William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 23: A Fresh Start

A FRESH START ON CRAIG'S CASE

William Craig presents a two-paragraph summary of his case for the resurrection of Jesus on page 360 of the 3rd edition of his book Reasonable Faith (hereafter: RF3).  That summary is a bit confused and unclear. However, Craig also provides a shorter and clearer summary of his case in a single paragraph that starts at the bottom of page 360 and continues on to the top of page 361.  

I am going to make a fresh start now, by focusing on that single-paragraph summary of his case, and I will also add in details, as required, from the previous two-paragraph summary on page 360.

CLARIFICATION OF THE ONE-PARAGRAPH SUMMARY

Here is Craig's one-paragraph summary of his case for the resurrection of Jesus:

As alluded to above, the case for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus seems to me to rest upon the evidence for three great, independently established facts: the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith. If these three facts can be established and no plausible nautural explanation can account for them as well as the resurrection hypothesis, then one is justified in inferring Jesus' resurrection as the most plausible explanation of the data. (RF3, p.306-361) 

The first sentence refers to three historical claims that Craig thinks are key claims in his case.  The second sentence refers to a comparison of the explanatory power of various natural explanations in relation to the "resurrection hypothesis", which Craig believes to be the most plausible explanation.   

Here is a key premise of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus:

1. IF these three facts can be established and no plausible nautural explanation can account for them as well as the resurrection hypothesis, THEN one is justified in inferring Jesus' resurrection as the most plausible explanation of the data.

HISTORICAL CLAIMS VS. HISTORICAL FACTS 

Because the word "facts" carries the implication that the claims made by Craig are KNOWN to be true, and this implies that the claims in question are firmly established on the basis of evidence, it is question-begging for Craig to use the term "facts" in his basic premises.  The use of the word "facts" is reasonable only AFTER he has presented evidence that firmly establishes the truth of the three key historical claims that Craig asserts.  To avoid question-begging use of the word "facts", I will replace the phrase "these three facts" with the phrase "Craig's three key historical claims".

1a. IF Craig's three key historical claims can be established as being historical facts and no plausible nautural explanation can account for them as well as the resurrection hypothesis, THEN Jesus' resurrection is the most plausible explanation of the data. 

I have also eliminated the phrase "one is justified in inferring..." because this is a long-winded and unnecessary inference indicator, which I will replace later by using the standard inference indicator: "Therefore". 

We need to clarify the meaning of the phrase "the resurrection hypothesis" in this key premise, and we can do so based on what Craig has stated in his previous two-paragraph summary of his case:

In my estimation the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate. (RF3, p.360)

Now we can clarify the meaning of the phrase "the resurrection hypothesis":

1b. IF Craig's three key historical claims can be established as being historical facts and no plausible nautural explanation can account for them as well as the hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead", THEN the hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead" is the most plausible explanation of the data. 

WHAT DOES THE PHRASE "THE DATA" MEAN? 

What does Craig mean by the phrase "the data" in this key premise? There are different possible interpretations of this phrase, given the context of Craig's two summaries of his case.  In the first paragraph of his longer summary, Craig says the following:

According to this approach, we begin with the evidence available to us and then infer what would, if true, provide the best explanation of the evidence. (RF3, p.360, emphasis added)

So, the phrase "the data" in Craig's key premise might refer to "the evidence available to us" that is "relevant to Jesus' final fate."

This concept of "the evidence available to us" is somewhat problematic, because some people have less evidence available to them than other people, even if we set aside the fact that people who lived in previous centuries had less historical evidence than we have in the 21st century, because various archeological artefacts and ancient texts have been discovered in recent centuries. 

Even if we just compare two people who live in the 21st century, one person might have carefully studied the historical evidence relevant to Jesus' final fate for many years, while another person might have never studied any such historical evidence. The second person has virtually no historical evidence available to consider, at least no evidence that he or she has ever seen or read about.

We can understand the idea of "the evidence available to us" more broadly to refer to ALL of the evidence that a person could see or read about if they chose to investigate this question seriously for several months and had no physical, mental, social, or financial obstacles that would prevent serious study of relevant historical evidence about Jesus' final fate.

It takes more than just a few months to master the translation and interpretation of ancient Greek texts, such as the Gospels and other N.T. writings.  However, one can lean on experts in ancient history, in translation of ancient Greek texts, in the interpretation of the Gospels and other N.T. writings, in order to learn the relevant historical information about Jesus' final fate in months rather than in years.

I think we can ignore the fact that some people are completely ignorant about the historical evidence that is relevant to Jesus' final fate, and understand the phrase "the evidence available to us" to mean "all of the historical evidence that is relevant to Jesus' final fate that is available to people in the 21st century".

However, Craig has also focused upon "three great, independently established facts: the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith." (RF3, p.360-361). So, the phrase "the data" in Craig's key premise might refer only to those three historical "facts" or claims.

There is also another possible meaning of the phrase "the data" in Craig's key premise.  Craig might be referring to the historical evidence that is relevant to his three key historical claims. In order to establish that these three claims are FACTS, Craig makes a case for each of those three claims and that case involves presenting various pieces of historical evidence. Even if Craig focuses primarily on his three historical claims, those claims are themselves based upon historical evidence. Thus, it could be that the phrase "the data" includes not only the three key historical claims but also all of the historical evidence upon which those claims are based.

There is clearly a big difference between these three different sets of historical data:

HD1: All of the historical evidence that is relevant to Jesus' final fate that is available to people in the 21st century.

HD2: Craig's three key historical "facts" (or claims) about: the empty tomb, the appearances of the risen Jesus, and the origin of the Christian faith.

