William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 13: The Revised Sub-Argument for the Key Premise (5c)

WHERE WE ARE

Premise (3b) is part of a sub-argument for the key premise (5c) in Craig's core argument for the resurrection of Jesus.  In Part 9 of this series, I gave a good reason to believe that premise (3b) is false.  

However, Craig provided a sub-argument in support of premise (3b), so we should give serious consideration to that sub-argument before making a final determination about the truth or falsehood of premise (3b).

As it stands, however, Craig's sub-argument for premise (3b) fails to give a good reason for believing that (3b) is true.  That is because the premises of that sub-argument are too unclear for them to be rationally evaluated in terms of their truth or falsehood. 

One of the unclear phrases used in the premises of the sub-argument for (3b) is this: 

"shown to be implausible"

In Part 11 of this series, I pointed out that the phrase "shown to be implausible" was ambiguous between two possible interpretations:

"shown to be categorically implausible" (without reference to the plausibility or implausibility of the alternative hypotheses)

"shown to be comparatively more implausible" (than the alternative hypotheses)

Because it is not clear which of these interpretations is correct, and because the comparatively-implausible interpretation makes the meaning of the premises clear, while the categorically-implausible interpretation leaves the meaning of the premises vague (and thus requires additional effort of further clarification), I decided to try out the comparatively-implausible interpretation first.

THE REVISED AND CLARIFIED VERSION OF THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3b)

Here is the revised and clarified version of the sub-argument for the third premise, using the comparatively-plausible interpretation of the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible":

1c. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true AND the alternative naturalistic explanations can be shown to be comparatively more implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Resurrection Hypothesis, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best  explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2b. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true AND the alternative naturalistic explanations can be shown to be comparatively more implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Resurrection Hypothesis.

 A1. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established as highly likely to be true.

THEREFORE: 

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

On this interpretation, the first premise contains redundant requirements and is thus more complicated and cumbersome than is necessary, and the second premise now appears to make a strong claim that could be the basis for a simpler and clearer argument for the key premise (5c) (on these points see Part 12).

If we go with the comparatively-implausible interpretation of the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible", then it would be best to ignore Craig's sub-argument for premise (3b) and re-state that argument as a simpler and clearer argument that directly supports the key premise (5c).

THE RE-STATED SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)

Here is the re-stated sub-argument for the key premise (5c):

2c. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true, AND the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic explanations.

 A1. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established as highly likely to be true.

THEREFORE:

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic explanations.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

This is how we should understand Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c) if we clarify the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible" in terms of the comparatively-implausible interpretation of that phrase. 

NOTE: I dropped the unnecessary phrase "can be shown to be" from the second claim asserted in the second premise, and I substituted the simpler and more straightforward word "is".  Craig is making a claim here that he will back up with evidence and arguments later in the chapter. In presenting the summary of his argument, Craig should simply assert this claim for now and then later on attempt to show the claim to be true. There is no need while presenting a summary of his case to hint at his upcoming effort (later in the chapter) to back up this claim with evidence and arguments.

As I mentioned in Part 12 of this series, the above re-stated argument for the key premise (5c) appears to correctly capture Craig's reasoning, because it lines up well with a one-sentence summary that Craig gave of his argument for the resurrection of Jesus:

If these three facts can be established, and no plausible natural explanation can account for them as well as the resurrection hypothesis, then one is justified in inferring Jesus' resurrection as the most plausible explanation of the data. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.361)

EVALUATION OF THE RE-STATED SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c) 

I don't have a problem with the definition of "an established historical fact" given in premise (A1), assuming it is understood as implying that the relevant evidence shows that there is at least an 80% chance that the historical claim is true.

Both of the claims asserted in premise (2c) are strong claims that appear to me to be false or dubious, so this sub-argument is not acceptable as it stands.  Further argument by Craig is required to support the two strong claims made in premise (2c).

The inference to premise (B) appears to be a valid deductive inference. Premise (B) is logically implied by the combination of premises (2c) and (A1). The argument does not have a standard deductive form, but Craig's three historical claims, according to premise (2c) have the characteristics required by the definition given in (A1), so we may infer from (2c) that those three claims are "established historical facts". 

