior", and "God believes that humans have a great need to hear truth and wisdom from God about God." Such assumptions are crucial in order for a person to logically reach a conclusion about God being the cause of some event.

If there is no God, then the claim "God raised Jesus from the dead" is FALSE.  If the existence of God is very improbable, then so is the claim "God raised Jesus from the dead".  Furthermore, the existence of God does not necessarily imply that miracles happen.  Deists believe that God exists, but they also believe that God does not intervene in human affairs. Even if it was certain that God exists, it might still be very improbable that miracles happen, because God could have a policy of not intervening in human affairs.

CONCLUSION

Although Craig appears to think that the scope of facts and evidence we should consider when investigating the question "Did God raise Jesus from the dead?" is this:

established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate

This scope is clearly too narrow, because it fails to include facts and evidence that are from the medical field, from the field of psychology, and from the field of philosophy.  Historical facts and evidence are of obvious relevance, but the question at issue here is clearly an interdisciplinary one, NOT a strictly historical question.

Here is the scope of information that we should be considering:

established facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate

This includes historical facts, medical facts, psychological facts, philosophical facts, and interdisciplinary facts (that require confirmation from more than just one field of inquiry).

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 7: Clarification of Premise (5a)

A KEY INFERENCE IN CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT 

In Part 4 of this series, I stated that the final inference in Craig's core argument was this:

5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

THEREFORE:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

However, in Part 6, I argued that the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is actually this:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead. 

In Part 5 of this series, I showed that the inference from (5a) to (8) was weak and dubious because Craig's selection of his three key historical claims was significantly influenced by Confirmation Bias. This problem with that inference is sufficient by itself to sink Craig's core argument and thus make his case for the resurrection of Jesus Dead on Arrival.

A PROBLEM WITH THE INFERENCE WAS INTRODUCED BY THE WORDING OF PREMISE (5a)

However, there is another problem with the inference from (5a) to (8) which is the result of how I phrased premise (5a), rather than being a problem in Craig's actual reasoning.  So, I need to revise the wording of (5a), and to revise parts of the argument that support premise (5a), in order to be fair to Craig's core argument.

This other problem with the inference from premise (5a) to premise (8) is that (5a) talks about historical claims, but (8) talks about established historical facts.  That shift in descriptions of the historical information is enough by itself to make this a bad and illogical inference.  But that is not a problem in Craig's reasoning, it is a problem that resulted from how I worded premise (5a), and some of the premises supporting (5a).

At this point in the argument, Craig believes that he has already shown that his three key historical claims are established historical facts and not just historical claims.  That happens with premise (2a):

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

This premise is a conjunction of two statements.  The first statement asserts that Craig's three historical claims can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence. So, if we accept premise (2a), then later in the argument, Craig believes we should view his three historical claims as being established historical facts.  

I think we need to make this shift from the description historical claims to the description established historical facts more evident by making the following assumption an explicit premise in Craig's core argument:

A. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

This assumption allows us to shift from use of the phrase "Craig's three key historical claims" to use of the phrase "Craig's three key established historical facts" after premise (2a) appears in the flow of Craig's core argument.

That means that by the time we arrive at premise (5), the description of the relevant historical information has shifted:

5b. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

This revised statement of the fifth premise avoids the problem of the shift in descriptions of the historical information from the fifth premise to premise (8).  

The serious problem of Confirmation Bias, however, remains and is sufficient to make the inference from (5b) to (8) a weak and dubious inference, and thus Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is still Dead on Arrival. 

While I'm clarifying the fifth premise of Craig's core argument, I want to make a couple of other modest revisions.  The phrase "the preferred explanation" appears to be an alternative way of saying "the best explanation", so we should revise the wording of (5b) to make it clearer that (5b) and (8) are both talking about the same evaluation: "the best explanation":

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

I also dropped the phrase "ought to be" since it is clear that Craig is asserting that the resurrection hypothesis IS OBJECTIVELY the best explanation. 

