WHERE WE ARE
So far, I have shown that four of Peter Kreeft's fourteen objections against the Hallucination Theory FAIL:
It is now time to examine Kreeft's fifth objection.
OBJECTION #5: RETURNED MANY TIMES
Kreeft states his 5th objection against the Hallucination Theory in just two brief sentences:
Hallucinations usually happen only once, except to the insane. This one returned many times, to ordinary people (John 20:19-21:14; Acts 1:3). (HCA, p.187)
Kreeft does not provide a conclusion to his argument, but the context here is that he is trying to refute the Hallucination Theory, so it is obvious what the conclusion of this argument should be:
1. Hallucinations usually happen only once, except to the insane.
2. This one returned many times, to ordinary people.
Therefore:
A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.
Before we attempt to evaluate this argument, we need to clarify the meanings of the premises.
CLARIFICATION OF PREMISE (1)
Premise (1) has at least two UNCLEAR words that need to be clarified: "usually" and "insane".
The word "usually" is unclear because it is a VAGUE QUANTIFICATION. Ideally, we would interpret this word with some quantification that was a bit more precise. The word "usually" is close in meaning to the word "most", so we could interpret premise (1) this way:
1A. Most hallucinations happen only once, except to the insane.
The word "most" can reasonably be understood to mean "at least 51% of". So, if claim (1A) is an accurate interpretation of Kreeft's claim in premise (1), then we could make this premise a bit more precise:
1B. At least 51% of hallucinations happen only once, except to the insane.
Claim (1B) is a fairly weak claim, and it probably will not be strong enough to allow Kreeft to establish the strong conclusion that the Hallucination Theory is FALSE. One could argue that the word "usually" is a bit stronger quantifier than the word "most". So, let's bump up the percentage a bit more:
1C. At least 60% of hallucinations happen only once, except to the insane.
Granted that this is a more precise claim than premise (1) which uses the VAGUE QUANTIFIER "usually", but this is a reasonable interpretation of the word "usually" and I have been generous to Kreeft by bumping the percentage up above 51% (which corresponds to the closely related quantifier "most").
What does Kreeft mean by "the insane"? Clearly, he is referring to some serious kinds of mental illness. But we can make this a bit more precise by specifying the causal relationship with hallucinations that Kreeft, no doubt, had in mind:
A person X is INSANE if and only if: person X has a serious mental illness that causes person X to have hallucinations or that makes it likely that person X will have hallucinations.
This definition is problematic, however, because many people who have a serious mental illness that causes them to have hallucinations, or that makes it likely that they will have hallucinations, are NOT insane. That is to say, many people with such a serious mental illness nevertheless manage to live normal or fairly normal lives, and do not require being locked away in a mental institution. So, it seems inappropriate and insulting and inaccurate to say that ALL people with such serious mental illnesses are "insane".
However, we could define a positive category of "mentally normal" people that requires the absence of such a serious mental illness:
A person X is MENTALLY NORMAL if and only if: person X does NOT have a serious mental illness that causes person X to have hallucinations or that makes it likely that person X will have hallucinations.
This would imply that people who have a serious mental illness that causes them to have hallucinations or that makes them likely to have hallucinations are NOT "mentally normal", but that does seem appropriate and accurate, and is far less negative than saying that ALL such people are "insane".
Here then is a nicely clarified version of premise (1):
1D. At least 60% of hallucinations experienced by mentally normal people will happen only once.
Kreeft, following in the footsteps of Josh McDowell, provides absolutely NO EVIDENCE whatsoever in support of this generalization about hallucinations. So, one obvious problem with this argument is that this key empirical claim is simply asserted and not supported with any relevant evidence. Since Kreeft is NOT an expert in the field of psychology, the fact that he believes and asserts premise (1D) does not provide any reason for us to accept this claim. Premise (1D) is therefore DUBIOUS.