HD3: Craig's three key historical "facts" (or claims) mentioned in (HD2) plus the historical evidence relevant to determining whether those three historical claims are facts.

(HD1) includes a large amount of historical evidence, while (HD2) might contain no historical evidence at all, since it is, strictly speaking, just a set of three historical claims, and historical claims are NOT the same as historical evidence.  (HD3) would contain some historical evidence, but not nearly as much historical evidence as (HD1). 

Let's consider the possibility that Craig meant the phrase "the data" to refer to his three key historical "facts" (which are actually historical claims unless and until he shows that the historical evidence firmly establishes that those three claims are true, and thus deserve to be called "facts").  Here then is the further clarification of his key premise: 

1c. IF Craig's three key historical claims can be established as being historical facts and no plausible nautural explanation can account for them as well as the hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead", THEN the hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead" is the most plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims being historical facts.

This key premise of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is a conditional claim; it has this logical form:

IF P, THEN Q. 

The other sentence in Craig's one-paragraph summary of his case makes this claim:

As alluded to above, the case for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus seems to me to rest upon the evidence for three great, independently established facts: the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith. (RF3, p.360-361)

In saying that his three key historical claims are "independently established facts", Craig is claiming that the relevant historical evidence shows that his three key historical claims are clearly and definitely true.  In other words, Craig is clearly implying this claim:

2. Craig's three key historical claims can be established as being historical facts.

This is one part of the condition specified in the conditional statement that Craig asserts in premise (1c). The other part of the condition specified in premise (1c) is this:

A. No plausible nautural explanation can account for Craig's three key historical claims being historical facts as well as the hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead."

THE CORE ARGUMENT OF CRAIG'S CASE

In order to make use of his key premise (1c), Craig must assert both parts of the condition in that conditional claim. That way, he can infer the consequent of the conditional claim asserted by (1c):

1c. IF Craig's three key historical claims can be established as being historical facts and no plausible nautural explanation can account for them as well as the hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead", THEN the hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead" is the most plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims being historical facts.

2. Craig's three key historical claims can be established as being historical facts.

A. No plausible nautural explanation can account for Craig's three key historical claims being historical facts as well as the hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead."

THEREFORE:

 B. The hypothesis that "God raised Jesus from the dead" is the most plausible explanation of Craig's three key historical claims being historical facts.

Claim (B) is not, however, the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  He makes a stronger claim than (B) in his two-paragraph summary:

In my estimation the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate. (RF3, p.360)

 Here is the stronger claim that Craig infers from (B):

3. The hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" furnishes the best explanation of the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate.

Claim (3) refers to a broader scope of evidence that goes beyond Craig's three key historical claims/historical facts.  It refers to "the historical data relevant to Jesus' final fate" which clearly includes much more evidence than just Craig's three key historical claims.  

Claim (3), however, is still not the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case.  The idea that the hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" is the best explanation of the historical evidence relevant to Jesus' final fate is an interesting claim, but the central question at issue is whether this hypothesis is TRUE.  Thus, in his two-paragraph summary, Craig connects his case to this central question by asserting a claim about the truth of this hypothesis:

I think that the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is such that a well-informed investigator ought to agree that it is more likely than not to have occurred. (RF3, p.360)

We can shorten this claim by setting aside the long and unnecessary inference indicator:

4. The resurrection of Jesus is more likely than not to have occurred.

What Craig means by the phrase "the resurrection of Jesus" is spelled out in the other premises of his argument:

4a. It is more likely than not that "God raised Jesus from the dead."

We can now outline the main premises of Craig's case:

 

 

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The Case Against the Swoon Theory by Kreeft and Tacelli - Part 1: Objections from the Gospel of John

In their Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA), the Christian philosophers Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli make a case for the resurrection of Jesus.  

Their case can be summarized in a brief two-premise argument:

1. IF Kreeft and Tacelli refuted the four alternative skeptical theories, THEN Kreeft and Tacelli have proved that the Christian Theory of the resurrection of Jesus is true (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).

2. Kreeft and Tacelli refuted (in HCA) the four alternative skeptical theories (i.e., the Swoon Theory, the Conspiracy Theory, the Hallucination Theory, and the Myth Theory).

THEREFORE:

3. Kreeft and Tacelli have proved that the Christian Theory of the resurrection of Jesus is true.  

Their case for the resurrection of Jesus fails completely because both premises of this argument are false.

The first premise is false because there are at least dozens of different skeptical theories about Jesus' final fate, not just four skeptical theories and the Christian Theory[1].  The second premise is false because their objections against the Swoon Theory are all weak and defective[2], as are their objections against the Conspiracy Theory[3], the Hallucination Theory[4], and the Myth Theory[5]. They failed to refute ANY of the four skeptical theories that they criticized in HCA.

Because both premises of their argument are clearly false, the case for the resurrection of Jesus put forward by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli in HCA fails completely.

In this current post, I will summarize my criticism of four of the objections made by Kreeft and Tacelli against the Swoon Theory.  

OBJECTIONS BASED ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN

I devoted Chapter 3 of my upcoming book (Thinking Critically about the Resurrection of Jesus, Volume 1: The Failure of Peter Kreeft's Case) to an analysis and critical evaluation of four objections against the Swoon Theory from Kreeft and Tacelli in their book HCA:

Kreeft and Tacelli also raise other objections to the Swoon Theory, but these four are based on the Gospel of John, and these are the objections I will discuss in this current post.

Because I have carefully analyzed and evaluated these objections in my upcoming book, in this post, I will just summarize the problems I found with these four objections.

