Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 21: Evaluation of Another Key Premise of Objection #5

 WHERE WE ARE

In Part 20 of this series, I showed that premise (C), a key premise in the argument constituting Peter Kreeft's Objection #5 against the Hallucination Theory, was not only DUBIOUS (because Kreeft failed to show it was true), but that this premise was in fact FALSE.  Thus, Objection #5 (Returned Many Times) FAILS, just like Objection #4, Objection #3, Objection #2, and Objection #1 all FAILED.

Before I move on to examine more of Kreeft's objections against the Hallucination Theory, I will examine the other key premise of Objection #5 and evaluate that premise.  Here is the core argument in Objection #5:

C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

I have already shown that this argument is UNSOUND because premise (C) is FALSE.  But there are also problems with the other key premise in this core argument, premise (D). 

IS PREMISE (D) TRUE? 

Based on my previous analysis of the argument constituting Objection #5, the argument includes support for premise (D):

1E. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 60% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.

Thus:

B. If a mentally normal person who was a follower of Jesus experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus, there is at least a 60% chance that that person would experience a hallucination of the risen Jesus only that one time. 

Thus:

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

Kreeft, following the horrible example of Josh McDowell, provides NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER in support of the empirical generalization in premise (1E).  Since Kreeft has no expertise in the field of psychology, the fact that Kreeft asserts and believes that premise (1E) is true provides no reason at all for anyone else to believe this empirical generalization.  So, premise (1E) is DUBIOUS, and since premise (B) is supported by (1E), premise (B) is also DUBIOUS.  Premise (D) is DUBIOUS because the only reason that Kreeft's argument gives in support of (D) is premise (B) which is a DUBIOUS claim.  

But there is another problem with this argument supporting premise (D).  Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant premise (B), this does not show that premise (D) is true.

First of all, premise (B) asserts a fairly weak correlation between being a mentally normal follower of Jesus who has a hallucination of the risen Jesus and having only one such hallucination. Premise (B) would be true even if 40% of mentally normal followers of Jesus who had a hallucination of the risen Jesus had three or more hallucinations of the risen Jesus. 

Suppose that ten of Jesus' apostles were mentally normal and that each of them experienced at least one hallucination of the risen Jesus.  Suppose that six of the ten apostles experienced only one hallucination of the risen Jesus, but four of those ten apostles each experienced at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  In that case, 60% of the ten apostles would have experienced only one hallucination of the risen Jesus and 40% of the ten apostles would have experienced three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  In scenario premise (B) could be completely correct, and yet premise (D) would be FALSE, because the four apostles who each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus would make it TRUE that "some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each experienced at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus."

Clearly, premise (D) does NOT follow logically from premise (B).  The inference here is logically INVALID, and so the sub-argument supporting premise (D) is based on an illogical inference.  

The main problem with this inference is that (B) leaves open the possibility that 40% of mentally normal followers of Jesus who experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus could each experience three or more hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  The conclusion, however, is NOT stated in terms of a percentage; the key quantifier in (D) is the word "some", which would be correct if just two or three mentally normal followers of Jesus each experienced three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.

That means the more mentally normal followers of Jesus there were who experienced at least one hallucination of the risen Jesus, the more likely it is that at least two or three of these people each experienced three such hallucinations.  More specifically, if ten or more mentally normal followers of Jesus each experienced at least one hallucination of the risen Jesus, then (B) would be completely compatible with it being the case that two or three of those people experienced three hallucinations of the risen Jesus, and in that case (D) would be FALSE even if (B) were true.

I have not shown that premise (D) is FALSE, but I have shown that it is based on a DUBIOUS premise (B), and that it also does NOT follow logically from premise (B).  So, Kreeft's argument in support of (D) is clearly an UNSOUND argument, so premise (D) itself remains DUBIOUS.

WHAT IF KREEFT MEANT "AT LEAST A 70% CHANCE"?

In Kreeft's UNCLEAR statement of the argument constituting Objection #5, he used the VAGUE quantifier "usually":

1. Hallucinations usually happen only once, except to the insane.

I have clarified this premise and interpreted "usually" as meaning "at least a 60% chance":

1E. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 60% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.

Someone might object that Kreeft might have intended to make a stronger claim than (1E).  Let's increase the chances of a hallucination happening just one time to 70%, and see if that allows Kreeft to show that premise (D) is true:

1F. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 70% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.

Thus: 

B1. If a mentally normal person who was a follower of Jesus experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus, there is at least a 70% chance that that person would experience a hallucination of the risen Jesus only that one time. 

 Thus:

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

The same objections that I raised above apply to this enhanced version of Kreeft's argument. As with the previous version, Kreeft provides NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER in support of premise (1F).  So, premise (B1) is just as DUBIOUS as premise (B).  Furthermore, premise (D) does NOT FOLLOW from premise (B1), just like it did not follow from premise (B).

Suppose that ten of Jesus' apostles were mentally normal and that each of them experienced at least one hallucination of the risen Jesus.  Suppose that seven of the ten apostles experienced only one hallucination of the risen Jesus, but three of those ten apostles each experienced at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  In that case, 70% of the ten apostles would have experienced only one hallucination of the risen Jesus and 30% of the ten apostles would have experienced three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  In this scenario premise (B) could be completely correct, and yet premise (D) would be FALSE because the three apostles who each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus would make it TRUE that "some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each experienced at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus."

The same objection still works even if we increase the chances of having a hallucination only one time to "at least 80%."  

