WHERE WE ARE
The core argument in Objection #7 is this:
1A. The disciples did not expect that Jesus would physically rise from the dead.
B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN the disciples must have expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead.
Therefore:
A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.
However, in Part 26 of this series, I clarified and revised premise (1A), so both key premises in the core argument need to be similarly revised:
1B. None of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.
B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.
Therefore:
A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.
The argument in support of premise (1B) is this:
3B. All of the eleven disciples thought Jesus was a ghost when they had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus. (see Luke 24:36-43)
4B. All of the eleven disciples became convinced that Jesus was not a ghost when they had experiences of an alleged appearance of Jesus in which Jesus ate something to prove to the disciples that he was not a ghost. (see Luke 24:36-43)
Thus:
2B. All of the eleven disciples doubted at first that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.
Therefore:
1B. None of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.
In Part 26 of this series, I argued that premises (3B) and (4B) are both probably FALSE because the Jerusalem appearance stories in Luke 24 are probably FICTIONAL.
I also argued that even if we assume that the story in Chapter 24 of Luke about a gathering of Jesus' disciples experiencing an alleged appearance of Jesus is an accurate description of an actual historical event, it does NOT follow that (3B) and (4B) are true. So, Kreeft has FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that premises (3B) and (4B) are true, and we have good reason to believe that those premises are FALSE. So, we may reasonably conclude that (3B) and (4B) are FALSE and that Kreeft's argument for (2B) is UNSOUND. So, premise (2B) remains DUBIOUS.
Furthermore, (2B) creates a dilemma for Kreeft. Either we accept (2B) as TRUE, and are forced to conclude that the Gospels are historically unreliable, or else we reject (2B) as FALSE, and are forced to conclude that Kreeft's Objection #7 FAILS, just like all of his previous six objections FAILED.
Kreeft has FAILED to show that his key premise (1B) is TRUE, so Objection #7 FAILS.
EVALUATION OF PREMISE (B1)
It is now time to examine the other key premise in the argument constituting Objection #7:
B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.
Kreeft provides us with no reason to believe that (B1) is true. However, since Objection #7 appears to have been borrowed from Josh McDowell's fifth objection against the Hallucination Theory in The Resurrection Factor (1981, p.85-86), it is reasonable to assume that Kreeft accepted the principle that McDowell based this objection upon:
C. A person P will hallucinate that X occurs (or has occurred) ONLY IF: person P anticipates or hopefully expects that X will occur.
Thus:
B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.
We have two main questions to answer about premise (B1):
- Is premise (C) true?
- Does premise (B1) follow from premise (C)?
Furthermore, it is fairly obvious that premise (C) is in fact FALSE. Sometimes hallucinations can be horrible or terrifying. Sometimes when people use a hallucinogenic drug they experience a "bad trip" which can include hallucinations that are horrible and/or terrifying.
A person could, for example, be afraid of snakes and hallucinate that hundreds of deadly snakes are slithering all over and around them. Did the person who has such a terrifying hallucination "anticipate" or "hopefully expect" to be buried in a huge pile of deadly snakes? Probably not.
Even more positive hallucinations can bring unexpected and unanticipated experiences. Suppose that someone take an hallucinogenic drug and then has a hallucination of floating on a cloud high above a beautiful green valley. Prior to taking that drug, did that person "anticipate" or "hopefully expect" to be floating on a cloud over a beautiful green valley that day? Probably not. This pleasant experience probably just happened and was unexpected and unanticipated.
Dreams also don't follow this principle. I might have a nightmare about being chased by a ferocious tiger. Does that mean that earlier that day I "anticipated" being chased by a ferocious tiger? or that I "hopefully expected" to be chased by a ferocious tiger? Probably not, since there aren't any ferocious tigers running around in my town. I just happened to have a bad dream about this highly unlikely terrifying event.