OBJECTION #2: BREAK THEIR LEGS

Here is how Kreeft and Tacelli state their second objection to the Swoon Theory:

The fact that the Roman soldier did not break Jesus’ legs, as he did to the other two crucified criminals (Jn 19:31-33), means that the soldier was sure Jesus was dead. Breaking the legs hastened the death so that the corpse could be taken down before the sabbath (v. 31). (HCA, p.183)

It is likely that the account of Roman soldiers breaking the legs of the other crucified men and not breaking Jesus' legs is unhistorical. Thus, the "Break Their Legs" objection is based on dubious historical claims:

• The Gospel of John provides a historically unreliable account of the life and words of Jesus.[6]
• The Passion Narrative in the Gospel of John provides a historically unreliable account of the alleged arrest, trials, crucifixion, and burial of Jesus.[7]
• Chapter 19 of the Gospel of John in particular provides a historically unreliable account of Jesus' alleged trial before Pilate, Jesus' crucifixion, and the burial of Jesus.[8]
• The author of the Gospel of John believed that the decision of the soldiers to not break Jesus' legs fulfilled an O.T. messianic prophecy (John 19:36), and this casts doubt on the historicity of that alleged event, because the prophecy might well have been the basis for the alleged event, rather than eyewitness testimony.

Furthermore, the Gospel of John differs from the other three Gospels in these relevant details:

• Only the Gospel of John reports that one of Jesus' disciples was "the beloved disciple" of Jesus (John 13:21-25 and John 19:26-27).
• Only the Gospel of John reports that "the beloved disciple" was present at Jesus' crucifixion to witness these alleged events (John 19:26-27).
• Only the Gospel of John reports that Jesus spoke to his mother and to one of his disciples from the cross (John 19:25-27).
• Only the Gospel of John reports that the Jewish leadership was concerned about the crucified men being left on their crosses over the Sabbath day (John 19:31).
• Only the Gospel of John reports that the Jewish leadership asked Pilate to order his soldiers to break the legs of the crucified men (John 19:31).
• Only the Gospel of John reports that the Roman soldiers broke the legs of some of the crucified men but not the legs of Jesus (John 19:32-33).

The inference from the dubious historical claims (about the breaking of the legs of the other crucified men and the decision of the Roman soldiers to not break Jesus' legs) to the conclusion that the soldiers were "sure Jesus was dead" is a dubious inference. If the soldiers were "sure Jesus was dead," then they would not have poked or stabbed Jesus in the side with a spear to check to see if he was alive (or to make sure that he would die from that wound), as reported by the Gospel of John.  

Finally, there was no modern scientific biology or scientific medicine two thousand years ago, and Roman soldiers were unaware of the basic facts of modern biology and medical science. They had no modern medical devices or equipment to check Jesus for signs of life.  Thus, the inference from the claim that the soldiers were "sure Jesus was dead" to the conclusion that Jesus was in fact dead, is also a dubious inference.

The "Break Their Legs" objection by Kreeft and Tacelli against the Swoon Theory clearly fails because it is based on  historical claims that are probably false, and because it is also based on at least two dubious inferences.

OBJECTION #3: BLOOD AND WATER

Here is how Kreeft and Tacelli state their third objection to the Swoon Theory:

John, an eyewitness, certified that he saw blood and water come from Jesus’ pierced heart (Jn 19:34-35). This shows that Jesus’ lungs had collapsed and he had died of asphyxiation.  Any medical expert can vouch for this.    (HCA, p. 183)

Like the "Break Their Legs" objection, this objection is based on historical claims that are probably false. All of the problems of historical unreliability with the Gospel of John mentioned concerning the "Break Their Legs" objection apply to this objection as well, including the fact that the author of the Gospel of John believed that the poking or stabbing of Jesus' side was predicted in an O.T. messianic prophecy (John 19:37).

Furthermore, the Gospel of John differs from the other Gospels in the previously mentioned ways, and also in these other relevant ways:

• Only the Gospel of John reports that a Roman soldier poked or stabbed Jesus in the side with a spear.
• Only the Gospel of John reports that Jesus had a wound in his side while he was on the cross.
• Only the Gospel of John reports that blood and water came from a wound in Jesus' side while he was on the cross.
• Only the Gospel of John reports that a disciple of Jesus saw a Roman soldier poke or stab Jesus' side with a spear while Jesus was on the cross.
• Only the Gospel of John reports that a disciple of Jesus saw blood and water come from a wound in Jesus' side while Jesus was on the cross.
• Only the Gospel of John reports that the risen Jesus had a wound in his side when he appeared to his disciples.
• Only the Gospel of John reports that the risen Jesus told his disciple Thomas to touch a wound in his side.

Each of these differences between the Gospel of John and the other three Gospels casts doubt on the historical claims that are the basis of the "Blood and Water" objection.

Also, it is simply false that "an eyewitness, certified that he saw blood and water come from Jesus’ pierced heart".  First, whether a clear liquid is water, and whether a reddish liquid is blood, cannot be determined merely by seeing these fluids.  Second, the Gospel of John says nothing about an eyewitness seeing liquids "come from Jesus' pierced heart".  It only claims that a disciple of Jesus saw liquids come out of a wound in Jesus' side. 

There are no details given in the Gospel of John about the precise location, width, depth, or shape of the wound in Jesus' side, so the assumption that Jesus' heart was pierced by the spear is speculation, not a fact.

Finally, it is false that "any medical expert can vouch for" the idea that blood and water flowing from a wound in Jesus' side "shows that...he [Jesus] had died of asphyxiation," because (a) one widely-read article about Jesus' death written by a medical doctor comments that this evidence shows that Jesus did NOT die of asphyxiation[9], and because (b) there are several different medical theories about what caused Jesus' death that have been put forward by different medical doctors.[10] The asphyxiation theory is just one of many medical theories about the cause of Jesus' death.  