The inference from (B) to (5c), however, is logically invalid. Premise (B) does not logically imply the conclusion (5c). Thus, this argument is unsound, at least as it stands.

Because the final inference in this sub-argument for (5c) is invalid, we should reject this sub-argument, and that means that Craig has failed to provide a good reason to believe the key premise (5c).  Since premise (5c) is neither obviously true nor self-evident, Craig's failure to give us a good reason to believe (5c) means that this key premise of his core argument is dubious.  Therefore, we have a third good reason to conclude that Craig's core argument for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

However, there might be a way to fix the problem with this final inference in the sub-argument for the key premise (5c). Before we reject this sub-argument, we should make an effort to repair it.

THE INFERENCE FROM (B) TO (5c)

There is a logical gap between premise (B) and premise (5c). 

One reason for this gap is that (B) talks about the Resurrection Hypothesis being a more plausible explanation than the other hypotheses, while (5c) talks about the Resurrection Hypothesis being the best explanation.  We can bridge this particular gap by adding a definition of "the best explanation" to the final inference of the sub-argument:

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic explanations.

C. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic explanations. 

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

The inference from premises (B) and (C) to (5c) appears to be a valid deductive inference.  Those premises logically imply the key premise (5c).

However, the definition of "the best explanation" given in premise (C) is clearly mistaken. There are other supernatural hypotheses besides the Resurrection Hypothesis. It is possible that some other supernatural hypothesis explains Craig's three historical facts as well as (or better than) the Resurrection Hypothesis.  In that case, the Resurrection Hypothesis would NOT be the best explanation of Craig's three key facts, contrary to the definition given in premise (C).  Therefore, premise (C) is false, and the above sub-argument is unsound and should be rejected.

[THIS POST IS STILL IN WORK] 

There is another potential problem with the inference from premises (B) and (C) to (5c).  The meaning of the phrase "the alternative naturalistic explanations" is unclear. This phrase could reasonably be interpreted as a shorthand for referring to the five naturalistic explanations or hypotheses that Craig discusses when he attempts to back up premise (2c):

• The Conspiracy Hypothesis[1]
• The Apparent Death Hypothesis[2] 
• The Wrong Tomb Hypothesis[3] 
• The Displaced Body Hypothesis[4] 
• The Hallucination Hypothesis[5] 

Alternatively, this phrase could be understood more abstractly as referring to all possible naturalistic explanations, or to all available naturalistic explanations, or to the top 10 best (i.e., most plausible) naturalistic explanations, or to the top 5 best (i.e., most plausible) naturalistic explanations. 

END NOTES

1. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), p.371-373.

2. Reasonable Faith, p.373-374.

3. Reasonable Faith, p.374-375.

4. Reasonable Faith, p.376-377.

5. Reasonable Faith, p.384-387.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 12: A Revision of Craig's Sub-Argument for (3b)

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3b)

Here is Craig's sub-argument for premise (3b):

1b. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key  historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best  explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

 A. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

THEREFORE: 

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

In Part 10 of this series, I argued that all three premises of this sub-argument for (3b) are unclear, and their unclarity is significant enough that it precludes rational evaluation of the truth or falsity of these premises. For this reason, Craig's sub-argument fails to provide us with a good reason to believe that (3b) is true.

However, if we can manage to clarify the meaning of the premises in this sub-argument, then we might well be able to rationally evaluate the truth or falsehood of these premises. So, clarifying the premises would give Craig's sub-argument for (3b) a chance of being a successful argument. 

PROPOSED CLARIFICATIONS OF THE PREMISES 

There are at least two unclear phrases in the premises of Craig's sub-argument for (3b):

 "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence"

"shown to be implausible"

In Part 11 of this series, I proposed an interpretation that would clarify the phrase "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence".  I argued that a "reasonable degree of confidence" means that the historical claim in question is "highly likely" or "very probable" (which I take to mean that the historical evidence shows the claim to have at least an 80% chance of being true).