I might also have a wonderful dream about flying like a bird through the treetops in my neighborhood. Earlier that day, did I "anticipate" that I would be flying like a bird through my neighborhood? Did I have a "hopeful expectation" that I would soon be flying like a bird through my neighborhood? Probably not, since human beings cannot fly like birds. I just happened to have a pleasant dream about this physically impossible event.
So, neither hallucinations nor dreams follow this principle asserted by McDowell, and presumably accepted by Kreeft as the basis for believing premise (B1). Because premise (C) is FALSE, this argument for (B1) is UNSOUND, and so (B1) remains unsupported and DUBIOUS.
DOES (B1) FOLLOW FROM PREMISE (C)?
A second problem with the argument for (B1) is that (B1) DOES NOT FOLLOW from premise (C), at least not from (C) by itself. There is at least one UNSTATED assumption that Kreeft is making here in order for this argument to work:
D. The Hallucination Theory requires that at least some of the eleven disciples had hallucinations of the risen Jesus.
C. A person P will hallucinate that X occurs (or has occurred) ONLY IF: person P anticipates or hopefully expects that X will occur.
Therefore:
B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.
With the addition of premise (D), the inference in this argument appears to be VALID. However, as I have argued previously, Kreeft's understanding of the Hallucination Theory is too narrow and is thus mistaken. The Hallucination Theory does NOT require that ANY follower of Jesus experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus.
If, for example, some followers of Jesus had dreams about a risen Jesus, and if the belief that Jesus rose physically from the dead spread among his followers as a result of those dream experiences, then the Hallucination Theory would be true, even though NOBODY experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus.
If Kreeft refuses to broaden his concept of the Hallucination Theory, then his case for the resurrection of Jesus immediately collapses, because by ignoring various alternative versions of the Hallucination Theory (such as dream experiences of a risen Jesus), Kreeft FAILS to refute all relevant skeptical theories, and thus FAILS to show that his theory is the only theory that might possibly be true. So, Kreeft has no choice but to accept a broader conception of the Hallucination Theory, one that encompasses other kinds of non-veridical experiences, such as dreams.
It is also possible that some followers of Jesus other than "the eleven" disciples experienced hallucinations of a risen Jesus, and that none of "the eleven" experienced such hallucinations, but the early Christian belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus came into existence because of those hallucinations experienced by followers of Jesus who were not among "the eleven" disciples. In that case one version of the Hallucination Theory woud be TRUE, even though NONE of "the eleven" disciples experienced a hallucinaiton of a risen Jesus.
Thus, there are at least two ways that the Hallucination Theory could be TRUE, without any of "the eleven" disciples having experienced a hallucination of a risen Jesus. Thus, premise (D) is FALSE. Therefore, the argument for (B1) is UNSOUND.
CONCLUSION ABOUT THE ARGUMENT FOR (B1)
There are two premises in the argument for (B1): premise (C) and premise (D). Premise (C) is FALSE, and premise (D) is also FALSE. So, the argument supporting (B1) is clearly an UNSOUND argument. Kreeft has FAILED to provide us with a good reason to believe that (B1) is true, so (B1) remains DUBIOUS.
Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Hallucination Theory does NOT require that ANY follower of Jesus had a hallucination of a risen Jesus, it is clear that (B1) is simply FALSE.
CONCLUSION ABOUT OBJECTION #7
Here is the core argument in the argument constituting Kreeft's Objection #7 against the Hallucination Theory:
1B. None of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.
B1. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of the eleven disciples expected that Jesus would physically rise from the dead a few days or weeks after his death on the cross.
Therefore:
A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.
In Part 26 of this series, I showed that Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that premise (1B) is true. So, premise (1B) remains dubious.
In this current post, I showed that Kreeft FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that premise (B1) is true, and that we have good reason to believe that (B1) is FALSE.
Since premise (1B) is DUBIOUS, and premise (B1) is FALSE, this core argument is UNSOUND, and Kreeft's Objection #7 against the Hallucination Theory FAILS, just like all of his previous six objections FAILED.
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