Only if we increase the chances of having a hallucination only one time up to "at least 90%" does it begin to be somewhat unlikely that two or more out of ten apostles would experience at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  A claim that strong, however, seems rather implausible, and clearly goes beyond what is suggested by the vague quantifier "usually".

EVALUATION OF OBJECTION #5

The core argument in Objection #5 is as follows:

C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

I have shown that premise (C) is FALSE, so this argument is UNSOUND.  I have also shown that Kreeft's argument in support of premise (D) is based on a DUBIOUS premise and on an INVALID inference from that DUBIOUS premise, so the argument supporting (D) is UNSOUND, and thus premise (D) is itself DUBIOUS.

The argument constituting Objection #5 against the Hallucination Theory is clearly a BAD argument, and therefore Objection #5 FAILS, just like Objection #4, Objection #3, Objection #2, and Objection #1 all FAILED.

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 20: Evaluation of Objection #5

WHERE WE ARE

Peter Kreeft's fifth objection to the Hallucination Theory was given in two brief sentences.  In Part 19 of this series of posts, I clarified the meanings of those two sentences, made explicit the UNSTATED conclusion of this argument, figured out the UNSTATED premises that form the core of the argument constituting Objection #5, and determined the logical structure of the argument:

Based on my analysis of this argument, here is the core of the argument, which consists entirely of claims that Kreeft left UNSTATED:

C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

Kreeft is attempting a reduction-to-absurdity argument against the Hallucination Theory.  He is arguing that the Hallucination Theory, in combination with an alleged historical fact, has an implication that is false or extremely improbable.  The implication that Kreeft thinks is false or extremely improbable is this:

Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus.

Premise (D) denies this alleged implication of the Hallucination Theory.

The logic of the core argument is deductively VALID, so the main questions at issue are:

Is premise (C) true?

Is premise (D) true?

I will argue that premise (C) is FALSE, and that premise (D) is DUBIOUS because Kreeft has failed to provide us with a good reason to believe that premise (D) is true.

 

IS PREMISE (C) TRUE?

Here is Kreeft's argument in support of premise (C):

2E. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus at least three times. 

Thus:

C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus. 

Kreeft refers to, but does not bother to quote, two NT passages in support of the historical claim made in premise (2E).  One of the passages is a single verse from the book of Acts:

After his suffering he presented himself alive to them ["the apostles whom he had chosen"] by many convincing proofs, appearing to them during forty days and speaking about the kingdom of God. 

(Acts 1:3, NRSV) 

Who are "the apostles whom he [Jesus] had chosen"?  The Gospel of Luke spells out what this means, and the book of Acts is a companion volume written by the person who wrote the Gospel of Luke, so the clarification of this phrase in Luke applies to the use of this phrase in Acts:

12 Now during those days he [Jesus] went out to the mountain to pray; and he spent the night in prayer to God. 

 13 And when day came, he called his disciples and chose twelve of them, whom he also named apostles: 

14 Simon, whom he named Peter, and his brother Andrew, and James, and John, and Philip, and Bartholomew, 

 15 and Matthew, and Thomas, and James son of Alphaeus, and Simon, who was called the Zealot, 

 16 and Judas son of James, and Judas Iscariot, who became a traitor.

(Luke 6:12-16, NRSV)

So, when Acts refers to "the apostles whom he had chosen" it is talking about the twelve apostles who are listed in Luke 6:14-16, who had become eleven apostles after the crucifixion of Jesus since Judas Iscariot had betrayed Jesus and left the inner-circle of Jesus' followers.

But Acts 1:3 might be fiction, or it might be a questionable story that the author of Acts heard from some early Christian believers.  In any case, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Acts 1:3 provides reliable and accurate historical information, it does NOT show that ANY of the apostles had "at least three different experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus".  Nor does it show that the eleven apostles were all "mentally normal" people.  

For example, suppose that Peter and John each had two experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus over the course of the forty-day period and that the other nine apostles each had just one experience of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus during the forty-day period.  In that case, the historical claim asserted in Acts 1:3 would be true, but it would be the case that NONE of the eleven apostles had "at least three different experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus".  Thus, even if we very generously granted the questionable assumption that Acts 1:3 provides accurate historical information, Kreeft's historical claim in (2E) might well be FALSE.

Kreeft also points to stories about alleged appearances of the risen Jesus in Chapters 20 and 21 of the Gospel of John.  In the first appearance story, ten of the remaining eleven apostles are present (Thomas is missing), and then there is a second appearance story that supposedly takes place a week later (John 20:26), and in that story all eleven remaining apostles are present.  

So, according to the Gospel of John, ten of Jesus' apostles each had at least two different experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus.  But Kreeft's claim is that some of the followers of Jesus had "at least three different experiences of an alleged appearance of Jesus".  So, the two appearance stories in Chapter 20 of John are insufficient evidence to establish Kreeft's historical claim.

However, in Chapter 21 there is a third story about an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus to some of his followers.  This event supposedly took place in Galilee (as opposed to the appearance stories in Chapter 20 of John, which took place in Jerusalem):

1 After these things Jesus showed himself again to the disciples by the Sea of Tiberias; and he showed himself in this way. 

2 Gathered there together were Simon Peter, Thomas called the Twin, Nathanael of Cana in Galilee, the sons of Zebedee, and two others of his disciples. 

3 Simon Peter said to them, “I am going fishing.” They said to him, “We will go with you.” They went out and got into the boat, but that night they caught nothing.

4 Just after daybreak, Jesus stood on the beach; but the disciples did not know that it was Jesus. 

5 Jesus said to them, “Children, you have no fish, have you?” They answered him, “No.” 

6 He said to them, “Cast the net to the right side of the boat, and you will find some.” So they cast it, and now they were not able to haul it in because there were so many fish. 

