WHERE WE ARE
Here again, is Craig's sub-argument for the key premise (5c):
D. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative supernatural hypotheses.
B. The Resurrection Hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses.
C1. A hypothesis H is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses.
THEREFORE:
5c. The best explanation for Craig's three key established historical facts concerning Jesus' final fate is the Resurrection Hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
I have given up hope, at least for now, of trying to clarify the principle stated in premise (C1). Thus, I have given up hope, at least for now, of attempting to rationally evaluate whether (C1) is true or false, probable or improbable. Therefore, I am unable to conclude that this sub-argument for (5c) is sound.(Note: I could still determine it to be an unsound argument, if I can clarify one of the other premises and determine that one of the other premises is false or improbable or dubious).
In Part 18 of this series, I proposed that we narrow the scope of premise (C1) so that it only addresses the question of Jesus' final fate. In that case, I had an idea for how to reformulate (C1) to turn it into a plausible principle:
C2. A hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses that have been mentioned or discussed in books or articles published by Christian thinkers or scholars or by non-Christian or skeptical thinkers or scholars in this century or in the previous century.
However, on reflection, it now seems to me that the principle stated in (C2) is not correct and is not acceptable as it stands. This principle is too constrictive; the scope is too narrow for the principle to be plausible and acceptable.
WHY PREMISE (C2) IS TOO NARROW
I have studied the question of the resurrection of Jesus for a number of decades, and one problem that I have found repeatedly with the arguments of Christian apologists is that they frequently commit the STRAWMAN fallacy when they criticize alternative naturalistic hypotheses.
The way that they do this is by including a number of unnecessary details and complexities in their characterizations of naturalistic hypotheses about Jesus' final fate.
For example, when I recently outlined some of the naturalistic hypotheses considered by William Craig in Chapter 8 of Reasonable Faith, I revised his characterization of two of the naturalistic hypotheses because he included unnecessary details in his characterizations (see End Notes #4 and #5 in Part 17 of this series). The more details and the more complexities one includes in characterizations of a naturalistic hypothesis, the less likely it is that the naturalistic hypothesis (so described) will be true.
It might well be the case that Craig commits the Strawman fallacy unknowingly, and thus innocently, when he characterized these two naturalistic hypotheses:
- The Wrong Tomb Hypothesis (WTH)
- The Displaced Body Hypothesis (DBH)
In Craig's defense, he accurately described the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis as it was presented by Kirsopp Lake, and he accurately described the Displaced Body Hypothesis as it was presented by Joseph Klausner. Nevertheless, it is unfair of Craig to characterize these two theories in a way that includes unnecessary details.
Why would the proponents of these alternative naturalistic hypotheses have included unnecessary details? This error by Lake and by Klausner (and by Craig), is very natural and quite understandable. It is based on a common cognitive bias that we all have and that we all must consciously fight against, namely the Conjunction Fallacy:
Cognitive Biases: The Conjunction Fallacy
The Conjunction Fallacy: Where Intuition and Probability Collide
Another cognitive bias also appears to be at work here, namely the Availability Heuristic:
The characteristic of "vividness" is relevant to this problem with many characterizations of naturalistic hypotheses.
By including unnecessary details, a storyteller can make the description of an event more vivid, more easily imagined or pictured in the minds of people who hear or read the story. The vividness of a story often makes that story seem more plausible to the people who hear or read that story. However, it is simply a fact of probability that the more details are included in a description of an event, the less likely it is the case that the event actually occurred as described.
The reason that I cannot accept the principle stated in (C2) is that it is very common for alternative naturalistic hypotheses to be characterized UNFAIRLY, because naturalistic hypotheses are frequently characterized with the use of unnecessary details or unnecessary complexity. Therefore, in order to give alternative naturalistic hypotheses a fair treatment, we must often reformulate the descriptions or characterizations of these hypotheses in order to remove unnecessary details or unnecessary complexities, as I have already done with Craig's characterizations of two alternative naturalistic hypotheses.
A REFINEMENT OF PREMISE (C2)
In view of the above problems with the principle stated in premise (C2), I propose the following revision of that premise:
C3. A hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is the best explanation of a specific set of facts IF AND ONLY IF hypothesis H about Jesus' final fate is a more plausible explanation of that set of facts than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses and the alternative supernatural hypotheses that either (a) have been mentioned or discussed in books or articles published by Christian thinkers or scholars or by non-Christian or skeptical thinkers or scholars in this century or in the previous century or that (b) are versions of those naturalistic hypotheses in which unnecessary details or complexities have been removed.
CONCLUSION
I realize that this refined version of premise (C) is more complicated and detailed than the original version (C1) and than the more narrowly scoped premise (C2). But the additional details and complexity are, in my view, needed in order for this principle to be plausible and acceptable.
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