I have one more clarification to make to this premise. My understanding of premise (1D) is that it is intended to be applicable to individuals. So, if James is a mentally normal person, and if James has a hallucination of a 6-foot tall talking rabbit, then premise (1D) allows us to infer that there is at least a 60% chance that James will NOT have another hallucination of a 6-foot tall talking rabbit.
Given this understanding of the implications of (1D), I think it is misleading to state the generalization here simply in terms of a percentage of hallucinations. This generalization is intended to apply to individual mentally normal people, and not just to various hallucinations in a large collection of hallucinations experienced by various mentally normal people.
- Suppose that you have identified a group of 100 mentally normal people who have experienced various hallucinations.
- Suppose that two of those people have each experienced 300 different hallucinations (for a total of 600 different hallucinations between those two people) and that all of those hallucinations were experienced only once.
- Suppose that 90 of the remaining mentally normal people each experienced 4 different hallucinations (for a total of 360 different hallucinations) and each of those 4 hallucinations was experienced twice by the person who had those hallucinations.
- Suppose that the 8 remaining mentally normal people each had 5 different hallucinations (for a total of 40 different hallucinations) and each of those 5 hallucinations was experienced three times by the person who had those hallucinations.
In this scenario, the breakdown of hallucinations among the 100 mentally normal people who have experienced hallucinations is as follows:
- 600 hallucinations out of 1,000 different hallucinations occurred only once
- 400 hallucinations out of 1,000 different hallucinations occurred more than once
- For two people in the group, 100% of their hallucinations are experienced only once.
- For ninety people in the group, 100% of their hallucinations are experienced twice.
- For eight people in the group, 100% of their hallucinations are experienced three times.
1E. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 60% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.
CLARIFICATION OF PREMISE (2)
Here is the initial version of premise (2) of the argument constituting Objection #5:
2. This one returned many times, to ordinary people.
This premise consists of three phrases, and each one of those phrases is UNCLEAR:
- This one
- returned many times to
- ordinary people
The phrase "This one" is a referring phrase, and it is referring back to something mentioned in premise (1). It is clearly a reference to the main thing mentioned in the subject of premise (1): hallucinations. So, we can get rid of the referring expression "one" to clarify premise (2):
2A. This hallucination returned many times to ordinary people.
However, the phrase "This hallucination" is still a referring phrase. We need to eliminate the word "this" by figuring out the specific hallucination or kind of hallucination that Kreeft has in mind here. Kreeft supports premise (2) with some NT passages about people having experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus. Clearly, it is hallucinations of the risen Jesus that Kreeft has in mind, so we can eliminate the word "this" to clarify premise (2) further:
2B. Hallucinations of the risen Jesus returned many times to ordinary people.
The phrase "returned many times to" is ambiguous between two different possible meanings:
were on many occasions experienced by different
OR
were experienced many times by some
On the first interpretation, each person who experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus may well have had this experience ONLY ONCE. But Kreeft intends for there to be a sort of conflict or tension between premise (2) and premise (1), and on the first interpretation, there would be no conflict or tension between these two premises. So, in order to capture the intended conflict between premise (1) and premise (2), we must interpret the phrase "returned many times" to be about particular individuals each having multiple hallucinations of the risen Jesus:
2C. Hallucinations of the risen Jesus were experienced many times by some ordinary people.
Furthermore, the NT passages that Kreeft provides in support of premise (2) indicate that some individual disciples of Jesus each had at least three different experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus. This confirms the interpretation above in claim (2C). This also indicates a way to make the VAGUE QUANTIFICATION "many times" more precise: "at least three times".
The phrase "ordinary people" is clearly intended to contrast with "the insane" mentioned in premise (1). But as I argued when clarifying premise (1), the relevant distinction is between people who are "mentally normal" and other people who are NOT "mentally normal". So, in order for there to be a clear logical connection between premise (1) and premise (2), we need to interpret the phrase "ordinary people" to mean "mentally normal" people. Also, these people were not just any people, they were followers of Jesus:
Now we can state a significantly clarified version of Kreeft's argument constituting his Objection #5 against the Hallucination Theory:2D. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus at least three times.