In Part 11 of this series, I pointed out that the phrase "shown to be implausible" was ambiguous between two possible interpretations:

"shown to be categorically implausible" (without reference to the plausibility or implausibility of the alternative hypotheses)

"shown to be comparatively more implausible" (than the alternative hypotheses)

Although it is unclear which of these two interpretations is correct, I will try out the comparative-implausibility interpretation first, because the meaning of the premises is clear on that interpretation.  The categorical-implausibility interpretation leaves the meaning of the premises vague.  Further work will be required (at a later time) to narrow down what is intended by a claim of categorical implausibility. 

A REVISED AND CLARIFIED VERSION OF THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR (3b)

Here is a revised and clarified version of Craig's sub-argument for premise (3b):

1c. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true AND alternative naturalistic explanations can be shown to be comparatively more implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Resurrection Hypothesis, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best  explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2b. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true AND alternative naturalistic explanations can be shown to be comparatively more implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Resurrection Hypothesis.

 A1. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established as highly likely to be true.

THEREFORE: 

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

Given this revision and clarification of Craig's sub-argument for (3b), the first premise of this sub-argument now seems to involve redundant requirements making that premise longer and more cumbersome than is necessary. This is a reason for doubting the correctness of the comparative-implausibility interpretation of the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible".

Nevertheless, the categorical-implausibility interpretation of the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible" has its own problems, so this problem of redundancy in the first premise is not a decisive reason for rejecting the above comparative-plausibility interpretation.

The redundance in premise (1c) is between the requirement that "alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims...can be shown to be comparatively more implausible than the Resurrection Hypothesis" and the requirement in the conditional statement in the second half (the consequent) of that premise: "IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the Resurrection Hypothesis...has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations ...".  

It is obvious that if each of the naturalistic hypotheses is more implausible than the Resurrection Hypothesis, then the Resurrection Hypothesis is NOT going to be more implausible than the naturalistic hypotheses! Thus, the requirement that the Resurrection Hypothesis NOT be more implausible than the naturalistic hypotheses is redundant and makes the statement of this first premise unnecessarily complicated and cumbersome.

EVALUATION OF THE CLARIFIED SUB-ARGUMENT FOR (3b)

In fact, on this interpretation of the sub-argument for (3b), the conclusion need not be a conditional statement at all.  The implied conclusion appears to be this:

The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

In any case, premise (1c) appears to be true, assuming that the five naturalistic hypotheses discussed by Craig are either ALL of the available alternative hypotheses, or that they constitute the best (the most plausible) of the available alternative hypotheses. If each of the available alternative hypotheses is more implausible than the Resurrection Hypothesis, then the Resurrection Hypothesis is the most plausible explanation, and is thus the best explanation. 

However, if there is just one available hypothesis that Craig has failed to examine, then that unexamined hypothesis might be as plausible as or more plausible than the Resurrection Hypothesis. In that case, the Resurrection Hypothesis would NOT be the best explanation of Craig's three key historical facts.

On this comparative-implausibility interpretation, the weight of the sub-argument is borne primarily by the second premise:

2b. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true AND alternative naturalistic explanations can be shown to be comparatively more implausible explanations of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the Resurrection Hypothesis.

The second conjunct in premise (2b) basically asserts that the Resurrection Hypothesis provides the most plausible explanation of Craig's three historical claims. Given this understanding, Craig's sub-argument for (3b) is unnecessary. 

A CLEAR AND SIMPLE ARGUMENT FOR KEY PREMISE (5c) 

Craig could have used this strong claim made in (2b) to make a simpler and clearer argument to directly support the key premise (5c) of his core argument:

2c. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established as highly likely to be true, AND the Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic explanations.

 A1. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established as highly likely to be true.

THEREFORE:

B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than any available naturalistic hypothesis.

THEREFORE:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key  established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

So, if we go with the comparative-implausibility interpretation of the unclear phrase "shown to be implausible", then we should ignore Craig's overly complicated sub-argument for premise (3b) and reformulate it as the above simple and clear sub-argument for the key premise (5c).

