WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION OF CRAIG'S CASE?
In Part 3 of this series, my initial analysis of the core argument of Craig's case for the resurrection had the following claim as the conclusion of that argument:
5a. The preferred explanation for Craig's three key historical claims concerning Jesus' final fate ought to be the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
But in Part 4 of this series, I argued that Craig had a stronger and more significant claim in mind that was the actual conclusion of his core argument:
8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
However, the key paragraph that I have been quoting from Craig's book Reasonable Faith is a bit longer than what I have previously quoted, and I now see that the final sentence of that paragraph asserts what is actually the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus. Here are the final sentences of that key paragraph:
The significance of this event is then to be found in the religio-historical context in which it occurred, namely, as the vindication of Jesus' own unparalleled claim to divine authority. I think that the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is such that a well-informed investigator ought to agree that it is more likely than not to have occured. (Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed., p.360)
The ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus is this:
9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.
This is clearly an inference that is based upon what I previously thought was the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case, namely, claim (8).
This does not invalidate my previous analysis and clarification of Craig's core argument; it simply adds one more step to the end of that argument.
THE NEW FINAL INFERENCE OF CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT
With this additional step added to Craig's core argument, the final inference in that argument becomes this:
8. The best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate is the resurrection hypothesis (i.e., God raised Jesus from the dead).
THEREFORE:
9. It is more likely than not that God raised Jesus from the dead.
This is a fairly modest conclusion. Craig is not trying to prove that God raised Jesus from the dead. Craig is not claiming it to be an established fact that God raised Jesus from the dead. He is only trying to show that this claim is somewhat probable. If the probability that God raised Jesus from the dead was merely .51 (i.e., having a 51% chance of being true), then the weak claim asserted by (9) would be true.
Craig is here following in the footsteps of the great Christian philosopher Richard Swinburne, who in his masterpiece The Existence of God[1], argued for this very modest conclusion:
On our total evidence theism [the belief that God exists] is more probable than not. (The Existence of God, 2nd ed., p.342)
Serious scholars and philosophers try not to make claims that are stronger than what they can support with their evidence and arguments.
EVALUATION OF THE NEW FINAL INFERENCE IN CRAIG'S CORE ARGUMENT
My previous criticism of the inference from (5a) to (8) still stands, so Craig has FAILED to provide a good reason to believe that claim (8) is true. One obvious problem with the final sub-argument is that it is based on a dubious premise, namely, claim (8).
What about the inference from (8) to (9)? This is not an instance of a valid form of deductive inference. It is not a modus ponens, nor a modus tollens, nor a disjunctive syllogism, nor is it any other sort of valid inference form.
Does claim (8) logically imply claim (9)? I don't think so, but Craig might think so. He does not explain his understanding of the nature of this inference.
Craig's method of comparing alternative hypotheses does not involve determining specific probabilities for each hypothesis. His method only allows us to make somewhat subjective judgments about the relative "plausability" of various alternative hypotheses. However, it seems reasonable to make some inferences about probability from conclusions about plausibility.
If hypothesis A is more plausible than hypothesis B, then one might reasonably infer that hypothesis A is more likely to be true than hypothesis B. If there were no such connection between plausability and probability, then Craig's method of relying on the comparative plausability of hypotheses would be of questionable significance.
In fact, Craig closely associates the degree of plausibility of an explanation with its degree of probability:
Any historical argument (p.350)
My understanding is that the best explanation for a set of facts X, is the most plausible explanation of set of facts X (when we compare the explanatory excellence of various alternative hypotheses in terms of a specific set of criteria used for evaluating explanatory excellence).
Thus, in order for Craig's resurrection hypothesis (God raised Jesus from the dead) to be the best explanation of the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate, it must be a more plausible explanation than any of the available alternative hypotheses about Jesus' final fate. This in turn implies that the resurrection hypothesis would be more probable than any of the available alternative hypotheses.
The problem I see here is that even if the resurrection hypothesis was more probable or more likely to be true than any of the available alternative hypotheses, it could still be the case that the resurrection hypothesis had a probability of less than .50 (had less than a 50% chance of being true). If I am correct, then claim (8) does not logically imply (9), and the new final inference is a dubious inference.
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THE FINAL INFERENCE
In Reasonable Faith, Craig discusses at least five different hypotheses that are alternatives to the resurrection hypothesis (God raised Jesus from the dead). He does not attempt to assign specific probabilities to any of the five alternative hypotheses. He only attempts to show that each of the skeptical alternatives provides an explanation of the established historical facts (that are relevant to Jesus' final fate) that is less plausible than the explanation provided by the resurrection hypothesis.
I take it that Craig would, on this basis, infer that each of the skeptical alternative hypotheses is less probable, less likely to be true, than the resurrection hypothesis. Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that Craig is correct on both points. Does it follow that the resurrection hypothesis has a probability greater than .50 (that it has a better than 50% chance of being true)? I don't think so.
Consider the following possible scenario:
- The probability of the Conspiracy Hypothesis being true is 15%.
- The probability of the Apparent Death Hypothesis being true is 10%.
- The probability of the Wrong Tomb Hypothesis being true is 15%.
- The probability of the Displaced Body Hypothesis being true is 15%.
- The probability of the Hallucination Hypothesis being true is 20%.
- The probability of the Resurrection Hypothesis being true is 25%.
If these probabilities were true and correct, and if we assume that relative probability corresponds with relative plausibility, then it would be the case that the Resurrection Hypothesis not only has a higher probability than any of the five skeptical hypotheses, but that it also has a greater plausibility than any of the five skeptical hypotheses, as an explanation for the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate.
Therefore, if Craig's methodology worked properly, on this scenario we would conclude that the Resurrection Hypothesis was the best explanation for the established historical facts that are relevant to Jesus' final fate. That is to say, on the above scenario, claim (8) would be true.
However, on this scenario, claim (9) would be FALSE, because on this scenario, the probability that the Resurrection Hypothesis is true would be .25 (it would have a 25% chance of being true). That is a significantly lower probability than .50. So, not only would claim (9) be FALSE on this scenario, but it wouldn't even be close to being true.
Therefore, it seems clear that claim (8) does NOT logically imply the ultimate conclusion of Craig's case for the resurrection of Jesus. Even if claim (8) were true, that would NOT show that claim (9) was true.
Furthermore, since the above imagined scenario is somewhat realistic, is plausible on its face, and since on that scenario claim (9) was not merely false, but was not even close to being true, premise (8) to (9) does not appear to even provide significant inductive support for (9). This inference appears to be a weak and dubious inference.
END NOTES
1. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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