1E. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 60% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.
2D. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus at least three times.
Therefore:
A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.
With this clarified version of Kreeft's argument, it becomes clear that the conclusion does NOT FOLLOW logically from his two premises. In fact, premise (2D) contradicts the conclusion! So this argument is WORSE than being a non-sequitur. Kreeft has put forward a premise that implies that his own conclusion is FALSE, and that supports the view that the Hallucination Theory is TRUE!
But this is not a decisive or deadly flaw with Kreeft's argument, because what this actually indicates is that premise (2) of Kreeft's argument should NOT be understood in a literal and straightforward way. We need to formulate an interpretation of premise (2) that has a significantly different meaning than this literal and straightforward interpretation.
Kreeft was thinking in terms of the implications of the Hallucination Theory. He was trying to show that the Hallucination Theory has an implication that is false or absurd or extremely improbable. He is attempting to reduce the Hallucination Theory to absurdity. So, what Kreeft had intended to claim in premise (2) is NOT a claim about hallucinations of the risen Jesus, but a claim about experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus:
2E. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus at least three times.
Kreeft's intention was to use this historical claim, a claim which he accepts--and which he would support with the NT passages that he referenced in his statement of premise (2)--in conjunction with the Hallucination Theory in order to infer an implication that he believes to be absurd or at least extremely improbable.
CLARIFICATION OF THE LOGIC OF THE ARGUMENT CONSTITUTING OBJECTION #5
We now have a clear idea of what the explicit claims or premises of Kreeft's argument mean. However, the logic of this argument is still UNCLEAR, and this is because there are some important premises or claims that Kreeft left UNSTATED. I will now make those UNSTATED premises explicit:
1E. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 60% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.
Thus:
B. If a mentally normal person who was a follower of Jesus experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus, there is at least a 60% chance that that person would experience a hallucination of the risen Jesus only that one time.
This is an application of the very general principle in premise (1E) concerning hallucinations in general to the more specific case at hand: in premise (B) we are talking about possible hallucinations of the risen Jesus experienced by mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus.
One might object that hallucinations of persons, or hallucinations of admired religious figures are special categories of hallucinations and that a very general principle about ALL hallucinations might not apply to these specific categories of hallucinations, or that the quantification that applies to hallucinations in general might be significantly off the mark in relation to these specific kinds of hallucinations (of persons or of admired religious figures). But my inclination is to view this inference as a reasonable inference, even though it is not a deductively valid inference. The conclusion does NOT follow with logical necessity, but I think it does follow as a reasonable inference.
Premise (2E) also has an implication, in Kreeft's view, that he leaves UNSTATED:
2E. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus at least three times.
Thus:
C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.
From premise (C) Kreeft can logically infer his desired conclusion, by a logically VALID inference called DENYING THE CONSEQUENT:
C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.
D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.
Therefore:
A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.
This is the CORE of the argument constituting Kreeft's Objection #5. Notice that both premises are UNSTATED premises and that the conclusion was also left UNSTATED by Kreeft. Thus, the entire core of Kreeft's argument here was only hinted at by the stated premises. (This example illustrates why presenting an argument concerned with historical claims about Jesus in just two brief sentences is IDIOTIC: such arguments are inevitably UNCLEAR.)
Also, note that the UNSTATED premise (D) is presumably being supported by the UNSTATED premise (B):
B. If a mentally normal person who was a follower of Jesus experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus, there is at least a 60% chance that that person would experience a hallucination of the risen Jesus only that one time.
Thus:
D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.
Now that we have uncovered the key UNSTATED premises and their logical relationships with the two stated premises, we can diagram the logical structure of the whole argument constituting Objection #5:
In the next post of this series, I will evaluate this argument.
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