The "Blood and Water" objection to the Swoon Theory by Kreeft and Tacelli clearly fails, because the historical claims it is based upon are probably false, and because the inference from those alleged historical facts to a particular medical theory (the asphyxiation theory) about Jesus' death is clearly a controversial and dubious inference.

OBJECTION #4: WINDING SHEETS AND ENTOMBMENT

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END NOTES

1. See Chapter 6 of my upcoming book, Thinking Critically about the Resurrection of Jesus, Volume 1: The Failure of Peter Kreeft's Case.  Here is a DRAFT version of that chapter:

CHAPTER 6: More than Five Theories

2. For full details on the failure of Kreeft and Tacelli to refute the Swoon Theory, see Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of my upcoming book, Thinking Critically about the Resurrection of Jesus, Volume 1: The Failure of Peter Kreeft's Case.  Here are DRAFT versions of those chapters:

CHAPTER 3: Objections to the Swoon Theory Based on John

CHAPTER 4: Objections to the Swoon Theory Based on Other Gospels

CHAPTER 5: Objections to the Swoon Theory NOT based on the Gospels

3. See my INDEX article with links to the fourteen blog posts I wrote defending the Conspiracy Theory against seven objections by Kreeft and Tacelli:

https://secularfrontier.infidels.org/2019/06/defending-the-conspiracy-theory-index/

4. See my INDEX article with links to the forty-five blog posts I wrote defending the Hallucination Theory against fourteen objections by Kreeft and Tacelli:

https://tcaict.blogspot.com/2022/02/defending-hallucination-theory-summary.html

See also my INDEX article with links to the eleven blog posts I wrote defending the Hallucination Theory against seven objections by Josh McDowell:

https://secularfrontier.infidels.org/2021/06/did-jesus-rise-from-the-dead-index/

5. See my blog post, “Defending the Myth Theory: COMPLETED“ at The Secular Frontier:

https://secularfrontier.infidels.org/2022/04/defending-the-myth-theory-completed/

6. See page 62 of DRAFT Chapter 3 of my upcoming book:

CHAPTER 3: Objections to the Swoon Theory Based on John

For a more in-depth discussion, see my series of posts on the historical unreliability of the Gospel of John: 

The Unreliability of the 4th Gospel - Part 14: Summary and INDEX

7. See these posts related to the historical unreliability of the Passion Narrative in the Gospel of John: 

The Unreliability of the 4th Gospel – Part 6: One-On-One Dialogues 

The Unreliability of the 4th Gospel – Part 11: Chapter 18

The Unreliability of the 4th Gospel - Part 12: Chapter 19

8. See my post on the unreliability of Chapter 19 of the Gospel of John:

The Unreliability of the 4th Gospel - Part 12: Chapter 19

9. Dr. C. Truman Davis wrote this comment: 

The 34th verse of the 19th chapter of the Gospel according to John: “And immediately there came out blood and water”. Thus there was an escape of watery fluid from the sac surrounding the heart and blood from the interior of the heart. We, therefore, have rather conclusive post-mortem evidence that Our Lord died, not the usual crucifixion death by suffocation, but of heart failure due to shock and constriction of the heart by fluid in the pericardium.

This quote is from “The Passion of Christ from a Medical Point of View” by Dr. C. Truman Davis, in Arizona Medicine, March 1965. Here is a copy of that article:

https://www.dtodayarchive.org/images/file/Crucifixion_Medical.pdf

10. One review of relevant medical articles on this topic found that there have been at least nine different theories as to the cause of Jesus’ death, plus one medical doctor argued that Jesus did not die on the cross. See the table of different medical theories in this article: “Medical Theories on the Cause of Death in Crucifixion” by Matthew Maslen and Piers Mitchell, in Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol. 99, April 2006, p.186.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 22: The Either/Or Fallacy and Imagination

WHERE WE ARE

In Part 21 of this series, I argued that the cases for the resurrection of Jesus made by Peter Kreeft, Josh McDowell, and William Craig are all Dead On Arrival because all three of these Christian apologists present cases that are based on a false dilemma, and thus their cases commit the Either/Or Fallacy.

Why is this so? For one thing, this is a very common fallacy, which indicates that it is a natural temptation to simplify our options to just two or three.  Many of us feel a bit uneasy when we walk through the cereal section of a supermarket and are confronted with two dozen different kinds of cereal to buy.  We feel more comfortable when there are just a handful of options to choose from.

A LACK OF IMAGINATION?

I think another problem contributing to the illogical thinking of these three Christian apologists is that they fail to exercise their imaginations when thinking about this issue.  People often accept a false dilemma because they fail to make a serious effort to think about the question, "What are ALL of the relevant options in this case?" 

With just a little bit of effort, just a little bit of imagination, one can come up with many alternatives to the following false dilemma:

EITHER there is a natural hypothesis that provides a plausible explanation of the empty tomb, OR the Resurrection Hypothesis is correct.

One might well accuse Kreeft, McDowell, and Craig of having no imagination.  However, I suspect that the problem is a bit more complicated than just a lack of imagination.  

Philosophy and law both require one to think critically and to reason logically, and in order to do so, one MUST exercise some imagination. Philosophers and law students (Kreeft and Craig are philosophers, and McDowell studied law) need to be able to think of counterexamples to broad generalizations (e.g., All Xs are Ys), and to think of counterexamples to false dilemmas (e.g., EITHER P is the case OR Q is the case).  Without imagination, Kreeft and Craig would not have been able to be successful in philosophy and logic, and McDowell would not have been able to be successful in studying law.

