WHERE WE ARE
The core of the argument constituting Peter Kreeft's Objection #6 is as follows:
C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.
2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.
Therefore:
A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.
In Part 23 of this series, I showed that Kreeft's argument in support of the key premise (2B) was based on a DUBIOUS premise and also on a FALSE premise, so he FAILED to provide a good reason for us to believe that premise (2B) is true.
I also briefly argued that premise (2B) is FALSE, because some versions of the Hallucination Theory do NOT require that ANY followers of Jesus had hallucinations of the risen Jesus (e.g. belief in Jesus' resurrection could have begun based on DREAMS about the risen Jesus).
Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that (2B) is true, and there is a good reason to believe (2B) is FALSE, so we may conclude that premise (2B) is FALSE, and that the core argument in Objection #6 is UNSOUND, and thus that Objection #6 FAILS.
However, I will continue my evaluation of the core argument by taking a closer look at the other key premise in the core argument:
C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.
EVALUATION OF PREMISE (C)
Here is my analysis of Kreeft's reasoning in support of premise (C):
1. Hallucinations come from what we already know.
B. IF hallucinations come from what we already know, THEN in hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.
Thus:
C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.
The logic of this argument for (C) is VALID. Thus, the questions at issue here concern the truth of premise (1) and premise (B).
I accept premise (1) as true, so long as we take the word "know" loosely to refer to a person's memories and experiences. Hallucinations and dreams are based on the memories and experiences of the person who has the hallucination or dream. Given that premise (1) is true, the only question remaining about this argument for (C) is whether premise (B) is true or false.
Kreeft is making a fundamental error in premise (B). He FAILS to take into account the power of human minds to create new combinations of ideas and characteristics. In short, he ignores the power of human imagination. I have seen gold coins, gold fillings, and gold nuggets, and I have seen many different mountains, in the state of Washington, in other states, and in other countries in Europe. But I have never ever experienced a GOLD MOUNTAIN, a mountain made of gold.
However, because I have experienced gold, and because I have experienced mountains, my mind is able to combine these two ideas into a new idea, the idea of a GOLD MOUNTAIN. It would be very "surprising and unexpected" for me to be driving along a road one day and to come upon a GOLD MOUNTAIN because I have never seen such a thing. I can, nevertheless, imagine a GOLD MOUNTAIN right now, without ever having seen one. Similarly, I could have a DREAM or a HALLUCINATION about a GOLD MOUNTAIN, even though I have never ever experienced a GOLD MOUNTAIN. Such a dream or hallucination would include something that is "surprising and unexpected", namely the experience of a GOLD MOUNTAIN.
Similarly, I have experienced people lying to me, and lying to others. So, if I met a person who was always completely honest with me, that would NOT prevent me from having a DREAM or a HALLUCINATION about that person lying to me.
Because I have had experiences of people lying to me, and because I have had experiences of the person who was always honest with me (let's say his name was James), I can put those two different ideas together in my imagination, and I can imagine James telling me a lie. So, even though I have never experienced James lying to me, I could DREAM about James lying to me, and I could have a HALLUCINATION about James lying to me. If I were to hallucinate about James lying to me, that hallucination would include James doing something that was "surprising and unexpected" for James to do.
Our minds are able to combine ideas and characteristics and things in ways that we have never actually experienced. Because of this power of our minds, premise (B) is clearly FALSE. Thus, Kreeft's argument in support of premise (C) is UNSOUND, and Kreeft has FAILED to give us a good reason to believe that premise (C) is true.
Furthermore, given that our minds can combine ideas and characteristics to create or imagine new and novel things and circumstances, it is clear that premise (C) is FALSE. For example, we see birds flying, and we see people walking and running and swimming, but we never see people flying like birds, and we never experience flying like a bird in normal life. But we can DREAM about people flying, and we can DREAM about flying ourselves.
Our minds have the power to combine ideas and experiences in new and novel ways. We can imagine the experience of flying like a bird, so we can have DREAMS about flying, and we can have HALLUCINATIONS about flying. Flying like a bird is not physically possible for humans, so we don't have such experiences, and if I experience flying in a DREAM, that is something that is "surprising and unexpected" for me to be able to do. But nothing prevents my mind from imagining what it would be like to fly like a bird, and many people do have such experiences while DREAMING.
We can imagine a person who has always been honest and truthful to us telling us a lie. We have experienced people lying to us and lying to others, so we are able to imagine anyone, even a totally honest person, lying to us. Because we can imagine anyone lying to us, we can DREAM about a person who is in fact completely honest lying to us, and we can HALLUCINATE about a person who is in fact completely honest lying to us. If I know a completely honest person named "James", I can DREAM or HALLUCINATE about James lying to me, even if I have never ever experienced James lying to me. That means that I can DREAM or HALLUCINATE about James saying something to me that it would be "surprising and unexpected" for James to say to me. Thus, premise (C) is FALSE.
EVALUATION OF OBJECTION #6
Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that (2B) is true, and there is a good reason to believe (2B) is FALSE, so we may conclude that premise (2B) is FALSE, and that the core argument of Objection #6 is UNSOUND.
Kreeft has also FAILED to provide us with a good reason to believe that (C) is true, and we have good reason to believe that (C) is FALSE, so we may conclude that premise (C) is FALSE, and that the core argument of Objection #6 is UNSOUND.
Because both key premises in the core argument of Objection #6 are FALSE, it is clear that this core argument is UNSOUND, and that means that Kreeft's Objection #6 FAILS to refute the Hallucination Theory.
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