(John 21:1-6, NRSV)

According to this story Peter, Thomas, Nathanael, the sons of Zebedee (John and James), and two unnamed disciples had an experience of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus in Galilee (the "Sea of Tiberias" is the Sea of Galilee).

Since two of the disciples are left unnamed, we don't know whether they were part of the eleven remaining apostles or just other followers of Jesus.  Thomas is one of the eleven apostles, but he was not present at the first alleged appearance of Jesus to his disciples in Jerusalem.  That means that Thomas was only present for two of the three alleged appearances of Jesus to his disciples found in Chapters 20 and 21 of the Gospel of John.  So, the appearance stories in the Gospel of John do NOT show that Thomas had "at least three experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus".

Nathaniel is NOT listed as one of the twelve apostles in any of the four lists of Apostles found in the NT.  Starting about the 9th century, Christians have frequently thought that Nathaniel was the same person as Bartholomew, who is listed in Matthew, Mark, Luke, and Acts as one of the twelve apostles.  However, there is no good reason to believe that Nathaniel is the same person as Bartholomew. Here is what John Meier, a leading Jesus scholar, says about this question:

Unless one adopts the erroneous notion that John's Gospel thought of most disciples as members of the Twelve (hardly a central group for the Fourth Gospel), there is no basis for such an identification.

(A Marginal Jew, Volume III: Comanions and Competitors, p.200)

Because there is no good reason to believe that Nathaniel is the same person as Bartholomew, the Gospel of John does NOT imply that Nathaniel had "at least three different experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus."

If we assume that ALL THREE stories in John about alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples are historically reliable and accurate accounts of actual events, then Chapters 20 and 21 would show that the following three apostles had "at least three different experiences of an alleged appearance of Jesus":

• Simon Peter
• John the son of Zebedee
• James the son of Zebedee

However, there are at least two serious problems with this evidence from Chapters 20 and 21 of the Gospel of John.  

First, the Gospel of John provides a HISTORICALLY UNRELIABLE account of the life, ministry, and death of Jesus.  Kreeft has offered evidence from a Gospel that most Jesus scholars view as HISTORICALLY UNRELIABLE.  So, we have very good reason to doubt that ALL THREE of these stories about alleged appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples are true and accurate accounts of actual events.  It is likely that at least one of these three stories is fictional or contains some serious inaccuracy, so Kreeft's evidence here is very weak, at best.

Second, there is very good reason to reject the two Jerusalem-appearance stories in Chapter 20 of the Gospel of John as FICTIONAL stories about events that did not actually take place.  The earliest of the four Gospels is the Gospel of Mark, and both Matthew and Luke use Mark as a primary source of information about the life, ministry, and death of Jesus.  So, if Mark is UNRELIABLE, then so are Matthew and Luke, which would pretty much eliminate all hope of Kreeft being able to "prove" that Jesus rose from the dead.  Thus, when an account of an event in Matthew, Luke, or John is in conflict with an account of that event (or other events) in Mark, Mark's account should be given preference over the conflicting account(s) in other Gospels, other things being equal.  

But Mark's Gospel clearly implies that Jesus left Jerusalem and headed to Galilee early on Sunday morning and that the FIRST TIME any of Jesus' disciples experienced an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus that event took place in Galilee.  Since it would take several days for his disciples to walk back to Galilee from Jerusalem, the Gospel of Mark clearly implies that the FIRST TIME any of Jesus' disciples experienced an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus that event took place in Galilee about a week or more after Jesus was crucified.

But if the FIRST TIME that any of Jesus' disciples experienced an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus was in Galilee a week or more after the crucifixion, then the appearance stories in Chapter 20 of the Gospel of John are FICTIONAL stories about events that did not actually.  According to those stories in the Gospel of John the FIRST TIME Jesus' disciples experienced an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus that event took place on the first Easter Sunday in Jerusalem, about 48 hours after Jesus had been crucified.  There is no way to reconcile the stories in Chapter 20 of John with the Gospel of Mark.  So, we have to choose between the earliest Gospel (Mark) and the latest and MOST UNRELIABLE Gospel (John).  Clearly, it is more likely that Mark's account is correct than John's, so it is probable that John's account is FICTIONAL.  Thus, we have good reason to doubt the Jerusalem-appearance stories found in Chapter 20 of John.

The MOST that we can reasonably infer from the Gospel of John, is that the story of the alleged appearance of the risen Jesus found in Chapter 21 of John has a significant chance of being based on an actual event and that IF this story is also accurate, then Peter, John, and James each had at least ONE experience of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus in Galilee, about a week or more after the crucifixion of Jesus.  But this falls far short of establishing Kreeft's historical claim in premise (2E) that some followers of Jesus had "at least three different experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus."  Kreeft's evidence FAILS to show that premise (2E) is true, so that premise remains DUBIOUS.

Premise (C) is based upon premise (2E), so because Kreeft has FAILED to show that (2E) is true, he has also FAILED to show that premise (C) is true.  Thus, premise (C) remains DUBIOUS.  

However, there are other problems with premise (C), problems that show this claim to be not just DUBIOUS, but FALSE.

Kreeft makes at least two incorrect assumptions in premise (C).  First, he incorrectly assumes that the Hallucination Theory implies that 

ALL experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus by early followers of Jesus were HALLUCINATIONS.  

This is NOT what the Hallucination Theory implies.  At most, some versions of the Hallucination Theory imply that some experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus were hallucinations, namely the experience or experiences that were the primary cause of the initial belief among Jesus' early followers that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.  This could have been just ONE such experience had by just ONE person.  