Here is how I would modify the premises in the sub-argument supporting premise (5c):

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4b. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE: 

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

The sub-argument supporting the revised premise (3b) needs to have premise (A) added to the original two premises in that sub-argument, and premise (1a) needs a minor revision to shift it from talking about "the preferred explanation" to talking about "the best explanation":

1b. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

 A. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

THEREFORE: 

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

REVISED ARGUMENT DIAGRAM 

Here is the revised argument diagram based on the above clarifications of Craig's core argument:

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 6: The Ultimate Conclusion of Craig's Case

WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION OF CRAIG'S CASE?

In Part 3 of this series, my initial analysis of the core argument of Craig's case for the resurrection had the following claim as the conclusion of that argument:

5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

But in Part 4 of this series, I argued that Craig had a stronger and more significant claim in mind that was the actual conclusion of his core argument:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

However, the key paragraph that I have been quoting from Craig's book Reasonable Faith is a bit longer than what I have previously quoted, and I now see that the final sentence of that paragraph asserts what is actually the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  Here are the final sentences of that key paragraph:

The significance of this event is then to be found in the religio-historical context in which it occurred, namely, as the vindication of Jesus' own unparalleled claim to divine authority.  I think that the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is such that a well-informed investigator ought to agree that it is more likely than not to have occurred.  (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360)

The ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is this:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

This is clearly an inference that is based upon what I previously thought was the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case, namely, claim (8). 

This does not invalidate my previous analysis and clarification of Craig's core argument; it simply adds one more step to the end of that argument.

THE NEW FINAL INFERENCE OF CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT

With this additional step added to Craig's core argument, the final inference in that argument becomes this:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

THEREFORE:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

This is a fairly modest conclusion.  Craig is not trying to prove that God raised Jesus from the dead.  Craig is not claiming it to be an established fact that God raised Jesus from the dead. He is only trying to show that this claim is somewhat probable.  If the probability that God raised Jesus from the dead was merely .51  (if there was a 51% chance of this being true), then the weak claim asserted by (9) would be true.

Craig is here following in the footsteps of the great Christian philosopher Richard Swinburne, who in his masterpiece The Existence of God[1], argued for this very modest conclusion: 

On our total evidence theism [the belief that God exists] is more probable than not. (The Existence of God, 2nd ed., p.342)

Serious scholars and philosophers try not to make claims that are stronger than what they can support with their evidence and arguments.

EVALUATION OF THE NEW FINAL INFERENCE IN CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT

My previous criticism of the inference from (5a) to (8) still stands, so Craig has FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that claim (8) is true.  One obvious problem with the final sub-argument is that it is based on a dubious premise, namely, claim (8).

What about the inference from (8) to (9)?  This is not an instance of a valid form of deductive inference.  It is not a modus ponens, nor a modus tollens, nor a disjunctive syllogism, nor is it any other sort of valid inference form.

Does claim (8) logically imply claim (9)?  I don't think so, but Craig might think so. He does not explain his understanding of the nature of this inference.

Craig's method of comparing alternative hypotheses does not involve determining specific probabilities for each hypothesis. His method only allows us to make somewhat subjective judgments about the relative "plausability" of various alternative hypotheses. However, it seems reasonable to make some inferences about probability from conclusions about plausibility.  

If hypothesis A is more plausible than hypothesis B, then one might reasonably infer that hypothesis A is more likely to be true than hypothesis B.  If there were no such connection between plausability and probability, then Craig's method of relying on the comparative plausability of hypotheses would be of questionable significance.

In fact, Craig closely associates the degree of plausibility of an explanation with its degree of probability:

Any historical argument for Jesus' resurrection will have two steps, even if these are not clearly delineated: (1) to establish the facts which will serve as historical evidence and (2) to argue that the hypothesis of Jesus' resurrection is the best or most probable explanation of those facts.(Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.350, emphasis added)

My understanding is that the best explanation for a set of facts X, is the most plausible explanation of set of facts X (when we compare the explanatory excellence of various alternative hypotheses in terms of a specific set of criteria used for evaluating explanatory excellence).

Thus, in order for Craig's resurrection hypothesis (God raised Jesus from the dead) to be the best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate, it must be a more plausible explanation than any of the available alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate. This in turn implies that the resurrection hypothesis would be more probable than any of the available alternative hypotheses.

The problem I see here is that even if the resurrection hypothesis was more probable or more likely to be true than any of the available alternative hypotheses, it could still be the case that the resurrection hypothesis had a probability of less than .50 (had less than a 50% chance of being true).  If I am correct, then claim (8) does not logically imply (9), and the new final inference is a dubious inference.