However, the cognitive bias that was a serious problem with Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus, namely confirmation bias, could explain why Kreeft, McDowell, and Craig failed to exercise their imaginations when considering the above false dilemma. 

Confirmation bias impacts various intellectual abilities and processes.  It impacts our focus or attention.  When one has a firm belief that P is the case, one will tend to search for facts or evidence that supports this belief, and when evidence supporting P presents itself, one will tend to notice that evidence.  And when evidence against P presents itself, one will tend to ignore that evidence. Also, even if one does notice disconfirming evidence, confirmation bias also impacts one's thinking in terms of memory.  We tend to remember evidence that confirms our beliefs, and we tend to forget evidence that disconfirms our beliefs.

Confirmation bias impacts what we are searching for, what we notice, and what we remember. So, I suspect that it also impacts when we exercise our imaginations.  If using your imagination might put a cherished belief at risk of being disconfirmed, then you will be less likely to use your imagination, but if using your imagination seems like it could help to confirm a cherished belief, then you are likely to use your imagination.

I don't think the problem is that Kreeft, McDowell, or Craig lack imagination.  I suspect that all three of these Christian apologists do have good imaginations and do use their imaginations, but that they tend to avoid using their imaginations when this carries the risk of disconfirming one of their basic Christian beliefs.

USING ONE'S IMAGINATION TO THINK UP MORE NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL HYPOTHESES

It is not in the interest of Christian apologists to think up more natural hypotheses or more supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.  That is to say, they have no desire to come up with a new hypothesis that might provide a better explanation of the relevant facts than the Resurrection Hypothesis, which they firmly believe and want to promote. Confirmation bias influences them to avoid using their imaginations for the purpose of constructing more hypotheses that would compete with the hypothesis that they believe and cherish.

GENERATING SUPERNATURAL HYPOTHESES THAT PARALLEL NATURAL HYPOTHESES

Anything you can do, God can do better.  Anything that nature can do, God can do better.  So, most natural hypotheses can be modified in order to generate a similar supernatural theory.  

The most obvious example of this way of generating more hypotheses occurs with the Hallucination Hypothesis. This is a naturalistic hypothesis that explains the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples as being hallucinations, malfunctions of their brains that produced experiences that made it seem like a living Jesus was present, when in reality, Jesus was not present.  

There is a supernatural hypothesis that is similar to this naturalistic one: the Vision Hypothesis.  This is the supernatural hypothesis that God intentionally caused Jesus' disciples to experience visions of a living Jesus, in order to communicate the message that Jesus was alive again, after he had died on the cross. 

God intervening in the lives and experiences of Jesus' disciples clearly makes this a supernatural hypothesis, but it is similar to the Hallucination Hypothesis, in that Jesus is not physically present during these experiences of the disciples, according to both the naturalistic explanation called the Hallucination Hypothesis and the supernatural explanation called the Vision Hypothesis.

Let's consider some other naturalistic hypotheses.  Craig considered and evaluated the Displaced Body Hypothesis in Reasonable Faith.[1] This is a naturalistic hypothesis that claims Joseph of Arimathea moved Jesus' body to a different location after the initial burial of Jesus in a stone tomb, and before the women came to visit the stone tomb on Sunday morning. 

Anything Joseph can do, God can do too.  So, one supernatural hypothesis is that God moved the body of Jesus to another tomb, perhaps instantly teleporting Jesus' dead body to a different tomb. This is similar to the naturalistic hypothesis that Craig evaluated, but it involves God intervening in human affairs, so that the moving of Jesus' body was done by a supernatural being using supernatural powers.

Craig also considers and evaluates the Apparent Death Hypothesis.  This is a naturalistic hypothesis that claims that Jesus only appeared to die on the cross, but had merely fainted, so that Jesus was actually still alive when he was removed from the cross.  This could have been merely a lucky break for Jesus.  However, if God was involved, God could have made sure that this fortunate outcome took place.

God could have performed healing miracles on Jesus' body to keep him alive despite the various injuries and wounds inflicted upon him.  God could have instantly healed the wounds from a severe scourging.  God could have instantly healed wounds in Jesus' scalp from the crown of thorns.  God could have made the nails in Jesus' hands and feet vanish into nothingness and instantly healed the wounds created by the nails. Jesus could have survived his crucifixion because of divine intervention.

Another possibility is that God could have let Jesus suffer from his wounds and injuries, but miraculously prevented Jesus from dying on the cross.  For example, if Jesus underwent clinical death (cessation of breathing and heartbeat) on the cross, God could have caused Jesus to be resuscitated before Jesus reached the point of brain death. God could have instantly created new blood in Jesus' veins (like a blood infusion), and God could have caused Jesus' chest to repeatedly compress every few seconds (as if someone were performing CPR on Jesus), causing Jesus' breathing and heartbeat to resume.

Furthermore, the Apparent Death Hypothesis focuses on the idea that Jesus appeared to die on the cross, but did not actually die on the cross.  There are different natural ways that this could have occurred.  But God also could have intervened to ensure that Jesus appeared to die while actually remaining alive.  

Recall that, according to the Gospel of Luke, when the risen Jesus appeared to some of his followers on the Emmaus road (Luke 24: 13-32), they didn't recognize Jesus.  Somehow, God made Jesus appear to be somebody else, so that these followers would not recognize who they were talking to.  But since God can alter the way Jesus appears to others, God could have performed a miracle that made Jesus appear to be dead while on the cross, even though Jesus was actually still alive.  Thus, this is a third way that there could be a supernatural hypothesis that is similar to the naturalistic hypothesis called the Apparent Death Hypothesis.