I dropped the unnecessary phrase "can be shown to be" from the second claim asserted in the second premise, and I substituted the simpler and more straightforward word "is".  Craig is making a claim here that he will back up with evidence and arguments later in the chapter. In presenting the summary of his argument, Craig should simply assert this claim and then attempt to show the claim to be true later. There is no need in his summary to hint at his upcoming effort (later in the chapter) to back up this claim with evidence and arguments.

In the paragraph immediately following the long paragraph where Craig presents his core argument, Craig gives a summary of his argument in just one sentence:

If these three facts can be established, and no plausible natural explanation can account for them as well as the resurrection hypothesis, then one is justified in inferring Jesus' resurrection as the most plausible explanation of the data. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.361)

This one-sentence summary looks very similar to the above sub-argument for premise (5c). This is evidence that my re-statement of Craig's sub-argument for (5c) represents the reasoning that Craig had in mind (but that he stated in a somewhat unclear and overly complicated manner).

I will attempt to critically evaluate this re-stated sub-argument for (5c) in the next post.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 11: Clarification of the Sub-Argument for (3b)

 CRAIG'S SUB-ARGUMENT FOR THE KEY PREMISE (5c)

If Craig's sub-argument in support of (5c) is a weak or defective argument, then he has failed to give us a good reason to believe that (5c) is true, and since (5c) is not obviously or self-evidently true, we should then conclude that premise (5c) is dubious.  Because (5c) is a key premise in Craig's core argument, this would be a third good reason to reject Craig's core argument and to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

Here, again, is Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c):

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4b. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE: 

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

My initial evaluation of premise (3b) is that this premise is false. In Part 9 of this series, I gave a good reason to believe that (3b) is false.  However, Craig has provided a sub-argument in support of (3b), so we should consider that sub-argument before forming a final evaluation of the truth or falsehood of (3b). If Craig's sub-argument is weak or defective, then we should conclude that premise (3b) is false, based on my initial evaluation.

CRAIG'S SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3b) 

 Here, again, is Craig's sub-argument in support of premise (3b):

1b. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key  historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best  explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

 A. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

THEREFORE: 

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

In Part 10 of this series, I argued that all three premises of this sub-argument for (3b) are unclear, and their unclarity is significant enough that it precludes rational evaluation of the truth or falsity of these premises. For this reason, Craig's sub-argument fails to provide us with a good reason to believe that (3b) is true.

However, problems of clarity of premises or conclusions can often be fixed by clarifying or defining the meaning of problematic words or phrases in such premises or conclusions. We should attempt to clarify the problematic words or phrases in Craig's sub-argument before we reject the premises of this sub-argument, and before we conclude that the sub-argument is a weak or defective argument.

There are at least two unclear phrases in the premises of Craig's sub-argument for (3b):

 "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence"

"shown to be implausible"

CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE "HISTORICALLY ESTABLISHED WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE"

Because premise (A) is basically giving a definition of the phrase "historically established fact", and because the term "fact" is usually reserved for claims that are KNOWN to be true, the degree of confidence that is specified in this definition ought to be a fairly high degree of confidence.  

The claim "I know that such-and-such is the case" usually implies certainty, or at least a degree of confidence that is very close to certainty. Because the word "fact" is usually reserved for claims that are known to be true, the word "fact" implies or strongly suggests that the speaker is certain of the truth of the claim being asserted, or is very close to being certain of the truth of that claim.

However, in the context of ancient history, there is little if anything that is known with certainty.  So, in the context of ancient history (such as claims about the historical Jesus), the words "know" and "fact" might well be used without implying certainty or even a level of confidence that is very close to certainty.  Reasonable educated people understand that certainty is very rare or non-existent when it comes to claims made about ancient historical events. 

In most contexts, the word "know" and the word "fact" imply a very high degree of confidence.  In terms of probability, these words suggest the claim in question has at least a 90% chance of being true. In contexts where the stakes are high, these words imply an even higher degree of probability, like a 95% chance of being true.

