The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Habermas and Licona - Part 4: The Conclusion Revisited

CONCLUSION (C2) HAS A DIFFERENT MEANING THAN CONCLUSION (C3)

Although I got the ultimate conclusion of the case by Habermas and Licona right in  Part 2  of this series, there is an important distinction that I failed to make clear. I thought that Habermas and Licona were being sloppy and were using the following two claims interchangably, as if both claims had the same meaning:

C2: Jesus rose from the dead.

C3: God raised Jesus from the dead.

(C3) is indeed the ultimate conclusion of their case, for the reasons I gave in Part 2.  However, in later chapters of CRJ, Habermas and Licona make it clear that they understand that these two claims have different meanings.  

In fact, they make it clear that only (C2) can be established on the basis of historical evidence and reasoning (plus some scientific evidence and reasoning), but that (C3) cannot be established only on the basis of historical and scientific evidence.  Philosophical arguments are required to establish claims about God's involvement in human affairs, including in the alleged resurrection of Jesus.

There are at least four passages in CRJ where Habemas and Licona make or imply the distinction between (C2) and (C3).  Here is such a passage from Chapter 8 of CRJ:

...while science cannot measure God's activity, there is no reason why we cannot consider non-supernatural portions of claims concerning the Resurrection.  For example, did Jesus die? Was he seen alive at some later time? The scientist or historian could evaluate the conclusion: "Jesus was seen alive after his death."  However, in his capacity as a scientist or historian, he perhaps could not draw the conclusion: "God raised Jesus from the dead," since he is unable to detect God's actions with the tools of his trade.

...On the other hand, the philosopher or theologian can argue that God raised Jesus based on other well-founded data (see pp. 174-81). (CRJ, page 135)

This suggests that while the conclusion (C2) can be established on the basis of historical and scientific arguments, the conclusion (C3) cannot be established only on the basis of such arguments, and that philosophical arguments are required in order to establish (C3).

This point is further confirmed by a passage in Chapter 12 of CRJ:

Can the historian establish that it was God who raised Jesus? The historian can conclude that Jesus rose from the dead. But the historian cannot conclude from historical inquiry alone that God raised Jesus from the dead. ...historical inquiry alone cannot answer the question of the cause of Jesus' resurrection. It can only address whether the event occurred. (CRJ, page 183)

The conclusion section of CJR also includes a comment that implies this distinction between the meaning of (C2) and the meaning of (C3):

...the complete inability of opposing theories to account for the data leaves Jesus' resurrection as the only plausible explanation to account for the known historical facts. And it seems that if Jesus rose from the dead, we have good evidence that God exists and has actually revealed himself to mankind in Jesus Christ.  (CRJ, page 214, emphasis added)

In saying that (C2) provides some "good evidence that God exists", Habermas and Licona imply that (C2) does not assume that God exists, but obviously (C3), the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead does assume that God exists.  If (C2) assumed that God exists, it would beg the question to use (C2) as evidence that God exists.  Clearly, Habermas and Licona understand that (C2) has a different meaning than (C3) and that these two claims have different implications.

There is a passage in the Appendix of CRJ that confirms the distinction between the claim (C2) and the claim (C3):

D. Other Challenges

1. Jesus' resurrection does not prove the existence of God. (p. 182)

 a. The question has become who raised Jesus or how was he raised; not whether the Resurrection occurred. (CRJ, page 243)

The distinction between the question of "whether the Resurrection occurred" and the question of "who raised Jesus" implies the distinction between the claim "Jesus rose from the dead" (which answers the question of whether the resurrection occurred) and the claim "God raised Jesus from the dead" (which answers the question of who raised Jesus).

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN (C2) and (C3)?

Because Habermas and Licona recognize that (C2) and (C3) have different meanings and different implications, and because they believe that only (C2) can be established on the basis of historical and scientific arguments, while (C3) requires support from philosophical arguments, we need to distinguish two phases of their case, whether they formulate their case in two phases or not:

Phase 1:  Did Jesus rise from the dead?  

Answered in terms of only historical and scientific arguments.

Phase 2: Did God raise Jesus from the dead? 

Answered in terms of philosophical arguments, at least in part.

It makes no sense to investigate the question of how Jesus rose from the dead until one first determines whether Jesus rose from the dead.  If one concludes that Jesus did NOT rise from the dead, then one may reasonably skip the Phase 2 question about whether God caused that alleged event to happen. 

The logical order is thus to first investigate the question of whether Jesus rose from the dead, and then investigate the question of whether God raised Jesus from the dead.  Similarly, we should analyze and evaluate the case by Habermas and Licona in terms of the above two phases, and in that order.