Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 22: Objection #6: Surprising Words and Actions

 WHERE WE ARE

Peter Kreeft's fifth objection to the Hallucination Theory was given in two brief sentences. In Part 19 of this series of posts, I clarified the meanings of those two sentences, made explicit the UNSTATED conclusion of this argument, figured out the UNSTATED premises that form the core of the argument constituting Objection #5, and determined the logical structure of the argument. The core argument in Objection #5 is as follows:

C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

In Part 20 of this series, I showed that premise (C), a key premise in the argument constituting Peter Kreeft's Objection #5 against the Hallucination Theory, was not only DUBIOUS (because Kreeft failed to show it was true), but that this premise was in fact FALSE.

In Part 21 of this series, I have shown that Kreeft's argument in support of premise (D) is based on a DUBIOUS premise and on an INVALID inference from that DUBIOUS premise, so the argument supporting (D) is UNSOUND, and thus premise (D) is itself DUBIOUS.

The argument constituting Objection #5 against the Hallucination Theory is clearly a BAD argument, and therefore Objection #5 FAILS, just like Objection #1, Objection #2, Objection #3, and Objection #4 all FAILED:

It is time to take a look at Kreeft's Objection #6 (Surprising Words & Actions).

INITIAL ANALYSIS OF OBJECTION #6

Kreeft again presents a very brief and UNCLEAR argument constituting his sixth objection against the Hallucination Theory:

6. Hallucinations come from within, from what we already know, at least unconsciously. This one said and did surprising and unexpected things (Acts 1:4,9)—like a real person and unlike a dream. (HCA, p.187)

Once again Kreeft left the conclusion of the argument UNSTATED:

1. Hallucinations come from what we already know.

2. This one said and did surprising and unexpected things.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

Once again Kreeft leaves important premises UNSTATED, because the conclusion clearly does NOT FOLLOW logically from these two STATED premises.  Once again Kreeft uses the referring expression "This one" in premise (2) which is a reference back to the subject of premise (1): "Hallucinations".  Once again if we take premise (2) literally and straightforwardly it contradicts Kreeft's own view:

1. Hallucinations come from what we already know.

2A. Hallucinations of the risen Jesus experienced by some of his followers included Jesus saying and doing surprising and unexpected things for Jesus to say or do.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

If some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus, then that SUPPORTS the Hallucination Theory, which Kreeft is attempting to DISPROVE.  Once again, because Kreeft's argument is so UNCLEAR, it needs a good deal of clarification before we can properly evaluate the argument.

TOO SUBJECTIVE AND TOO VAGUE TO BE A REFUTATION

However, it is possible to make an important initial evaluation before clarifying the argument further.  Premise (2) is a key premise of this argument but it makes a claim that is both SUBJECTIVE and VAGUE.  The following two kinds of claims are hopelessly SUBJECTIVE and VAGUE:

It would be surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say X. 

It would be surprising and unexpected for Jesus to do X.

In general, claims like this about Jesus will be impossible to PROVE or DISPROVE with any significant degree of certainty.  One can give reasons for or against such claims, but they are too SUBJECTIVE and too VAGUE to be the sort of claim that can be a rational basis for a DISPROOF or REFUTATION of the Hallucination Theory. At best, Objection #6 can only provide a modest reason against the Hallucination Theory, and cannot possibly DISPROVE or REFUTE the Hallucination Theory.

THIS IS DANGEROUS TERRITORY FOR KREEFT

In this argument, Kreeft is stomping around on ground where angels fear to tread.  His argument here threatens a basic doctrine of Christian faith.

God is mysterious.  God is perfectly wise and all-knowing, according to Christian theology.  Are we finite and limited human beings capable of PREDICTING what God is going to say or do?  We are able to predict the words and actions of other ordinary human beings to some degree.  But even predicting the words and actions of ordinary people is a shaky and uncertain thing to do.  How much more uncertain and unreliable would the predictions of finite and imperfect humans be about an infinite and perfect person who is all-knowing? 

The problem of evil illustrates the difficulty of knowing what God will say or do.  A world in which there is predation, where preditor animals hunt, kill, and eat other animals does not seem like what a perfectly good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God would create.  A world in which there is pain, suffering and death does not seem like what a perfectly good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God would make.  A world in which there are viruses, bacteria, and parasites that cause sentient animals and human beings to suffer and die does not seem like a world that a perfectly good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God would create.  But this world is such a world, so if God exists and this world was created by God, then clearly God's ways are mysterious, and we limited and finite human beings cannot understand or predict what God will say and do.

But if Jesus was God incarnate, then any difficulty that we have in trying to PREDICT the words and actions of God apply equally to PREDICTING the words and actions of Jesus.  If God is a mystery, and if Jesus was God incarnate, then Jesus must be just as much a mystery to us as God.  If the words and actions of God are something that we limited and finite humans CANNOT PREDICT, then the words and actions of Jesus must also be something that we finite humans CANNOT PREDICT.   

If we humans can PREDICT what Jesus will say or do, then Jesus is presumably an ordinary human being and Jesus is NOT God incarnate.  But if we CANNOT PREDICT what Jesus will say or do, then nothing Jesus says or does can be "surprising and unexpected".  So, either Christianity is FALSE (for claiming that Jesus is God incarnate) or else it is not possible to determine whether Kreeft's premise (2) is TRUE.  

In confidently asserting premise (2) to be TRUE, Kreeft implies that the words and actions of Jesus can be PREDICTED by ordinary finite humans, and this strongly suggests that Jesus is an ordinary finite human being and that Jesus is NOT God incarnate. So, if this argument by Kreeft is successful, it will also cast doubt on a basic doctrine of the Christian faith: the belief that Jesus is God incarnate.

MAKING KREEFT'S UNSTATED PREMISES EXPLICIT

The first premise of Kreeft's argument FAILS to logically connect with the second premise, because the first premise talks about "from what we already know", but the second premise talks about what is "surprising and unexpected".  Clearly, Kreeft assumes that there is a connection between these two different concepts:

1. Hallucinations come from what we already know.

B. IF hallucinations come from what we already know, THEN in hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do. 

Thus:

C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.

The second premise of Kreeft's argument appears to contradict his own viewpoint:

2A. Hallucinations of the risen Jesus experienced by some of his followers included Jesus saying and doing surprising and unexpected things for Jesus to say or do.

This premise needs to be revised so that it does not contradict Kreeft's own view.  As with the previous argument constituting Objection #5, Kreeft intends to put forward a reduction-to-absurdity argument against the Hallucination Theory:

2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

Kreeft references a couple of verses from the book of Acts in support of this second premise, so there is an UNSTATED historical claim that he has in mind as support for the second premise:  

D. Some of Jesus' followers experienced alleged appearances of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do. (see Acts 1:4, 9)

Thus:

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say and do.

The core of the argument constituting Objection #6 is thus as follows:

 C. In hallucinations, we never experience someone saying or doing something that is surprising and unexpected for that person to say or do.

 2B. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some of Jesus' followers experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus in which Jesus said and did things that it was surprising and unexpected for Jesus to say or do.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

The logical structure of the whole argument constituting Objection #6 can now be diagramed:

Now that we have clarified and analyzed the argument constituting Kreeft's Objection #6 against the Hallucination Theory, we are in a position to rationally evaluate the argument, which I will begin to do in the next post of this series.