But in the context of claims of "fact" or "knowledge" concerning ancient history, a probability claim of 90% chance of truth seems too high. A probability of 80% seems like a more reasonable implication for a claim of "fact" or "knowledge" concerning persons or events in ancient history.

Craig does not offer clarification in terms of a numerical characterization of the chances or probabilities of a historical claim being true.  However, it does seem that he has in mind the idea of a historical claim being determined to be "highly likely" on the basis of relevant historical evidence:

It's strange that Allison doesn't seem to notice that that the same arguments which lead to his unqualified verdict of "highly likely" for the burial by Joseph also support the historicity of the empty tomb, which he deems "with great hesitation" to be "historically likely"...(Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., footnote #49, p.367)

Craig clearly thinks that Allison should have concluded that the historicity of the empty tomb was also "highly likely".  This implies that Craig believes the relevant historical evidence makes his empty tomb claim highly likely (or very probable).

It seems to me that asserting a historical claim to be highly likely (or very probable) means something like asserting that the historical claim has at least an 80% chance of being true. 

This lines up with my previous thinking about how the words "fact" and "knowledge" normally indicate certainty or a level of confidence that is nearly certain, but that the context of claims about ancient history weaken the implications of these words, so that instead of implying at least a 90% chance of being true, they imply at least an 80% chance of being true.

I propose that we interpret the phrase "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence" as pointing to historical claims that are supported by historical evidence that is sufficient to make those claims "highly likely" or "very probable", i.e., so that the claims have at least an 80% chance of being true. 

CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE "SHOWN TO BE IMPLAUSIBLE" 

I have previously pointed out that there is a problem of vagueness in the phrase "shown to be implausible".  Because there is a wide range of plausibility and implausibility, it is unclear where to draw the line between hypotheses that are plausible and hypotheses that are not plausible (or "implausible"). 

There also appears to be an ambiguity of meaning in the phrase "shown to be implausible".  Craig's methodology is based upon comparative claims, such as: "Hypothesis A is MORE PLAUSIBLE than hypothesis B" or "Hypothesis B is MORE IMPLAUSIBLE than hypothesis A". As a result, there does not appear to be any clear way to make categorical claims about plausibility or implausibility, such as: "Hypothesis A is plausible" or "Hypothesis B is implausible".  

Given that such categorical claims don't fit with Craig's methodology, it might well be the case that Craig's use of the phrase "shown to be implausible" was a sloppy and careless way of referring to a comparative claim about implausibility rather than referring to a categorical claim about implausibility. If this is the case, then what Craig meant, and he ought to have written, is the phrase: "shown to be MORE implausible than" the alternative hypotheses.

Thus, we have an ambiguity between a comparative claim and a categorical claim:

"shown to be categorically implausible" (without reference to the plausibility or implausibility of the alternative hypotheses)

"shown to be comparatively more implausible" (than the alternative hypotheses)

On the comparative interpretation, there is no problem of vagueness.  The claim "Hypothesis A is MORE PLAUSIBLE than hypothesis B" is not a vague or unclear claim in this context, nor is the claim "Hypothesis B is MORE IMPLAUSIBLE than hypothesis A".

However, on the categorical interpretation, the problem of vagueness remains: where should we draw the line between plausible hypotheses and implausible hypotheses?

I have already mentioned two reasons to prefer the comparative interpretation.  First, Craig's methodology is based on comparative plausibility. His method is aimed at determining which hypothesis provides the MOST plausible explanation for a given collection of historical data.  

Second, if we interpret the phrase "shown to be implausible" in terms of comparative plausibility, then there would be no problem of vagueness or unclarity in that phrase, but if we interpret this phrase in terms of categorical implausibility, then this phrase would remain vague and unclear.