Suppose that Peter had ONE hallucination of the risen Jesus, and this hallucination gave Peter a very strong conviction that Jesus had risen physically from the dead.  Then suppose that Peter preached this and persuaded some or all of the other apostles that Jesus had physically risen from the dead, and they too began to incorporate this belief into their teaching and preaching.  Some of the other apostles may have, at a later point in time, had dreams or visions about the risen Jesus that were brought about because of the belief in the resurrection of Jesus that Peter had inspired in them.  

In this case, it doesn't matter whether the later experiences of the other apostles and other believers were hallucinations or not.  What matters is that the primary cause of the origin of this belief among early Christians was one hallucination of the risen Jesus that was experienced by just one person: Peter.  In this scenario, the Hallucination Theory would be TRUE, even though just ONE apostle had just ONE hallucination of the risen Jesus, and nobody else had a hallucination of the risen Jesus.

Second, Kreeft mistakenly assumes that the Hallucination Theory requires that:

 SOME early followers of Jesus had HALLUCINATIONS of the risen Jesus.  

This would be the case only with some versions of the Hallucination Theory, but not the case with other versions of the Hallucination Theory.  Kreeft has a very narrow understanding of the Hallucination Theory.  The view that the early Christian belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus came about because some early followers of Jesus had HALLUCINATIONS of the risen Jesus is just one version of the Hallucination Theory.  There are other versions of this theory that Kreeft must also refute in order to be in a position to make a case for the resurrection of Jesus.  Refuting only one version of the Hallucination Theory might well leave other versions of the theory UNTOUCHED and UNREFUTED.  

Part of the problem is that the title "Hallucination Theory" is misleading.  A better name for this theory would be the "Non-Veridical Experiences" theory.  Another kind of non-veridical experience is DREAMS.  Some early followers of Jesus might have had DREAMS about the risen Jesus, and either mistakenly thought those DREAMS were ordinary sensory experiences or that the DREAMS were sent by God and thus the contents of the DREAMS were as reliable as ordinary sensory experiences (or even more reliable than ordinary experiences).  

If such DREAMS were the primary cause of the origin of the early Christian belief that Jesus had physically risen from the dead, then the Hallucination Theory would be true, even though the belief in the resurrection was formed on the basis of dream experiences and NOT on the basis of hallucinations.  Thus, it is possible for the Hallucination Theory to be true, even if there were ZERO early Christians or disciples of Jesus who experienced hallucinations of the risen Jesus.

In conclusion, there are at least two different ways that (2E) could be true, and the Hallucination Theory could also be true, and yet it would NOT be the case that: 

...some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus. 

First, the followers of Jesus who "each had at least three different experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus" might not have experienced ANY hallucinations, because the Hallucination Theory can be true even if no follower of Jesus ever had a hallucination of the risen Jesus.  

Second, the Hallucination Theory can be true because one or two of the apostles each had just one or two hallucinations of the risen Jesus.  In that case, the fact that other followers of Jesus each had three or more "experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus" does NOT require one who accepts the Hallucination Theory to view those experiences had by other followers to be hallucinations.  So long as the one or two hallucinations of the risen Jesus experienced by one or two of the apostles was the primary cause of the development of the early Christian belief that Jesus had risen from the dead.

Thus, there are plausible scenarios in which premise (2E) would be true and the Hallucination Theory would also be true, but where it was NOT the case that "some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three different hallucinations of the risen Jesus".  In other words, there are various COUNTEREXAMPLES to premise (C), and those COUNTEREXAMPLES show that premise (C) is FALSE.

EVALUATION OF PREMISE (C)

The NT passages that Kreeft provides in support of premise (2E) FAIL to establish that (2E) is true.  So, premise (2E) is DUBIOUS.  Because Kreeft's argument gives (2E) as the only reason in support of premise (C), premise (C) is also DUBIOUS.

However, Kreeft makes some FALSE ASSUMPTIONS about the Hallucination Theory, and once we reject those FALSE ASSUMPTIONS, it becomes clear that there are various plausible scenarios that constitute COUNTEREXAMPLES to premise (C). Therefore, premise (C) is not only DUBIOUS, it is FALSE. Therefore, Kreeft's Objection #5 FAILS, just like Objection #4, Objection #3, Objection #2, and Objection #1 all FAIL.  

Notice a pattern here?  The fact that ALL of the first five objections in Kreeft's collection of fourteen objections FAIL, is an indication that Kreeft has very little ability to discern whether an argument is good or bad, or else he just doesn't give a damn about the quality of his arguments for the resurrection of Jesus.  

In the next post in this series, I will continue my evaluation of Objection #5 by evaluating premise (D), the other key premise of the argument constituting Objection #5.

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 19: Objection #5: Returned Many Times

 WHERE WE ARE

So far, I have shown that four of Peter Kreeft's fourteen objections against the Hallucination Theory FAIL:

It is now time to examine Kreeft's fifth objection.

OBJECTION #5: RETURNED MANY TIMES

Kreeft states his 5th objection against the Hallucination Theory in just two brief sentences:

Hallucinations usually happen only once, except to the insane.  This one returned many times, to ordinary people (John 20:19-21:14; Acts 1:3).  (HCA, p.187)

Kreeft does not provide a conclusion to his argument, but the context here is that he is trying to refute the Hallucination Theory, so it is obvious what the conclusion of this argument should be:

1. Hallucinations usually happen only once, except to the insane.

2. This one returned many times, to ordinary people.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

Before we attempt to evaluate this argument, we need to clarify the meanings of the premises.