MULTIPLYING SUPERNATURAL HYPOTHESES

The philosopher Spinoza was skeptical about miracles and divine revelation. He proposed a powerful objection to miracle claims.  He pointed out that Christians believe that there are various supernatural beings besides God: spirits, angels, and demons. But if there are other supernatural beings besides God, then any alleged "miracle" might actually have been caused by a supernatural being other than God.  

Given that we (a) don't know God's plans, purposes, and motivations, (b) don't know the plans, purposes, and motivations of other supernatural beings, (c) don't know the number and kinds of supernatural beings that exist, and (d) cannot see or directly observe the actions and activities of God or of any other supernatural beings, we have no way of determining whether an alleged "miracle" was brought about by God or by some other supernatural being.

Therefore, any supernatural explanation involving God or divine intervention into human affairs can be modified into a similar supernatural explanation involving some other sort of supernatural being, such as:

• a spirit or ghost
• an angel
• a demon
• the Devil/Satan
• a finite deity (Zeus, Poseidon, Mars, Athena, etc.)
• a human with magical or supernatural power(s)

Thus, for any supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate that involves God intervening in human affairs, we can always easily generate at least six more similar supernatural hypotheses involving some other sort of supernatural being intervening in human affairs.

MULTIPLYING NATURAL HYPOTHESES

In Part 19 of this series, I pointed out that Christian apologists often commit the STRAWMAN fallacy by including unnecessary details or complications in a particular naturalistic hypothesis.  So, one way we can generate more naturalistic hypotheses is by either (a) removing an unnecessary detail from a naturalistic hypothesis or (b) substituting alternative details.  

Just as we can substitute an angel or a demon for God in a supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate, so we can substitute a different specific person for a specific person named in a naturalistic hypothesis, or substitute a different category of person for a specific category of person that is specified in a naturalistic hypothesis.

For example, Craig commits the STRAWMAN fallacy in his description of the Displaced Body Hypothesis, because he includes the unnecessary detail that it is Joseph of Arimathea who moves Jesus' body from the stone tomb where it was initially placed.  We could simply remove this detail and characterize the Displaced Body Hypothesis more generally, like this:

SOMEBODY moved Jesus' body from the stone tomb where it was initially placed, but did not tell Jesus' disciples about doing this.

Another way to fix the problem with Craig's overly-specific characterization of this naturalistic hypothesis is to just generate several similar naturalistic hypotheses that name other people:

• Nicodemus moved Jesus' body...
• A gardener moved Jesus' body...
• Some Roman soldiers moved Jesus' body...
• James, the brother of Jesus, moved Jesus' body... 
• Judas moved Jesus' body...
• Peter moved Jesus' body...
• John moved Jesus' body...
• Mary Magdalene moved Jesus' body...
• Thomas moved Jesus' body... 

Whenever a naturalistic hypothesis names a specific person or specifies a particular group or category of persons, we can modify that hypothesis by naming a different person or a different category of persons in order to generate more naturalistic hypotheses.

INDIVIDUATING THE DISCIPLES

Another common problem with a failure of imagination by Christian apologists is that they oversimplify hypotheses by treating Jesus' disciples as a uniform group, rather than as individual people who had different experiences and who might have formed different beliefs about Jesus' final fate.

This is especially obvious in the case of the Conspiracy Hypothesis.  Here is how Craig characterises this naturalistic hypothesis:

According to this explanation, the disciples stole the body of Jesus and lied about his postmortem appearances, thus faking his resurrection.[2]

Craig does not specify the meaning of the phrase "the disciples", but it seems fairly clear that he is referring to Jesus' twelve disciples minus Judas Iscariot. 

It is certainly possible that all eleven remaining disciples out of "the twelve" conspired together to lie about how Jesus' body disappeared and about seeing the risen Jesus.  However, it is not necessarily the case that all eleven disciples were deceivers.  

Some of the eleven disciples could have been deceived.  Each of the eleven disciples had their own individual experiences after Jesus was crucified, and each of them formulated their own individual beliefs about what happened to Jesus after he was crucified.  It is an oversimplification to assume that all eleven disciples had the same experiences and formed the same beliefs about what happened to Jesus after his crucifixion.

If we treat each of the eleven disciples as an individual person, then the Conspiracy Hypothesis can be divided up into many different possibilities, many different combinations of disciples in which some were deceivers, and some were deceived:

Given eleven disciples and two possible states (Deceiver OR Deceived), there are this many different permutations of the disciples:

2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2

= 2 x (2 x 2) x (2 x 2) x (2 x 2) x (2 x 2) x (2 x 2)

= 2 x (4) x (4) x (4) x (4) x (4)

 = 2 x 4 x [(4) x (4)] x [(4) x (4)]

 = 2 x 4 x [16] x [16]

 = (2 x 4) x (16 x 16)

= (8) x (256)

 = 2,048 permutations

In only one of these 2,048 permutations is none of the eleven disciples a deceiver.  So, there are 2,047 different naturalistic hypotheses where at least one of the disciples was a deceiver. Thus, there are 2,047 different naturalistic hypotheses that are contained just in the idea of the Conspiracy Hypothesis if we treat the eleven disciples as individuals, instead of treating them all as a uniform group.

Furthermore, the distinction between being a deciever and being deceived is itself subject to an Either/Or Fallacy and an associated failure of imagination by Christian apologists:

Each of Jesus' eleven remaining disciples was EITHER a deceiver OR was deceived concerning Jesus' final fate.

This Either/Or claim is a false dilemma, because one or more of Jesus' eleven remaining disciples might have been neither a deceiver nor deceived concerning Jesus' final fate.  For example, suppose that Jesus had not risen from the dead, and suppose that one of the disciples seriously doubted or rejected the claim that Jesus rose from the dead, and suppose this disciple did not promote or preach the belief that Jesus rose from the dead.  Such a doubting disciple would have been neither a deceiver nor would this disciple have been deceived concerning Jesus' final fate.