However, there is also a reason to prefer the interpretation of this phrase in terms of categorical implausibility. When Craig examines various naturalistic explanations of his three key historical facts, he implies that they are categorically implausible as explanations of the alleged empty tomb, not just that they are MORE implausible than the Resurrection Hypothesis:

There simply is no plausible natural explanation available today to account for how Jesus' tomb became empty. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.377)

This is not a comparison of the plausibility of naturalist hypotheses with the plausibility of the Resurrection Hypothesis.  This is a statement by Craig that the naturalistic hypotheses are all categorically not plausible, meaning that they are all categorically implausible.

Craig makes a similar categorical claim about the naturalistic hypotheses in relation to the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus:

So once again, if we reject the resurrection of Jesus as the only reasonable explanation of the resurrection appearances, we are left with an inexplicable mystery. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.387) 

Craig here asserts that the Resurrection Hypothesis is "the only reasonable explanation" of the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. That implies that none of the naturalistic hypotheses provides a "reasonable explanation" of this alleged key historical fact.  

To divide hypotheses into the two categories of those that provide "reasonable explanations" and those that do not provide "reasonable explanations" is much the same as dividing hypotheses into the two categories of those that provide "plausible explanations" and those that do not provide "plausible explanations". It appears that Craig is using the word "reasonable" here as a synonym for the word "plausible". 

Because there are two good reasons to interpret Craig's phrase "shown to be implausible" in terms of comparative plausibility, and at least one good reason to interpret this phrase in terms of categorical plausibility, it remains unclear which interpretation is correct.  

Thus, we should consider both interpretations, one at a time.  The interpretation of this phrase that makes the premises of Craig's argument true or that makes those premises the most plausible should, other things being equal, be the interpretation that we use to evaluate Craig's sub-argument for premise (3b).  

By giving his sub-argument the best chance of success, we can avoid committing the Straw Man fallacy. The Straw Man fallacy occurs when someone mischaracterizes an argument presented by an opponent in order to make the argument seem weak or defective.  This is a dishonest and unfair way of treating the arguments of other people. People who care about critical thinking try to be fair to the arguments of others, and thus avoid mischaracterizing arguments in order to make those arguments seem weak or defective.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 10: The Sub-Argument for (3b)

 A GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE (3b) IS FALSE

In Part 9 of this series, I proposed the initial evaluation that premise (3b) is false.  I argued that (3b) is false because it is a conditional statement and the first part of the conditional (the antecedent) does not logically imply the second part of the conditional (the consequent).

However, because Craig has provided a sub-argument in support of premise (3b), we should consider that argument before making a final determination about whether (3b) is true or false. If his sub-argument fails to provide a good reason to believe that (3b) is true, then we should conclude that (3b) is false on the basis of my initial evaluation, which gave us a good reason to believe (3b) is false.

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3b)

Here is Craig's sub-argument in support of premise (3b):

1b. IF Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible, THEN IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2a. Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence AND alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate can be shown to be implausible.

 A. A historical claim C is an established historical fact IF AND ONLY IF historical claim C can be historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence.

THEREFORE: 

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

Because (3b) talks about "established historical facts" while premise (1b) and premise (2a) talk about "historical claims", I previously introduced premise (A) in order to bridge the logical gap between the premises of this sub-argument and the conclusion of this sub-argument.

Also, because (3b) talks about "the best explanation" for a specific collection of historical data, while premise (1a) talks about "the preferred explanation", I modified premise (1a), so that version (1b) uses the same terminology as (3b), and now talks about "the best explanation".  I assume that "the preferred explanation" and "the best explanation" are just two alternative expressions that Craig uses that have the same meaning.

THESE PREMISES CANNOT BE RATIONALLY EVALUATED

Clarity is one of the most important standards of critical thinking. Dr. Richard Paul and Dr. Linda Elder, who are critical thinking experts, emphasize the importance of clarity as a universal intellectual standard of thinking:

Clarity is a gateway standard. If a statement is unclear, we cannot determine whether it is accurate or relevant.  In fact, we cannot tell anything about it because we don’t yet know what it is saying.[1]    

But all three premises in this sub-argument for (3b) are unclear.  As they currently stand, these premises cannot be rationally evaluated as being either true or false because they are too vague and unclear.