A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THE FINAL INFERENCE

In Reasonable Faith, Craig discusses at least five different hypotheses that are alternatives to the resurrection hypothesis (God raised Jesus from the dead). He does not attempt to assign specific probabilities to any of the five alternative hypotheses. He only attempts to show that each of the skeptical alternatives provides an explanation of the established historical facts (that are relevant to Jesus' final fate) that is less plausible than the explanation provided by the resurrection hypothesis.

I take it that Craig would, on this basis, infer that each of the skeptical alternative hypotheses is less probable, less likely to be true, than the resurrection hypothesis.  Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that Craig is correct on both points. Does it follow that the resurrection hypothesis has a probability greater than .50 (that it has a better than 50% chance of being true)?  I don't think so.

Consider the following possible scenario:

• There is a 15% chance that the Conspiracy Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 10% chance that the Apparent Death Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 15% chance that the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 15% chance that the Displaced Body Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 20% chance that the Hallucination Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 25% chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true.

I'm not asserting that any of these claims are true.  I'm not claiming that there is a good reason to believe any of these claims are true.  I'm just saying that this is a possibility. Furthermore, apart from a careful and in-depth examination of the various hypotheses and consideration of the relevant historical evidence, there is no obvious reason to think that any of the above claims is false.  There is at least a degree of plausibility to this scenario.  Apart from a careful examination of evidence and arguments, each of these claims has some real chance of being correct. None of the above claims is absurd or obviously false.

If these probabilities were true and correct, and if we assume that relative probability corresponds with relative plausibility, then it would be the case that the Resurrection Hypothesis not only has a higher probability than any of the five skeptical hypotheses,  but that it also has a greater plausibility than any of the five skeptical hypotheses, as an explanation for the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate. 

If Craig's methodology works properly, then given this scenario we would end up concluding that the Resurrection Hypothesis was the best explanation for the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate. That is to say, if the above scenario were the case and if the use of Craig's method of determining which hypothesis provides the most plausible explanation of the established facts relevant to Jesus' final fate leads us to a correct evaluation of the relative plausibility of the various hypotheses, then we would arrive at the conclusion that the Resurrection Hypothesis was a more plausible explanation than the alternative hypotheses, and that claim (8) was true.

However, on the above scenario, claim (9) would be FALSE, because on this scenario, the probability that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true would be .25 (it would have a 25% chance of being true).  That is a significantly lower probability than .50. So, not only would claim (9) be FALSE on this scenario, but it wouldn't even be close to being true.

Therefore, it is clear that claim (8) does NOT logically imply the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  Even if claim (8) were true, that would NOT show that claim (9) was true.

Furthermore, because the above imagined scenario is somewhat realistic, is somewhat plausible on its face, and because on that scenario claim (9) was not merely false, but was not even close to being true, premise (8) does not appear to provide significant inductive support for (9).  Therefore, the inference from premise (8) to the ultimate conclusion (9) is a weak and dubious inference.

Finally, in the above scenario, although the Resurrection Hypothesis is the best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate, it is very probable (on that scenario) that one of the skeptical hypotheses is true and that the Resurrection Hypothesis is false.  

On the above scenario, there would be a 75% chance that one of the skeptical hypotheses was true and that the Resurrection Hypothesis was false.  In that circumstance, it is unclear that accepting or believing the Resurrection Hypothesis would be the most reasonable position to take.  It seems more reasonable in that circumstance to take the position that one of the skeptical hypotheses is true, even though we could not be confident about which specific skeptical hypothesis is true. 

CONCLUSION

The final step in the core argument in Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is this sub-argument:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

THEREFORE:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

Premise (8) is a dubious claim, and the inference from (8) to (9) is a weak and dubious inference. Thus, Craig's core argument FAILS to give us a good reason to believe the ultimate conclusion of his case for the resurrection of Jesus, even though that conclusion was a fairly modest and weak claim in the first place.

William Craig was only trying to show that the resurrection of Jesus is somewhat probable, not that it is an established fact, and not even that it is very probable.  Yet, his argument FAILS to show that this rather modest claim is true.

END NOTES 

1. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).