CLARIFICATION OF PREMISE (1)

Premise (1) has at least two UNCLEAR words that need to be clarified:  "usually" and "insane".

The word "usually" is unclear because it is a VAGUE QUANTIFICATION.  Ideally, we would interpret this word with some quantification that was a bit more precise. The word "usually" is close in meaning to the word "most", so we could interpret premise (1) this way:

1A. Most hallucinations happen only once, except to the insane.

The word "most" can reasonably be understood to mean "at least 51% of".  So, if claim (1A) is an accurate interpretation of Kreeft's claim in premise (1), then we could make this premise a bit more precise:

1B. At least 51% of hallucinations happen only once, except to the insane.

Claim (1B) is a fairly weak claim, and it probably will not be strong enough to allow Kreeft to establish the strong conclusion that the Hallucination Theory is FALSE.  One could argue that the word "usually" is a bit stronger quantifier than the word "most".  So, let's bump up the percentage a bit more:

1C.  At least 60% of hallucinations happen only once, except to the insane.

Granted that this is a more precise claim than premise (1) which uses the VAGUE QUANTIFIER "usually", but this is a reasonable interpretation of the word "usually" and I have been generous to Kreeft by bumping the percentage up above 51% (which corresponds to the closely related quantifier "most").

What does Kreeft mean by "the insane"?  Clearly, he is referring to some serious kinds of mental illness.  But we can make this a bit more precise by specifying the causal relationship with hallucinations that Kreeft, no doubt, had in mind:

A person X is INSANE if and only if: person X has a serious mental illness that causes person X to have hallucinations or that makes it likely that person X will have hallucinations.

This definition is problematic, however, because many people who have a serious mental illness that causes them to have hallucinations, or that makes it likely that they will have hallucinations, are NOT insane.  That is to say, many people with such a serious mental illness nevertheless manage to live normal or fairly normal lives, and do not require being locked away in a mental institution.  So, it seems inappropriate and insulting and inaccurate to say that ALL people with such serious mental illnesses are "insane".

However, we could define a positive category of "mentally normal" people that requires the absence of such a serious mental illness:

A person X is MENTALLY NORMAL if and only if: person X does NOT have a serious mental illness that causes person X to have hallucinations or that makes it likely that person X will have hallucinations.

This would imply that people who have a serious mental illness that causes them to have hallucinations or that makes them likely to have hallucinations are NOT "mentally normal", but that does seem appropriate and accurate, and is far less negative than saying that ALL such people are "insane".

Here then is a nicely clarified version of premise (1):

1D. At least 60% of hallucinations experienced by mentally normal people will happen only once.

Kreeft, following in the footsteps of Josh McDowell, provides absolutely NO EVIDENCE whatsoever in support of this generalization about hallucinations.  So, one obvious problem with this argument is that this key empirical claim is simply asserted and not supported with any relevant evidence.  Since Kreeft is NOT an expert in the field of psychology, the fact that he believes and asserts premise (1D) does not provide any reason for us to accept this claim.  Premise (1D) is therefore DUBIOUS.

I have one more clarification to make to this premise.  My understanding of premise (1D) is that it is intended to be applicable to individuals.  So, if James is a mentally normal person, and if James has a hallucination of a 6-foot tall talking rabbit, then premise (1D) allows us to infer that there is at least a 60% chance that James will NOT have another hallucination of a 6-foot tall talking rabbit.  

Given this understanding of the implications of (1D), I think it is misleading to state the generalization here simply in terms of a percentage of hallucinations.  This generalization is intended to apply to individual mentally normal people, and not just to various hallucinations in a large collection of hallucinations experienced by various mentally normal people.

• Suppose that you have identified a group of 100 mentally normal people who have experienced various hallucinations.  
• Suppose that two of those people have each experienced 300 different hallucinations (for a total of 600 different hallucinations between those two people) and that all of those hallucinations were experienced only once.  
• Suppose that 90 of the remaining mentally normal people each experienced 4 different hallucinations (for a total of 360 different hallucinations) and each of those 4 hallucinations was experienced twice by the person who had those hallucinations.  
• Suppose that the 8 remaining mentally normal people each had 5 different hallucinations (for a total of 40 different hallucinations) and each of those 5 hallucinations was experienced three times by the person who had those hallucinations.   

In this scenario, the breakdown of hallucinations among the 100 mentally normal people who have experienced hallucinations is as follows:

• 600 hallucinations out of 1,000 different hallucinations occurred only once
• 400 hallucinations out of 1,000 different hallucinations occurred more than once

So, the hallucinations experienced by this group of 100 mentally normal people appear to fit with the generalization in premise (1D), because 60% of the hallucinations experienced by this group of people occurred only once.  

However, the 60% ratio does NOT, in this scenario, apply to any individual mentally normal person in this group:

• For two people in the group, 100% of their hallucinations are experienced only once.
• For ninety people in the group, 100% of their hallucinations are experienced twice.
• For eight people in the group, 100% of their hallucinations are experienced three times.

There is not a single individual in this group of 100 mentally normal people for whom it is true that about 60% of their hallucinations occur only one time.  But that, it seems to me, is completely contrary to the intended implications of premise (1D).

So, the misleading focus on the percentage of hallucinations needs to be changed so that the 60% chance of a hallucination happening only one time applies to individual people:

1E. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 60% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.