This is not a decisive and devastating objection, because it is  possible to clarify an unclear claim, or to define an unclear word or phrase.  If we are able to clarify the meanings of the three premises, then we might well be able to make a reasonable determination of whether they are true or false.

Let's start with premise (A).  This premise could be viewed as a definition of the phrase "established historical fact".  The problem with this definition is that it is an unclear definition.  The definition requires that a claim be "historically established with a reasonable degree of confidence."  I understand the phrase "historically established".  This means that there must be historical evidence that supports the claim in question. 

The remaining part of the definition is where the problem of unclarity resides: "with a reasonable degree of confidence."  What constitutes the achievement of a reasonable degree of confidence?  How can one determine that this degree of confidence has been obtained?  This is like telling a six-year-old child to eat a reasonable amount of candy on Halloween.  What the heck is a reasonable amount of candy for a young child to eat?  That instruction is too unclear and too vague to be of any significant help or guidance.

Given the unclarity and vagueness of the phrase "a reasonable degree of confidence", we cannot form a rational judgment about whether a specific historical claim meets this standard or not.  This definition is too unclear to be of any significant help or guidance.  This unclear phrase occurs in all three of the premises of Craig's sub-argument for (3c), so all three premises, as they currently stand, are too unclear to be rationally evaluated as being either true or false.

Premise (1b) and premise (2a) include another unclear and vague phrase: "shown to be implausible". I understand the meaning of the first words "shown to be...". This is talking about providing evidence in support of some claim or view.  In this case, the claim in question is that "such-and-such hypothesis is implausible". I also understand the general meaning of the word "implausible".  The problem here is that, as Craig and I are both well aware, there is a wide range of degrees of plausibility and of implausibility.  Because of this fact about plausibility (and the related concept of probability), it is unclear where to draw the line between hypotheses that are plausible and hypotheses that are implausible.

For example, suppose that the Resurrection Hypothesis has a 20% chance of being true. Does that mean that this hypothesis is implausible?  I don't know.  Suppose that the Resurrection Hypothesis has a 40% chance of being true. Does that mean this hypothesis is implausible? I don't know.  What if this hypothesis has a 50% chance of being true? Does that mean it is implausible? I don't know.  

Obviously, if the Resurrection Hypothesis had a 90% chance of being true, then it would be silly to say this hypothesis was implausible.  But when the chance of this hypothesis being true is down to somewhere between 10% and 50%, I'm not sure where to draw the line between the hypothesis being plausible and it being implausible.  That is too wide a range of uncertainty for the concept of being "implausible" to constitute a useful standard or guideline.

Because premise (1b) and premise (2a) include this unclear and vague phrase "shown to be implausible", it is not possible to rationally evaluate whether these premises are true or false, as they stand, without further clarification.

CONCLUSIONS

All three premises of Craig's sub-argument for (3b) are unclear, and their unclarity is significant enough that it precludes rational evaluation of the truth or falsity of these premises. Only if we can somehow manage to clarify the meaning of these premises will we be in a position to determine whether we should accept or reject the premises in this sub-argument.

END NOTES

1. The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking, 4th edition (Dillon Beach, CA: The Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2006), p.10.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 9: The Sub-Argument for (5c)

 CRAIG'S CASE IS DEAD ON ARRIVAL

Before I evaluate the sub-argument for premise (5c) in Craig's core argument, I would like to reiterate my evaluation of the last two inferences in Craig's core argument:

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

THEREFORE:

8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead). 

THEREFORE:

9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.

The inference from premise (5c) to premise (8) is weak and dubious because we have no good reason to believe that Craig's selection of his three key established historical facts constitutes a good and representative sample of the general collection of established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.  Furthermore, in Part 5, I provided a good reason to believe that Craig's selection of three established historical facts was significantly influenced by Confirmation Bias. 

This is a serious problem with the inference from premise (5c) to premise (8) that is sufficient to sink Craig's core argument, and to make his case for the resurrection of Jesus Dead on Arrival.