Because the above Either/Or claim is false, we must recognise at least three different possible states for each of the eleven remaining disciples.  That means that the number of historical possibilities suggested by the Conspiracy Hypothesis is much greater than 2,047:

3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3

= 3 x (3 x 3) x (3 x 3) x (3 x 3) x (3 x 3) x (3 x 3)

= 3 x (9) x (9) x (9) x (9) x (9) 

 = 3 x 9 x [(9) x (9)] x [(9) x (9)]

 = 3 x 9 x [81] x [81]

 = (3 x 9) x (81 x 81)

= (27) x (6,561)

 = 177,147 permutations

Some of these 177,147 historical possibilities involve none of the disciples being a deceiver, and thus those possibilities would not be included under the idea of the Conspiracy Hypothesis.  There are 2,048 such permutations where none of the eleven disciples would be a deceiver[3], so the total number of historical possibilities that are included in the idea of the Conspiracy Hypothesis, when we view the eleven remaining disciples as individuals instead of as a uniform group would be this:

 177,147 total - 2,048 permutations with no deceivers

= 175, 099 possibilities with at least one deceiver

CONCLUSIONS 

The fact that three different well-known Christian apologists put forward cases for the resurrection of Jesus that are Dead on Arrival because they commit the Either/Or Fallacy suggests that there is a problem of lack of imagination on the part of many Christian apologists.

I suggest that this lack of imagination is connected to the cognitive bias called Confirmation Bias, so that these Christian apologists do sometimes use their imaginations, but tend to avoid using their imaginations when doing so puts their cherished Christian beliefs at risk.

Kreeft foolishly believed that there were only five possible explanations or hypotheses concerning Jesus' final fate.[4]  McDowell believed there were twice as many explanations of Jesus' final fate: five occupied-tomb explanations, and five empty-tomb explanations.[5]  

In Reasonable Faith, Craig discusses and evaluates four naturalistic hypotheses about the empty tomb, one naturalistic hypothesis about the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus, three naturalistic explanations of the origin of the Christian belief in Jesus' resurrection, and just one supernatural explanation, the Resurrection Hypothesis.[6]

There are many more alternative hypotheses, both supernatural and naturalistic, that should be considered and evaluated, but Christian apologists tend to avoid using their imaginations to generate more than just a handful of hypotheses about the final fate of Jesus, probably because of confirmation bias and because of their sense that generating more such hypotheses would put their belief in the Resurrection Hypothesis at risk. 

END NOTES

1. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), pp.376-377.

2. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, p.371.

3. Since "Deceived" and "Neither Deceiver nor Deceived" are two alternative states that an individual disciple could be in, we can calculate the total number of permutations that involve eleven disciples each being in one of these two states.  That is the same as the total number of permutations in my first calculation, where each of the eleven disciples was assumed to either be a Deceiver or to be Deceived: 2,048 permutations. 

4. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p.182.

5. Josh McDowell, The Resurrection Factor (Milton Keynes, England: Authentic Media, 2005), p.114.

6. William Craig, Reasonable Faith. Craig discusses four naturalistic explanations of the empty tomb on pages 371 to 377; Craig discusses one naturalistic explanation of the alleged appearances of the risen Jesus on pages 384 to 387; Craig discusses three naturalistic explanations of the origin of the Christian belief in Jesus' resurrection on pages 390 to 395. Craig compares these eight naturalistic theories to just one supernatural hypothesis: the Resurrection Hypothesis.

William Craig's Case for the Resurrection of Jesus - Part 21: Craig's Either/Or Fallacy

 WHERE WE ARE

In Part 20 of this series, I argued that Craig failed to give us a good reason to believe premise (D1) of the reformulated sub-argument for his key premise (5c).  This means that we may reasonably reject this sub-argument, which gives us a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus fails.

However, this problem with Craig's case reveals a deeper problem that impacts not only Craig's case but also other cases for the resurrection of Jesus by other Christian apologists.  Specifically, Peter Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus and Josh McDowell's case for the resurrection of Jesus are both Dead on Arrival because their cases involve the Either/Or Fallacy, also referred to as a False Dilemma. Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is also Dead on Arrival because his case commits the Either/Or Fallacy.

THE EITHER/OR FALLACY

Howard Kahane was a professor of philosophy who promoted informal logic, especially in his textbook called Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life:

According to argumentation theory scholar Michael A. Gilbert, before Kahane's 1971 book, North American curricula on critical thinking and fallacies were primarily taught from textbooks (such as Irving Copi's Introduction to Logic) in which "fallacies are presented in a brief fashion using examples that were mostly invented or taken out of context. [...] The 'radical change' was that Kahane's book took current examples from newspapers and periodicals dealing with issues students cared about or, at least, recognized. This meant that fallacies were more situated than in older books."[1]

Here is Howard Kahane's characterization of the Either/Or Fallacy:

Strictly speaking, the fallacy of false dilemma (also called the either-or-fallacy) occurs when we reason or argue on the assumption that there are just two plausible solutions to a problem or issue, when there is at least three. However, it's convenient to stretch the term false dilemma to cover false trilemmas, and so on.[2]

THE EITHER/OR FALLACY IN PETER KREEFT'S CASE

Let's begin with Peter Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  Peter Kreeft uses a diagram to lay out the various logical possibilities in relation to alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate[3]:

According to Peter Kreeft, there are only five possible hypotheses about the final fate of Jesus. The five hypotheses are listed on the right side of the above diagram. 