CLARIFICATION OF PREMISE (2)

Here is the initial version of premise (2) of the argument constituting Objection #5:

2. This one returned many times, to ordinary people.

This premise consists of three phrases, and each one of those phrases is UNCLEAR:

• This one
• returned many times to
• ordinary people

The phrase "This one" is a referring phrase, and it is referring back to something mentioned in premise (1).  It is clearly a reference to the main thing mentioned in the subject of premise (1): hallucinations.  So, we can get rid of the referring expression "one" to clarify premise (2):

2A. This hallucination returned many times to ordinary people.

However, the phrase "This hallucination" is still a referring phrase.  We need to eliminate the word "this" by figuring out the specific hallucination or kind of hallucination that Kreeft has in mind here.  Kreeft supports premise (2) with some NT passages about people having experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus.  Clearly, it is hallucinations of the risen Jesus that Kreeft has in mind, so we can eliminate the word "this" to clarify premise (2) further:

2B. Hallucinations of the risen Jesus returned many times to ordinary people.

The phrase "returned many times to" is ambiguous between two different possible meanings:

were on many occasions experienced by different  

OR

were experienced many times by some

On the first interpretation, each person who experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus may well have had this experience ONLY ONCE.  But Kreeft intends for there to be a sort of conflict or tension between premise (2) and premise (1), and on the first interpretation, there would be no conflict or tension between these two premises.  So, in order to capture the intended conflict between premise (1) and premise (2), we must interpret the phrase "returned many times" to be about particular individuals each having multiple hallucinations of the risen Jesus:

2C. Hallucinations of the risen Jesus were experienced many times by some ordinary people.

Furthermore, the NT passages that Kreeft provides in support of premise (2) indicate that some individual disciples of Jesus each had at least three different experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus. This confirms the interpretation above in claim (2C).  This also indicates a way to make the VAGUE QUANTIFICATION "many times" more precise:  "at least three times".

The phrase "ordinary people" is clearly intended to contrast with "the insane" mentioned in premise (1).  But as I argued when clarifying premise (1), the relevant distinction is between people who are "mentally normal" and other people who are NOT "mentally normal".  So, in order for there to be a clear logical connection between premise (1) and premise (2), we need to interpret the phrase "ordinary people" to mean "mentally normal" people.  Also, these people were not just any people, they were followers of Jesus:

2D. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus at least three times.

Now we can state a significantly clarified version of Kreeft's argument constituting his Objection #5 against the Hallucination Theory:

1E. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 60% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.

2D. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus at least three times.

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

With this clarified version of Kreeft's argument, it becomes clear that the conclusion does NOT FOLLOW logically from his two premises.  In fact, premise (2D) contradicts the conclusion!  So this argument is WORSE than being a non-sequitur.  Kreeft has put forward a premise that implies that his own conclusion is FALSE, and that supports the view that the Hallucination Theory is TRUE!

But this is not a decisive or deadly flaw with Kreeft's argument, because what this actually indicates is that premise (2) of Kreeft's argument should NOT be understood in a literal and straightforward way.  We need to formulate an interpretation of premise (2) that has a significantly different meaning than this literal and straightforward interpretation.

Kreeft was thinking in terms of the implications of the Hallucination Theory.  He was trying to show that the Hallucination Theory has an implication that is false or absurd or extremely improbable.  He is attempting to reduce the Hallucination Theory to absurdity.  So, what Kreeft had intended to claim in premise (2) is NOT a claim about hallucinations of the risen Jesus, but a claim about experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus:

2E. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus at least three times. 

Kreeft's intention was to use this historical claim, a claim which he accepts--and which he would support with the NT passages that he referenced in his statement of premise (2)--in conjunction with the Hallucination Theory in order to infer an implication that he believes to be absurd or at least extremely improbable.

CLARIFICATION OF THE LOGIC OF THE ARGUMENT CONSTITUTING OBJECTION #5

We now have a clear idea of what the explicit claims or premises of Kreeft's argument mean.  However, the logic of this argument is still UNCLEAR, and this is because there are some important premises or claims that Kreeft left UNSTATED.  I will now make those UNSTATED premises explicit:

1E. Whenever a mentally normal person experiences a hallucination, there is at least a 60% chance that that person will experience that hallucination only that one time.

Thus:

B. If a mentally normal person who was a follower of Jesus experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus, there is at least a 60% chance that that person would experience a hallucination of the risen Jesus only that one time. 

This is an application of the very general principle in premise (1E) concerning hallucinations in general to the more specific case at hand: in premise (B) we are talking about possible hallucinations of the risen Jesus experienced by mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus.

One might object that hallucinations of persons, or hallucinations of admired religious figures are special categories of hallucinations and that a very general principle about ALL hallucinations might not apply to these specific categories of hallucinations, or that the quantification that applies to hallucinations in general might be significantly off the mark in relation to these specific kinds of hallucinations (of persons or of admired religious figures). But my inclination is to view this inference as a reasonable inference, even though it is not a deductively valid inference.  The conclusion does NOT follow with logical necessity, but I think it does follow as a reasonable inference.

Premise (2E) also has an implication, in Kreeft's view, that he leaves UNSTATED:

2E. Some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus at least three times. 

Thus:

C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus. 

In other words, it appears that Kreeft understands the Hallucination Theory to have a significant implication when combined with the historical claim in premise (2E).  That implication is that "at least three different hallucinations of the risen Jesus were experienced by some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus."

From premise (C) Kreeft can logically infer his desired conclusion, by a logically VALID inference called DENYING THE CONSEQUENT:

C. IF the Hallucination Theory were true, THEN some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus. 

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus. 