However, there is also a serious problem with the inference from premise (8) to the conclusion (9). In Part 6, I showed that premise (8) does not logically imply the conclusion (9) and that premise (8) also falls short of providing significant inductive confirmation of conclusion (9).  This final inference is thus also weak and dubious, providing another sufficient reason to reject Craig's core argument, and another good reason to conclude that his case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead on Arrival. 

Therefore, even if Craig has provided a strong and solid argument for premise (5c), the two weak and dubious inferences at the end of his argument make Craig's core argument a bad argument and cause his case for the resurrection to fail.

CRAIG'S SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (5c)

Here is the sub-argument for premise (5c):

3b. IF IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate, THEN the best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

4b. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE: 

5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

The inference here is a modus ponens, so the inference in this sub-argument is a valid deductive inference. Thus, the logic of this sub-argument is fine. If there is a problem with this sub-argument for (5c), it would be a problem with the truth of one or both premises.

INITIAL EVALUATION OF PREMISE (3b) 

Craig provides a sub-argument in support of premise (3b), so we need to consider that argument before we form a final evaluation of premise (3b).  However, at this point, my initial evaluation is that (3b) is FALSE. If I am correct about this, then that would make this sub-argument an unsound argument for premise (5c), and would give us a third good reason to reject Craig's core argument, and to reject his case for the resurrection of Jesus.

Premise (3b) is a conditional statement.  Thus, it asserts that the antecedent of that statement (i.e., IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT the resurrection hypothesis has been shown to be more implausible than the alternative naturalistic explanations for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate.) logically implies the consequent of that statement (i.e., The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis.)  But it seems clear that the antecedent of (3b) does NOT logically imply the consequent of (3b).

The problem is that the antecedent statement only claims that the resurrection hypothesis is not more implausible than the alternative hypotheses.  That does NOT imply that it is more plausible than the alternative hypotheses.  But an explanation is "the best explanation" only if it is the most plausible explanation of the available alternatives. 

Suppose that the Resurrection Hypothesis and the skeptical alternatives that Craig evaluates all have the same probability:

• There is a 16% chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Conspiracy Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Apparent Death Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Displaced Body Hypothesis is true.
• There is a 16% chance that the Hallucination Hypothesis is true.  
• There is a 4% chance that some other hypothesis is true.

Craig assumes that there is a correlation between the relative plausability of alternative explanations and the relative probability of those alternative explanations. Given the above scenario where the Resurrection Hypothesis has the same probability as each of the various skeptical hypotheses, we may infer that they have the same relative plausibility. 

Thus, if Craig's methodology for determining the relative plausibility of alternative hypotheses leads us to a correct evaluation of the relative plausibility of these hypotheses, then using his methodology would lead us to the conclusion that NONE of these hypotheses is more plausible than the other alternative hypotheses. 

In this scenario, the antecedent of premise (3b) would be true, but the consequent would be false. Although none of the other hypotheses would, in this scenario, be more plausible than the Resurrection Hypothesis, it is also the case that the Resurrection Hypothesis would not be more plausible than any of the skeptical hypotheses. In this scenario, the Resurrection Hypothesis would NOT be "the best explanation" of the relevant facts. 

Therefore, the antecedent of (3b) can be true and yet the consequent of (3b) could be false.  That means that the conditional statement asserted by premise (3b) is false.

Furthermore, in the above scenario, the chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true is 16%, which is far smaller than what the conclusion of Craig's core argument asserts.  According to the conclusion (9), the chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true is greater than 50%.

Finally, given the above scenario, the chance that one or the other of the five skeptical hypotheses considered by Craig is true is 80% (5 skeptical hypotheses x 16% each = 80%), compared to the small 16% chance that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true.  So, in this scenario, it seems much more reasonable to believe that one or the other of the five skeptical hypotheses is true than to believe that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true.

CONCLUSION

Because Craig has provided a sub-argument in support of premise (3b), we should leave open the possibility that my initial evaluation of this premise is incorrect, at least until we consider the sub-argument for (3b). However, if Craig's sub-argument fails to give us a good reason to believe that (3b) is true, then we ought to conclude that premise (3b) is false, based on the above line of reasoning.