Notice that only the "Christian" hypothesis is a supernatural hypothesis. The Christian Hypothesis here is the same as Craig's Resurrection Hypothesis.  And just as Craig discusses and evaluates only ONE supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate, so does Kreeft discuss and evaluate only ONE supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate.

Kreeft's case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead on Arrival, because his reasoning can be summarized as follows: 

EO1. EITHER there is a plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the relevant facts about Jesus' final fate, OR the supernatural explanation of the Christian Hypothesis is correct.

EO2. There is no plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the relevant facts about Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE:

EO3. The supernatural explanation of the Christian Hypothesis is correct.

Premise (EO1) is false, because there are alternative supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate besides just the Christian Hypothesis (i.e. the Resurrection Hypothesis).

Peter Kreeft's diagram of the logical possibilities is clearly mistaken because it fails to take into account the fact that there are other supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate besides the Christian Hypothesis (or the Resurrection Hypothesis).  In Part 20 of this series, I pointed out that there are at least three such alternative supernatural hypotheses.  Kreeft's case for the resurrection is based on an Either/Or Fallacy.  Premise (EO1), in the above summary of Kreeft's reasoning, asserts a False Dilemma.

THE EITHER/OR FALLACY IN JOSH MCDOWELL'S CASE

Now let's take a look at Josh McDowell's case for the resurrection of Jesus.  McDowell also uses a diagram to lay out the various logical possibilities in relation to alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate[4]:

McDowell divides all hypotheses about Jesus' final fate into two broad categories: Occupied Tomb hypotheses and Empty Tomb hypotheses.  Unlike Kreeft and Craig, McDowell does consider one supernatural hypothesis in addition to the Resurrection Hypothesis.  Among the Occupied Tomb hypotheses, McDowell considers and evaluates the Spiritual Resurrection Hypothesis:

A fourth 'occupied tomb' theory is that Christ's body decayed in the grave and that His real resurrection was spiritual.[5]

This hypothesis accepts that there was a resurrection miracle, but that the miracle did not involve Jesus' physical body.  God returned Jesus to life after death, but did not do so by giving Jesus an immortal physical body.  After his death, Jesus became a spirit or an angel, and his physical body remained in the tomb where it had been buried, according to the Spiritual Resurrection Hypothesis.

Because McDowell does consider at least this one supernatural hypothesis about Jesus' final fate, the reasoning that I used to summarize Kreeft's case does not accurately represent McDowell's reasoning. 

However, if we focus on the general category of "Empty Tomb" hypotheses, McDowell does commit a similar Either/Or Fallacy and thus his case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead on Arrival:

JM1. EITHER there is a plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the Empty Tomb and other relevant facts about Jesus' final fate, OR the supernatural Resurrection Hypothesis is correct.

JM2. There is no plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the Empty Tomb and other relevant facts about Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE:

JM3. The supernatural Resurrection Hypothesis is correct.

Premise (JM1) is false because there are alternative supernatural hypotheses besides the Resurrection Hypothesis that explain the empty tomb.  For example, McDowell does not mention or evaluate the Demonic Hypothesis.  In a later post, I will discuss another supernatural hypothesis that would also explain the empty tomb.

Josh McDowell's diagram of the logical possibilities is clearly mistaken because it fails to take into account the fact that there are other supernatural hypotheses about Jesus' final fate that explain the empty tomb besides the Resurrection Hypothesis.  

McDowell's case for the resurrection is based on an Either/Or fallacy.  Premise (JM1), in the above summary of McDowell's reasoning, asserts a False Dilemma.

THE EITHER/OR FALLACY IN WILLIAM CRAIG'S CASE

William Craig summarizes his case for the resurrection of Jesus in two paragraphs on page 360 of his book Reasonable Faith (3rd edition). Although Craig mentions "alternative naturalistic explanations" in those paragraphs, the ONLY reference to a supernatural explanation or hypothesis in those paragraphs is to the "resurrection hypothesis", the view that God raised Jesus from the dead.

Craig also provides a shorter one-paragraph summary of his case at the bottom of page 360 and the top of page 361:

As alluded to above, the case for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus seems to me to rest upon the evidence for three great, independently established facts: the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith. If these three facts can be established, and no plausible natural explanation can account for them as well as the resurrection hypothesis, then one is justified in inferring Jesus' resurrection as the most plausible explanation of the data.[6] 

Given this summary of his case, Craig's argument is based on showing that the Resurrection Hypothesis provides a more plausible explanation of certain alleged historical facts about Jesus' final fate than various natural explanations or hypotheses.  This completely ignores the fact that there are alternative supernatural hypotheses that should be considered and evaluated in comparison to the Resurrection Hypothesis. 

Therefore, Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus, like Kreeft's case, is Dead on Arrival because it can be accurately summarized as an argument that commits the Either/Or Fallacy:  

EO1. EITHER there is a plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the relevant facts about Jesus' final fate, OR the supernatural explanation of the Christian Hypothesis is correct.

EO2. There is no plausible naturalistic hypothesis that explains the relevant facts about Jesus' final fate.

THEREFORE:

EO3. The supernatural explanation of the Christian Hypothesis is correct.

This is a third good reason to conclude that Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is Dead on Arrival.  His case fails because it is based on a False Dilemma. 

END NOTES

1. "Howard Kahane" in Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard_Kahane

2. Howard Kahane, Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric, 3rd edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Inc.,1980), p.80-81.

3. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p.182.

4. Josh McDowell, The Resurrection Factor (Milton Keynes, England: Authentic Media, 2005), p.114.

5. Josh McDowell, The Resurrection Factor (Milton Keynes, England: Authentic Media, 2005), pp. 90-91.

6. William Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), pp.360-361.