Therefore:

A. The Hallucination Theory is FALSE.

This is the CORE of the argument constituting Kreeft's Objection #5.  Notice that both premises are UNSTATED premises and that the conclusion was also left UNSTATED by Kreeft. Thus, the entire core of Kreeft's argument here was only hinted at by the stated premises.  (This example illustrates why presenting an argument concerned with historical claims about Jesus in just two brief sentences is IDIOTIC: such arguments are inevitably UNCLEAR.)

Also, note that the UNSTATED premise (D) is presumably being supported by the UNSTATED premise (B):

B. If a mentally normal person who was a follower of Jesus experienced a hallucination of the risen Jesus, there is at least a 60% chance that that person would experience a hallucination of the risen Jesus only that one time. 

Thus:

D. It is NOT the case that some mentally normal people who were followers of Jesus each had at least three hallucinations of the risen Jesus. 

Now that we have uncovered the key UNSTATED premises and their logical relationships with the two stated premises, we can diagram the logical structure of the whole argument constituting Objection #5:

 

      In the next post of this series, I will evaluate this argument.

Defending the Hallucination Theory - Part 18: Objection #4: A Long-Lasting Hallucination

 WHERE WE ARE

Over at The Secular Outpost,  I have written a series of posts about Peter Kreeft's objections to the Hallucination Theory found in Chapter 8 of his Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA).  Kreeft thinks that he can prove that Jesus rose from the dead by refuting four skeptical theories:

• The Conspiracy Theory
• The Hallucination Theory
• The Swoon Theory
• The Myth Theory

Even if Kreeft could refute these four theories, that would NOT prove that Jesus rose from the dead, because there are MANY other skeptical theories besides these four, especially since Kreeft, like other Christian apologists, has a very narrow definition or understanding of what these theories claim.

In any case, Kreeft's attempts to refute these four theories are pathetic.  All of his objections are weak or dubious or logically defective.  So far, I have argued that the first three of Kreeft's 14 objections against the Hallucination Theory FAIL:

It is now time to examine Kreeft's 4th objection against the Hallucination Theory.

OBJECTION #4: A LONG-LASTING HALLUCINATION

Kreeft states his 4th objection against the Hallucination Theory in just two sentences:

Hallucinations usually last a few seconds or minutes; rarely hours.  This one hung around for forty days (Acts 1:3).   (HCA, p.187)

The statement of this argument is, as usual, UNCLEAR.  However, it is easy enough to figure out what Kreeft meant:

1. Hallucinations usually last a few seconds or minutes; rarely hours.

Thus:

A. It is extremely unlikely that hallucinations of Jesus lasted for forty days. 

B. If the Hallucination Theory were true, then hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days.

Therefore:

C. It is extremely unlikely that the Hallucination Theory is true.

PREMISE (B) IS FALSE 

There are at least two serious problems with this argument.  

First of all, premise (B) is FALSE, and so this argument is UNSOUND. 

Someone who believes the Hallucination Theory or who takes this theory seriously is probably a skeptical person.  Skeptics usually do NOT believe that the Gospels and Acts are 100% accurate and reliable historical accounts.  Skeptics usually believe that the Gospels and Acts are UNRELIABLE historical accounts.  So, the fact that the book of Acts claims that followers of Jesus experienced alleged appearances of the risen Jesus for 40 days, does NOT show that this was what actually happened, at least not to a skeptical person who views the Gospels and Acts as UNRELIABLE.  

So, one can accept the Hallucination Theory but reject the claim that various followers of Jesus experienced alleged appearances of the risen Jesus for 40 days.  Thus, the Hallucination Theory does NOT imply that hallucinations of Jesus occurred to various people for a period of 40 days.  Thus, premise (B) is FALSE. 

[NOTE: A possible reply in response to the charge that premise (B) is FALSE is that although premise (B) is strictly speaking FALSE, the argument could be modified to claim that the combination of the Hallucination Theory with the belief that experiences of alleged appearances of Jesus lasted for 40 days does IMPLY that "hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days".  I will argue that this response does not work later in this post, but for now, let's stick to evaluating the argument as stated above.]

THE LOGIC OF THIS ARGUMENT IS INVALID

Second, there is an obvious EQUIVOCATION here on the phrase "hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days", so this argument is also INVALID.

In premise (A) the phrase "hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days" clearly means this:

some particular hallucinations experienced by particular individuals each had a continuous duration of 40 days from the start of a particular hallucination being experienced by a particular individual until the end of that same hallucination by that same individual 

However, it is OBVIOUS that the phrase "hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days" has a different meaning in premise (B):

some particular hallucinations experienced by particular individuals took place at the beginning of a 40-day period of time, and other particular hallucinations experienced by particular individuals took place later on in that 40-day period of time, and some particular hallucinations experienced by particular individuals took place at the end of that 40-day period of time

In premise (B), the phrase "hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days" does NOT imply that ANY hallucination of Jesus had a duration that was longer than a few seconds or a few minutes.

Because the meaning of the key phrase "hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days" is ambiguous, and because the meaning of this phrase CHANGES between premise (A) and premise (B), this argument commits the FALLACY OF EQUIVOCATION, and thus it is logically INVALID.  The shift in the meaning of this key phrase breaks the logical connection between premise (A) and premise (B) which makes the reasoning in this argument illogical.

Because this argument is clearly UNSOUND and INVALID, Kreeft's Objection #4 FAILS.

The obviousness of the defects of this argument is an indication that Kreeft either has very little ability to rationally evaluate arguments or else that he is very intellectually lazy and just doesn't care about the quality of his arguments for the resurrection of Jesus.  This argument is a clear-cut example of the FALLACY OF EQUIVOCATION.  It is clearly and obviously a BAD argument.

A POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF THE ARGUMENT CONSTITUTING OBJECTION #4

One might try to rescue the argument constituting Objection #4 from the charge that premise (B) is FALSE by modifying that premise and adding another premise to the argument.  Here is how the argument constituting Objection #4 could be so modified:

1. Hallucinations usually last a few seconds or minutes; rarely hours.

Thus:

A. It is extremely unlikely that hallucinations of Jesus lasted for forty days.

B1. If the Hallucination Theory were true and it was the case that experiences of alleged appearances of Jesus lasted for 40 days, then hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days.

D. It is the case that experiences of alleged appearances of Jesus lasted for 40 days.

Therefore:

C. It is extremely unlikely that the Hallucination Theory is true.

With this modification of the argument, Kreeft could make a case for the historical claim (D) based on various NT passages, and then he could argue for (B1) as follows:

Someone who accepts the Hallucination Theory could be persuaded by presentation of historical evidence that experiences of alleged appearances of Jesus lasted for 40 days.  If so, then because this person accepts the Hallucination Theory  he or she would have to interpret those experiences of alleged appearances of Jesus to be hallucinations, but in that case he or she must logically conclude that hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days.

The first thing to note about this modified version of Kreeft's argument is that it still includes the ambiguous phrase "hallucinations of Jesus lasted for 40 days" and it still commits the fallacy of EQUIVOCATION, and so it is still an INVALID argument.

Setting aside the BAD reasoning in this modified argument, I would object that premise (B1) is FALSE, and so this modification of Kreeft's argument doesn't get around the problem of being based on a FALSE premise.

There is no possibility of making a solid or persuasive case for the historical claim that some followers of Jesus in the weeks following his crucifixion experienced hallucinations that lasted for 40 days, that is, where a particular individual begins to experience a hallucination of Jesus and where the experiencing of that same hallucination by that same individual continues without a break for a period of 40 days.  

Since there is no hope of making a solid or persuasive for that claim, presumably the historical claim that Kreeft would attempt to support with evidence from the NT would be the claim that various different followers of Jesus had experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus, and that some of these people had this experience at the beginning of a 40-day period, others had this experience later on in the 40-day period, and yet others had this experience at the end of the 40-day period.

Would someone who accepts the Hallucination Theory and who was persuaded of this historical claim be logically forced to conclude that hallucinations of Jesus were experienced by various people over a 40-day period (some at the beginning of the period, some later on, and some at the end of the period)?  I don't think so.     The Hallucination Theory does NOT assert that EVERY experience of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus must be a hallucination.  At most, this theory requires that some early experience(s) of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus were hallucinations and that those early hallucinatory experiences of the risen Jesus were the primary cause of the early Christian belief that Jesus had physically risen from the dead. This is compatible with the claim that various other experiences of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus took place that were NOT hallucinations and that those other experiences did not play a significant role in causing the belief in the resurrection of Jesus to be embraced by the earliest Christians.

It could be the case, for example, that Peter and John had hallucinations of the risen Jesus, and that this experience gave them the conviction that Jesus had physically risen from the dead, and that they began to preach about Jesus being the risen savior of mankind.  After that point, people might have had experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus for a period of 40 days, but those experiences might have been from dreams, or hypnotic trances, or visions, or those might have been cases of mistaken identity, where someone who looks like Jesus is seen and the person who saw them mistakenly believed that they had seen the risen Jesus. The precise nature of those other experiences is NOT relevant to the Hallucination Theory, because those other experiences of alleged appearances of the risen Jesus might not have played a significant role in causing the initial belief the Jesus movement that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

Furthermore, Kreeft's understanding of the Hallucination Theory is clearly too narrow.  In order for his case for the resurrection to have any hope of success, he must interpret the various skeptical theories as broadly as possible, so that they include ALL, or nearly all, logical possibilities.  Otherwise, he leaves many alternative skeptical theories untouched, and his case for the resurrection FAILS.  So, Kreeft must also include other kinds of NON-VERIDICAL EXPERIENCES under the umbrella of the "Hallucination Theory".   

If, for example, Peter had a DREAM about the risen Jesus, and if that dream convinced Peter that Jesus had physically risen from the dead, and if Peter's strong conviction that Jesus physically rose from the dead was the primary cause for this belief being accepted by other followers of Jesus, then it was a DREAM that explains the early Christian belief in the resurrection, NOT a hallucination.  But if a DREAM was the initial cause of this belief, then the Hallucination Theory, understood broadly, would still be true.  

The problem here is that the name of the theory is misleading.  A better name for this theory would be the "Non-Veridical Experiences Theory".  That would encompass the skeptical possibility that some early followers of Jesus had DREAMED of the risen Jesus, and that it was such dream experiences that caused the people in the Jesus movement to accept the belief that Jesus had physically risen from the dead.

Given this broader understanding of the Hallucination Theory, this theory does NOT require that ANY experience of an alleged appearance of the risen Jesus be taken to be a hallucination.  Therefore, a person who accepts the Hallucination Theory, properly understood in this broad sense, can believe that various followers of Jesus had experiences of alleged appearances of Jesus, and that these experiences occurred at different points in time over a period of 40 days, and yet that NONE of those experiences was a hallucination.

So, there are at least two different scenarios that I have described in which premise (B1) would be FALSE.  Since (B1) is making a universal logical claim, those two scenarios work as counterexamples to the universal claim made in (B1) and show that premise (B1) is FALSE.  

Therefore, not only does this modified argument still suffer from the defect of the fallacy of EQUIVOCATION, but it also still suffers from the defect of having a FALSE premise.